Zimbabweland in 2013

Over the Xmas and New Year break, why not catch up with the blogs you missed (as I am taking a break and not writing any new ones until the new year….!)? Below is a listing of the 20 most viewed blogs that were published this year. They reflect the tumultuous political events of constitution making and elections, but also the on-going debates about the way forward for agriculture, land and rural development.

You can also read many of them, along with some new essays and many others, both older and recent, in the new 224 page book, Debating Zimbabwe’s Land Reform. As mentioned last week, it’s now out and is available at a very reasonable price through Amazon.

The top 20 for this year is below (of course biased by the fact that those posted in January have had rather longer to accumulate views). Happy reading! Do please add constructive comments, as it’s always good to get reactions on the blog, and don’t forget to sign up for an alert each time a blog is posted.

1	Difficult lessons from Zimbabwe that some South Africans just don’t want to hear
2	Food crisis in Zimbabwe: 2.2 million at risk. But where do the figures come from, and what do they mean?
3	Policies for land, agriculture and rural development: some suggestions for Zimbabwe
4	Guest Blog: Land Reform in Zimbabwe Revisited: Reflections from a book launch in London
5	The new farm workers: Changing agrarian labour dynamics following land reform in Zimbabwe
6	What role for large-scale commercial agriculture in post-land reform Zimbabwe: Africa’s experience of alternative   models
7	Agrarian change, rural poverty and land reform: South Africa’s experience
8	Class, politics and land reform in Zimbabwe
9	Beyond White Settler Capitalism: Zimbabwe’s Agrarian Reform
10	The Unbearable Whiteness of Being. Reflections on white farming in Zimbabwe
11	Growth in jeopardy? Reflections on Zimbabwe’s 2013 budget statement
12	Tractors, power and development. Mechanising Zimbabwean agriculture
13	Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector goes from ‘bread basket to basket case’? Or is it (again) a bit more complicated?
14	Transforming Zimbabwe’s agrarian economy: why smallholder farming is important
15	The sweet smell of success: the revival of Zimbabwe’s sugar industry
16	When is research ‘really authoritative’? Challenges of evidence, authorship and positionality in research on Zimbabwe’s land reform
17	Zimbabwe’s elections 2013: more confusion, more uncertainty
18	The MDC-T’s Agenda for Real Transformation (ART): why the land and agriculture sections need more thought
19	Zimbabwe has a new Constitution, but disputes over the land provisions continue
20	Old powers and new powers: agriculture and investment in Africa This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

New book: Debating Zimbabwe’s Land Reform

Blog readers may be interested in the recently published book Debating Zimbabwe’s Land Reform. It’s out now in a low-cost version and available through Amazon.

Its 60 chapters are a compilation of some of the blogs that have been published on Zimbabweland in the last few years. They are clustered around a series of themes, each introduced with a new introductory essay. The themes are agricultural and livestock production, the economy, political dimensions, land, livelihoods and rural development, aid and development, comparative lessons and researching land and agrarian.

This blog has gathered quite a following. Not everyone agrees with what is written, but it certainly has helped catalyse debate and is a forum for sharing new research, from our on-going studies in Masvingo, but also from others’ work elsewhere in the country.

Readers come from Zimbabwe, the UK, South Africa, the US and around 100 other countries, with the blog getting around 3000 views per month. However most of the blog readers are people who are not living in our study areas. Internet connectivity is a constraint to joining the debate. The main reason therefore for producing a ‘hard copy’ version of the blog was to share it with our research participants in the resettlement areas of Masvingo and beyond.

In the last few weeks I have been in Zimbabwe and we handed out some copies of the new book to those we have been working with over the last 13 years. Previous publications have been read, shared and discussed through reading circles and simply by passing around. I hope this book will join the other material in galvanising continued discussion on the challenges and consequences of land reform in Zimbabwe.

So, along with Mr Chidangure of Uswaushava A1 resettlement, you too can get yourself a copy at a very reasonable price for 234 pages…. and a perfect addition to your Christmas shopping list!

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Property rights and development: Lessons for Zimbabwe

Earlier this year I was involved in a review of the literature on the relationships between property rights and development commissioned by DFID and led by Future Agricultures partners, the Overseas Development Institute, and supported by the FAC land theme. The focus relates to an important and long-running debate in Zimbabwe about what to do about land tenure in both rural and urban areas.

The review was prompted by a concern by DFID to underpin with solid evidence the claims made in the UK government’s narrative about international development, known as the ‘golden thread’. This emphasises secure property rights as a key element in promoting economic growth and development. The British Prime Minister David Cameron states: “A genuine golden thread would tie together economic, social and political progress in countries the world over… Only then will people escape the fear of seeing their homes bulldozed just because they don’t have property rights.” Such rights would be underpinned by mapping and formal cadastre systems “…using satellite photos to map plots of land that will facilitate the creation of property rights”.

This is a familiar argument, resonant of that made by Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto who claimed that many resources in the developing world are ‘dead capital’, and so underutilised because private property rights have not be assigned. Only through titling programmes, he argued, would dead capital be transformed economic prosperity be realised. While extensively critiqued, this argument has captured the imagination of many policymakers in Africa, including in Zimbabwe where the ‘gold standard’ of private freehold tenure is often held up as the approach to follow.

The reviews, focusing on the post-2000 literature on Africa, looked at the broad relationship between property rights and economic growth, as well as specific areas, including rural and urban contexts, as well as the particular case of water rights. In addition, questions of empowerment were addressed. Just as many similar studies before showed that the evidence for a tight relationship between private property rights and economic growth and development is equivocal. Some studies show a positive relationship, others the opposite. And of course many other factors impinge. This is perhaps especially so for the relationship in rural areas, and linked to rights over land.

For those of us who have been immersed in this debate for years, particularly in Africa, this is no surprise. The 1980s for example saw a flurry of studies that looked at the benefits and costs of land titling, and the consequences for investment, including many by the World Bank. These showed again and again that, while improving security of tenure is essential, this does not have to be achieved through asserting private property rights, and indeed other forms of tenure, including common property, but also a range of registration systems can achieve the same end. The costs of cadastres and formal land titling systems are prohibitive, and can generate conflicts, and the processes of exclusion that occur can have significant negative effects. This is the conclusion drawn by many for Zimbabwe, despite the on-going, ideologically-driven debates.

A recent World Bank study looking at urban and peri-urban land in Burkina Faso and Mali came to much the same conclusion. Elsewhere in Africa, Rwanda has gained prominence as a case where land titling works, but there are also knock-on consequences especially for the poor and marginal of such efforts. In Ethiopia, a country with similarly dense populations in the Highlands, more informal registration systems seem to deliver good results.

The review looked at all these cases, and many more. The review was somewhat hampered, as it was obliged to follow a rather odd DFID-prescribed methodology (then in draft, but now formalised as a practice paper – which is admittedly an improvement on the draft) that had the effect of excluding large parts of the literature. This stipulated that ‘evidence’ as only in refereed journal articles, and had to be assessed in terms of empirically evaluated quantitative impacts of a property-growth relationship. This ‘evidence’ in the guidance is therefore privileged over other sources in terms of assessments of evidence ‘quality’ and ‘reliability. This limited the scope, and introduced particular biases of discipline and case study. The work of economists, and material from Ethiopia was thus over-represented and, according to the final report, “as a result, perspectives from some disciplines are not fully represented, notably history, politics, anthropology, cultural studies and sociology”. Given the subject area, rather a shame to say the least!

The focus on journal articles in particular databases also meant that large chunks of the literature were excluded, including all the fantastic books on the subject, both empirical cases and historical overviews, published over the years, not to mention the important project-based and grey material. To undertake a review on land, property and development in Africa and not include the key works of Sara Berry, Louise Fortmann, Pauline Peters, Elinor Ostrom and others was, to me and other advisors on the project, plain bizarre. Fortunately some flexibility was allowed and some elements of these key foundational insights were in the end included, but not without some difficulty, and some serious questioning of the draft DFID guidance.

Despite all these battles over the nature of evidence, the key findings of the rural review were fairly clear. It notes: “Overall, the evidence reviewed does not fully support the expected outcomes of the conventional economic view on the link between stronger property rights and investment gains”. In particular (from the executive summary):

• “While present in some cases, links between reduced risk of expropriation and greater application of short and long term investments are not universal or unambiguously clear. There are numerous constraints preventing this causal link occurring, and there is some evidence of a reverse causal relationship: in some cases a greater risk of expropriation encourages certain types of investments”
•  “The link between strengthening of tenure and increased access to credit is particularly weak, due to numerous other factors which prevent land from being successfully collateralised. These include issues related to credit supply, as well as borrowers’ willingness to mortgage their major asset, land”.
•  “The evidence on the hypothesis that active land markets result from stronger property rights is mixed. There is some evidence which points to land markets leading to more efficient outcomes where these have not existed before (Ethiopia) but in the majority of cases, (informal) land markets are active under customary systems and there is little evidence to indicate that these are inefficient”
•  “Whether titling or other tenure strengthening initiatives promise more benefits to women compared to existing tenure arrangements is highly context specific and depends on processes under which changes in tenure occur and are managed. The extent to which women’s greater access to land leads to higher agricultural production also does not appear to be supported by the literature”

No surprises there. What is perhaps more surprising is the wider persistence of the narrative about the role of private property, and especially titling, in economic development, including in Zimbabwe. This, as with the UK’s golden thread, is driven more by ideological commitment than an appreciation of the facts on the ground. Thus, with the benefit of evidence, the firm assertions of the golden thread narrative look distinctly frayed. Given its commitment to evidence-based policy, we will have to see if the statements of UK government officials, from the PM down, will be tempered by the results of its own review. I am not holding my breath. Equally in Zimbabwe, let’s hope that evidence prevails over assumption and prior bias in the on-going, fraught debate about property rights and land tenure reform.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Rural cattle marketing in Zimbabwe

As a result of the changes in the beef value chain, discussed in previous blogs, rural cattle marketing has been transformed in recent years. No longer are abbatoirs able to source animals in large numbers from single ranches, now they must purchase from multiple sources. These include council run sales pens and from networks of cattle buyers employed on contract the abbatoir or from individual cattle buyers. These are quite different arrangements, with contrasting pros and cons.

The main Masvingo based abbatoirs, notably Montana and Carswell, but also some butcheries employ buyers scattered across rural areas, working under area coordinators. When the buyer has sufficient animals in an area, they will call the abbatoir who will send a truck. Usually around 35 animals are required for a trip. Cash is then paid on receipt on the basis of estimated weights. No money is paid for the ‘fifth quarter’ (head, feet, offal etc.), and the transport is presented as ‘free’. For producers unable to trek their animals to an abbatoir (essentially Masvingo or Chiredzi) and pay for feed, transport and so on, this arrangement works well. Prices are not the highest, and some complain that weight estimates are not accurate, but this is one way of getting a reasonable deal. For more immediate sales, however, especially in times of urgency, for example if funeral costs have to be covered, other options may have to looked for, including selling to individual buyers and at council auctions.

Mr Z is an individual cattle buyer based in Chikombedzi. He has a number of businesses including a general store, but in recent years he has taken up cattle buying across the area. He complains that this is not so profitable now. He cites several reasons. Buying from council sales pens has, he complains, has become prohibitive because of the levies they charge. “This is now 10.5% on the sale price of every beast. For nothing!”, he exclaims. He now prefers to buy from individuals, but this means moving door to door and so transport becomes a significant costs. Also, disease outbreaks in an area can wipe out business at stroke as all movement is prevented by the veterinary department. This happened recently with foot-and-mouth disease. This, he explains, is a common disease, with regular outbreaks, but it affects trade, but not the cattle as they are used to it.  He used to sell on to large companies like Montana or Bulawayo Grills, but he says they don’t offer good prices, and rip off the cattle buyer. He prefers to transport animals to Chiredzi himself and sell to butcheries directly. Finally he says he has to pay fees to Chiredzi district council every few months to have a licence to buy. “What do they give me in return?” he asks.

Mr V has been a buyer in the area for years. He used to have a farm, but this was taken in land reform. Now he concentrates on cattle buying. He used to attend the public auctions, but because of fees and attempts by officials to extract bribes he only goes along to watch, and check out the prices. Instead he creates his own buying points and alerts people in the area through his contacts, usually village headmen, who he all knows. He has points all over the Chikombedzi and Sengwe area. Mr V employs someone to weigh animals using a belt, and he pays on account, paying farmers once the animal is sold on. He prefers this as he does not want to have thousands of dollars on him on buying day.  Since he is able to avoid the council levy his prices are reasonable, and he is well trusted in the area. He involves the police and veterinary department too, and picks them up and feeds them on a buying day. If someone refuses his price, he says” Go and sell at the formal market where the council takes a big cut, and see what the price is there!”.  He employs drovers to move cattle from the buying point to an abbatoir or to a holding place which he may rent.  Drovers are usually paid $5 per day, for trekking cattle over 10km or so. For longer distances he uses trucks.

Despite the proliferation of informal marketing, the council auctions still go ahead. In Chikombedzi they are a big event, attracting many others selling all sorts of wares at the market. When an animal is sold at the market, a fee is levied, but also the owner must present his/her stock card to have the sale registered by the police and the veterinary department. Both charge fees, around $2 and $10 respectively. However, very often, informal arrangements are struck. Bribes are sometimes paid to avoid registration and permits, and buyers and sellers can informally agree to settle outside the formal auction to avoid the council levy. The council official can be paid off too, and no receipts are logged.

While there is some competition in the cattle market, the levy system on council run auctions and the (semi)illegal nature of other sales operations means that overall sales levels are depressed, and producers and consumers do not necessarily get the best deal. A recent USAID study showed how changing the levy system could result in a massive boost of supply through formal networks, according to an economic model. But it is not just the costs of formal marketing. Lack of market knowledge is another issue, as farmers do not necessarily know the real price of an animal, as auctions are rare, and not competitive. Sometimes distress sales mean that much lower prices are gained, as animals are sold on at knock-down prices just to get the cash.

Market engagement needs more active organisation on the part of producers. As the manager of a leading abbatoir in Masvingo put it: “Rural people need to get together. If they could get together 200 to 300 cattle at one point, they could get really worthwhile prices”.  As small herds scattered across the rural areas are now the main suppliers of beef nationally, new ways of organising marketing are needed. The high tax formal system is clearly not effective, and private buying may be undermining producer prices through lack of competition. If Zimbabwe’s meat eaters are to continue to get good, cheap meat, a rethink is clearly required.

For more on wider debates about trade, see the discussion in the comments section on the Retail Revolutions blog in this series.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Abbatoirs and the Zimbabwe meat trade

Continuing the blog series on meat and livestock, this week I am going to focus on abbatoirs and the meat trade, again drawing on our work in Masvingo. Just as we have seen with the retail and production ends of the value chain, the ‘middlemen’ who source animals, slaughter then and supply butcheries have also been changing.

In the past the Masvingo trade was dominated by a narrow group of abbatoirs – essentially Carswell and Montana, together with the CSC (Cold Storage Company). They were organised around an external trade, mostly to Harare. With the CSC now effectively defunct, the big two remain, and continue to have a healthy trade in the province. Still around 90% of their meat ends up in Harare, although Montana has a number of shops and butcheries elsewhere. Both have networks of buyers who work across the rural areas, sourcing animals which are then transported to the Masvingo-based abbatoirs. They both rent farms near town to act as holding and fattening areas, so as to assure even supplies and higher value. Several thousand head are held on farms near Masvingo at any one time, involving paying grazing fees of $3-5 per beast per month. With the decline in beef production in the Highveld following land reform, assuring supplies from Masvingo is essential.

Local producers however complain about the prices at these two abbatoirs, plus the fact neither pay for the ‘fifth quarter’ (offal etc.), yet this is sold on. In recent years some other abbatoirs have sprung up serving a different market. In Masvingo there are currently three, each reflecting differences in the customer base.

Kismet is linked to a farm and so has direct access to animals. In addition the owners buy at auctions in Mwenezi, Bikita and elsewhere. They have restaurant and butchery in town, and so have a fairly well organised and vertically integrated business. They offer service slaughter, but most people currently prefer Gonyohori abbatoir. Farmers come to abbatoir for service slaughter, and the abbatoir has very good links with butcheries in town. Mr Machingambi says: “I link producers and buyers at this abbatoir”. Although there is no refrigerator, butchers know when meat is available and around 5 beasts are slaughtered each day. Nearly all the meat is economy grade. As Mrs Foroma explained “Meat is meat” in the market she supplies to, and Gonyohori supplies is efficiently and complying with safety standards. The only other abbatoir, Tafira, has gone downhill recently, and used to be the favoured place for service slaughter. The links with the butchery and restaurant trade are not so well developed, although on relative has a butchery in Zvishavane.

The other option is to buy from ‘under the tree’ pole slaughtering sites. Most butcheries do not prefer this because of the health risks, but some argue that as long as the meat is fresh, it is fine, and much cheaper. A number of people operate such sites, although they are constantly being closed down by the municipal health authorities.

Another option is to buy from meat traders who purchase animals, have it slaughtered and sell it on. Again there are complaints about health standards, but the supply is regular and efficient. Mr C explained his business: “I entered the business of meat trading through bartering scotch carts for oxen. I make good carts, and there is a demand. I now buy cattle from those who urgently need to sell” He sources from Mushandike and surrounding areas, and moves them in his 1.5 tonne truck. He rents space in a shop and distributes to butcheries after slaughter. “I regularly supply butcheries. I’m now a petrol attendant, so everyone knows where to find me”, he explained.

Others have entered the trade, finding it lucrative. A group of veterinarians in the district office for example buy up heifers and barter them for oxen or cows who no longer produce milk. They leave heifers with local farmers they trust and exchange across the district. They can also buy for cash. Animals are then slaughtered in town either for cash, or as part of advance deals with butcheries and restaurants. The syndicate buys up to 5-6 cattle per month, and given their expert knowledge and access to farmers they make a good profit to supplement their meagre government salaries.

Finally, there are ‘beef committees’ operating across the rural areas where single animals are bought by a group, usually of civil servants resident in the rural areas. Teachers, police, extension workers and others may be members. This allows a supply of meat which by-passes butcheries and supermarkets, allowing premium deals to be struck.

All such transactions are expected to be regulated, often by multiple authorities. This can sometimes cause confusion and cost. The police have to be involved for any transport of meat or live animals, as a way of preventing stock theft. The veterinary department too must provide certificates for movement, to avoid disease spread. And slaughter places are supposed to be regulated by the health authorities, particularly in urban, municipal areas. Farmers, traders, butchers and abbatoir owners complain that this plethora of regulations, and the involvement of so many different people can be a problem. If someone arrives late or not at all a deal may be lost, or meat may be left unrefrigerated for a long time. Sometimes transport is provided to the relevant people to facilitate the process, but the right people have to turn up with the right forms at the right time. Sometimes too the process is smoothed by a bribe or a gift, and increasingly this has become the pattern. But this too can slow down transactions as officials bid for a better level of compensation.

The beef value chain is certainly complex and diverse with multiple different actors at each stage. But it does seem to work: cheap, safe meat is provided to the customers that want it, and quite a number of people get gainful employment in the process. But is the current, often highly informal, system efficient and effective? Too often we deem anything informal as in need of reform, with a need to formalise, structure and regulate. Yet this system is responsive to diverse demands, and apparently flexible to changing supply situations. Indeed, the main thing that seems to slow things down, and add sometimes unnecessary cost is the complex system of regulation, now associated with bribes and payments. While such regulations and controls are clearly necessary, a more streamlined system is clearly needed to improve returns and value.

As next week’s blog shows, this is even more important in the context of rural livestock marketing.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Retail revolutions: the rise and rise of butcheries and informal food selling in Zimbabwe

In last week’s blog I discussed the new beef production systems supplying meat to consumers in Masvingo province and beyond. A radically reconfigured pattern of land use and ownership has resulted in diverse new value chains. This has had effects across the chain, including in the retail sector.

In our book, and a paper we wrote in 2008, we discussed the situation in the midst of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. The picture was one of informal markets, illegal trade and the collapse of the mainstream retail sector. What has happened since 2009 and the stabilisation of the economy and the introduction of a multicurrency environment?

Certainly the growth of butcheries has continued, despite challenges. In a survey in 2006-07 we counted 31 butcheries in Masvingo town (20 in Mucheke township alone) and 9 in Ngundu. All businesses suffered badly at the peak of the economic crisis, and many closed in 2008. However since 2009, they have reopened. In 2013 the number of registered butcheries in Masvingo stood at 32 (14 in town, including 8 supermarkets, with a further 18 in the townships). In 2010-11 there were also 13 in Ngundu and 21  in Chiredzi (5 in town, 12 in Tshovani and 4 in Garage). Unlike in 2006, supermarkets are stocking beef, but only the more premium ‘supergrade’ cuts. In Masvingo, for example, OK and TM source from the larger abbatoirs, such as Carswell and Montana who can supply high quality meat regularly. During the economic crisis they would source from wherever, including meat traders, but, as TM’s meat buyer explained, the quality and reliability was poor, and enjoying a vibrant trade. Today meat traders supply other butcheries who undercut the supermarkets in terms of price. Some outlets are directly linked to abbatoirs, and they can cut costs even further.

Clearly demand is buoyant, despite economic difficulties. While red meat consumption has declined according to official statistics, and there has been a switch to pork, chicken and fish, beef remains people’s favoured meat. But with the change in production system, there is a different pattern and quality of supply. Instead of the top cuts, the lower quality ‘nyama’ is more commonly sold, and this can still be marketed at reasonable prices.  In addition to registered butcheries there are number of ‘mobile’ illegal operations. Masvingo’s Chief Health Officer, Mr Munganasa explained they have a ‘running battle’ with such vendors who sell cheap, imported South African chicken and beef from freezer boxes. A leading local butcher, Mrs Foroma, complained: “We are losing business from these vendors. We pay our rent, and comply with the regulations, but they  undercut us. They become very active in the evening after the municipal authority workers knock off. They use illegal ‘under the tree’ slaughter and sell to food sellers”.  But illegal operators say there plenty of business: “there is room enough for everyone”, one argued.

In order to increase profits, and compete with the multiple independent vendors, many butcheries also have a food selling business, sometimes operated as a franchise. For example Hungoidza butchery at Ngundu established a food outlet in 2000 which has continued as a thriving business, relying on truckers who stop on their way to and from Beitbridge. The butchery makes biltong which they buy, and also has a braai (barbecue). “There is always a brisk trade”, the owner explained.

Also with local slaughter arrangements, linked to butcheries, there has been a growth in sales of ‘fifth quarter’ products (offal, head, feet etc.), including sales to small restaurants and street sellers of food. Take Stanford Maringo. He is in his early thirties and comes from Zaka. He got a job about 10 years ago at Chakona’s butchery in Masvingo. He was a meat cutter and cattle buyer. But the pay was poor and he wanted to have his own business. In the end after trying out vegetable selling in the market, he struck a deal with the  butchery owner that he would continue cutting meat, but could use the machine for slicing ‘mazondo‘, and he could put up a braai stand (barbecue) outside the shop. He sells mazondo to the customers at the next door bar, and has a roaring trade. He also generates good business for the butchery, buying about 80 cows’ feet a week, and selling on uncooked but sliced mazondo to other food sellers and restaurants.  Stanford explains his plans:

My business is doing well. I send money home each month to my relatives in Zaka. Last month I bought a digital camera, and I will start a photo business too. My real, long term plan is become a cattle buyer, and enter meat retailing with my own shop. I also married my sweetheart, thanks to the proceeds from selling mazondo. She is also a butchery employee, but wants to start a hair salon. My mazondo business is going to provide the seed funds for this.

So, from selling cattle feet or tripe on the street, big and better things can happen.  The same applies to the food sellers in Chikombedzi market. This is a massive weekly market centred on the cattle trade. Each week hundreds of animals are exchanged, and thousands of people from all around congregate. A number of food selling outlets have sprung up to serve the customers.  The market is tightly regulated however. The local council charges vendors for their stands, and the Ministry of Health also requires certificates, banning those who are HIV positive from selling food. This all adds to the costs, but it is still profitable.

Nyariwe Ngudu has a stall, and she hires someone each month over the two days of the market to fetch water, wash plates and help her with the cooking. She sells pork from her own farm, but also buys in other meat to serve with sadza (mealie meal porridge). Betty Madondo focuses on cooking relish on market days. She has a mix: some goat meat, but also chicken as those coming from town prefer chicken, she says. Others get game meat and fish poached from the park, but the game scouts are always around at the market and demand bribes for selling.  Although she doesn’t deal in game meat, she still has to pay bribes to the council workers and health officials, as the regulations are so strict. She cooks it in the evening before the market, and the food vendors come and buy from her, who sell on when the buses and trucks arrive for the market.

“There are so many people who come to the market”, Betty explains. “It’s great business, and they all want meat relish”. Although this is an intermittent business, with the market happening only once a month she gets a good profit in a few days, She also sometimes travels to other markets in the area to make up her income. She explains her business model: “When I get cash from relish sales, I buy sandals at the market. I then exchange these for goats, chickens, occasionally pigs, in the villages before the next market”.

Meat retailing has been transformed in recent years, as has the whole meat value chain. All these new enterprises are across the chain are connected, and have links to the land reform programme. From the new farms come the livestock, providing the business for the cattle traders, butcheries, abbatoirs and pole slaughterers. Low paid government workers also take a cut, deploying ‘regulations’ strategically, taking fines or bribes. And from there, food sellers, restaurant owners and others can make a living, providing new opportunities to build, expand and extend their livelihood activities.

The current situation represents a highly differentiated scene with room for diverse enterprises fitting different market niches. As South African and local capital reinvests in the Zimbabwean retail sector, will this diversified, employment and livelihood generating sector remain, or will the longer term picture be one of consolidation in a few big players, as has happened in so many other places, with the smaller operators squeezed out? Hopefully policy and consumer choice will mean that the more diverse pattern that has arisen will continue to thrive.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

 

 

Beef value chains in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe

There has been a lot of talk recently about reviving the beef sector. The donors are commissioning consultancy after consultancy. But most fail to look at the reality on the ground, instead harking back to a model of the past. As discussed in an earlier blog, I believe that this is missing the point. The past will not return, nor should it. The days of the heavily subsidised large scale commercial ranching sector are gone. Instead, there are multiple, smaller producers, with offtake coming often from multiple use herds in A1 and communal areas. In addition there are the new beef producers who link small and medium scale production on A2 farms with new value chains.

In the next few weeks, it is this group of producers, and their inter-linkages, that I want to focus on in a series of blogs. This is something we have been investigating as part of a project on ‘space, markets and employment’, and the implications of new economic linkages for local economies, with one of our cases being beef value chains in Masvingo province. Yet this new dynamic of cattle production has been almost completely forgotten in the current discussions, yet such producers perhaps the potential core of a new commercial beef sector. This week, let me illustrate my point with a series of short case studies drawn from our on-going work in Masvingo province.

Case 1: Mr OM has an A2 farm north of Masvingo of around 250 ha. He runs around 60 cattle there, which are regularly slaughtered. He also milks the cows and sells soured milk locally, and even has plans for a dairy on the farm. He has a truck which can transport live animals for slaughter at the abbatoirs in town. He also owns a small supermarket in town, which now has a thriving butchery section, supplied by his farm. When his own supply is short, or animals are in poor condition on his farm, he sends buyers out to the communal and resettlement areas near his farm to purchase more to make the trip to town worthwhile. He also buys from local abbatoirs. The supermarket was established some years ago when he was working in government and then the NGO sector. During the economic crisis it was not making any money, and it was closed for some time. But since 2009 and dollarization business has been booming. Demand for beef remains high, and he can undercut the main supermarkets (OK and TM), by strategic pricing, particularly of the lower quality cuts. He employs labourers on his farm, as well as at the supermarket, and buyers work on contract. His relatives act as farm managers and oversee the shop.

Case 2. Mrs M acquired A2 ranches in the lowveld during land reform. They also own a butchery and local store in Ngundu. Today the two enterprises are connected, with cattle being brought to the butchery for slaughter and sale from the ranches. They also have a meat supply contract with the local mission which provides a regular demand. The main challenge is transport as the farms are several hundred kilometres away along appalling roads. Sometimes they make arrangements with the town abbatoirs to bring their livestock for slaughter in their own trucks, allowing a greater number to be transported at a time. The herds are gradually being stocked at the two plots, and since there is plenty of grazing they believe that greater numbers can be held, despite the dry conditions. Check out the video, where Mrs M explains how all this works, and her plans for the future.

Case 3: A local family business, into retail, restaurants, transport and a range of other activities in Masvingo, rented the essentially unused CSC abbatoir as part of a new vertically integrated local ranching business. This was short-lived however, as the local deal with CSC was not approved. They switched instead to other local abbatoirs for slaughter. They have combined their own A2 farm with a number of others which are now leased, allowing them to run some 450 head of cattle across 3-4 farms. The other farms had been acquired by local elites during land reform, but were not being fully utilised, and spare grazing was available for leasing. They now have a network of farms supplying beef across the province at outlets they own in Masvingo, Chiredzi, Bikita, Mashava and so on. Their butcheries remain good business, but they are now branching out into a restaurant business in Masvingo town.

Case 4: Lease grazing is also at the centre of another business, run by a white farmer whose family used own over 10000 ha in the province across multiple properties, including unused CSC ranches. These days he only has one farm, which is subdivided which is far too small to keep his cattle on. Instead, he leases grazing from new A2 plot holders. At the peak around 3000 head were grazed in this way across a dozen properties. These are however scattered, and managing these lease arrangements and maintaining fences etc. is a major headache. While he kept this going for around 10 years, in the end he decided the costs of managing such an arrangement were too much. Instead he focuses on the purchase, sale and marketing of stock from a variety of sources, including communal and resettlement areas. Cattle are purchased at auctions and then slaughtered at Montana and Carswell abbatoirs in Masvingo, with sales to town supermarkets, as well as school contracts. Occasional leasing is required, but he no longer maintains such a network of farms, and has many fewer cattle of his own.

Case 5: Mr RM says that “land reform unlocked grazing potential and gave me the opportunity move more cattle from distant areas and lease graze then in nearby resettlement areas like Beza and Kenilworth” He also leases CSC land and Mushandike ranch. He breeds Brahman bulls with indigenous females which he says is ideal for this area. Around 50 cattle are sold per month, nearly all to Montana Meats in Masvingo. Their prices are not the best, but they pay immediately, he says. Two years ago he established a restaurant in town. At the restaurant 1kg of meat can yield $10, so $2000 from a dressed animal of 200kg, instead of $700 by selling it at $3.50/kg (late 2010 prices). The restaurant takes around 2 beasts a week. “While there is stiff competition in the restaurant business in Masvingo, it’s still a good option compared to just meat selling”, he explains.

Case 6. Mr D used to own plenty of land in the lowveld of Zimbabwe around Mateke hills, and had a huge herd of good quality Brahman cattle. When land reform came he diversified his business with connections over the border in Mozambique. He established a camp over the border, and employed people there to create small settlement and large holding pens. He illegally drove cattle across the border, paying bribes to the Zimbabwean and Mozambican officials. On a visit during 2010 there were over 3000 cattle being held at Bazani camp. He also has acquired land for holding pens near Maputo where the cattle are transported for slaughter and sale. Transport is by train or by truck. Some animals are sold locally at the bazaars along the border which thrive on illegal trade with Zimbabwe and South Africa. Animals are still transported across the border, but he is working on a plan to develop the ranch business in Mozambique, where land is plentiful

These cases show that the cattle and beef business is thriving in Masvingo province, but not in the ways it did before. The CSC abbatoir is effectively defunct, a massive white elephant created on the back of subsidies to white farming in the 1970s. Instead smaller abbatoirs are thriving, along with informal pole slaughter linked to butcheries. New value chains are being created, no longer based on massive individually owned ranching operations. Instead, with smaller farm sizes, there is a need to aggregate from multiple farms. In this way benefits are more widely shared, and more people become involved in the market. Links to the big retailers still exist, such as the large supermarkets in Masvingo, but increasingly it is smaller operations, sometimes linked to new farm operations. The new beef entrepreneurs are not poor –they require capital, transport and connections, and are beneficiaries (often from elite circles) of the A2 farm allocations. Former white ranchers are also engaged, through lease grazing, cross-border trade and purchase and selling operations. But again their businesses have transformed. All are generating business and employment, and linking communal and other resettlement farmers into new market networks.

If the consultants employed by the aid agencies want to get to grips with the new beef economy and build practical solutions and new policies on what is happening rather than some perception of what ought to be the case, they need to take a trip to Masvingo. And of course, as already hinted at, it is not just the production side that has changed, but also the pattern of meat retailing, and cattle purchasing. In the next few weeks, the blog will look at the growth of butcheries and the changes in the retail sector, as well as the role of abbatoirs and the challenges and opportunities of local cattle marketing.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Britain and Africa: confronting the Zimbabwe question

Last week my boss, Lawrence Haddad, asked me to write a guest blog for Development Horizons. He had read Richard Dowden’s piece in Prospect magazine, and wanted to know my views. The blog I wrote, subsequently picked up by African Arguments, All Africa, the Zimbabwe Mirror and various other websites, is below.

Britain and Africa: confronting the Zimbabwe question

Britain’s relationship with Africa has always been a tricky one; and this is particularly so for a former settler colony like Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe’s recent win in the contested election in Zimbabwe has been seen by some as a victory for independent, sovereign Africa over the former colonial power and its imperial ambitions. As Richard Dowden commented in a recent issue of Prospect Magazine, this was “the biggest defeat for the United Kingdom’s policy in Africa in 60 years”.

In his recent speeches, Mugabe has not been able to constrain his glee. The deep animosity that developed between Zimbabwe and Tony Blair in particular is still a recurrent refrain. Britain has misjudged its diplomatic relationships with Zimbabwe many times, but the most extreme incident was Clare Short’s ill-judged letter in 1997 arguing that Britain had no special responsibility for the land issue, and Short’s Irish ancestry showed that she was not on the side of the coloniser. This of course infuriated Mugabe and many others. As nationalist leaders who fought a liberation war against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia regime, the denial of responsibility for colonialism was outrageous.

Yet today Britain is a declining power, with decreasing economic and political clout. Zimbabwe, as other African states, has turned to others for support, where the baggage of colonialism and the strings of aid and investment conditionality do not apply. Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy focuses on China, but also Malaysia, India and others. Chinese investments in Zimbabwe have accelerated, particularly in the period from 2000 when Western nations boycotted the country, and investment and credit lines were curtailed, due to Western reaction to Zimbabwe’s radical land reform.

The land reform saw a major restructuring of the agricultural sector and the wider economy. A transfer of nearly 10 million hectares benefitted over 170,000 households, around a million people. But at the same time it removed 4000 mostly white farmers from their land, and considerable numbers of farm workers lost their jobs. The consequences have been far-reaching, as we outlined in our book, and debates continue about the pros and cons, means and ends.

The sanctions imposed by the West were aimed at punishing the Mugabe regime, and were particularly focused on the President himself and his immediate coterie. The withdrawal of Western capital and credit had an even bigger impact, and helped precipitate a collapse in the economy. From 2009, and the establishment of a unity government with the opposition, the economy recovered to some extent, especially following the abandonment of the local currency. This put an end to hyperinflation that had increased in some estimates to 230 million percent, and encouraged investment again.

In the agricultural sector, tobacco and cotton production boomed. Chinese and Indian companies in particular have been important players. For example, the Chinese company Tian Ze has contracting arrangements with over 250 farms, mostly in the new resettlement areas. Smallholder farmers who gained land through the reform are now the major producers of such cash crops, and contribute significantly to the national economy. Chinese led outgrower arrangements provide support in terms of finance, inputs and advice. British companies that had been important as buyers of tobacco from the previous white commercial farmers have looked on, and are now trying to get back into the game.

Mugabe’s party, ZANU-PF, has certainly exploited the land reform to gain political advantage. The land reform, they argue, is evidence of the struggle for liberation having reached a final phase. Shedding commercial links with Western companies shows in turn that sovereign countries like Zimbabwe now have a choice, both in economic and political affairs. No longer will they be pushed around, condescended or demeaned. Of course this rhetoric must be taken with a very large pinch of salt, as the political-security-business elite associated with ZANU-PF have benefitted from these reconfigurations of land and economy, alongside considerable numbers of ordinary people.

Indeed, the electoral calculus of 2013 suggests that land reform beneficiaries, along with other rural people, backed ZANU-PF, reversing the major wobble in 2008, when ZANU-PF lost both parliamentary and presidential polls. It is impossible to know for certain what the real results were, as there was most definitely fiddling going on. This included bussing in voters to swing constituencies, changing constituency lists and obstructing registration for young and urban voters, as well as various forms of intimidation.

However many commentators believe that the results were probably pitched in favour of ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC lost, if not by the margin announced. Certainly the opposition offered very little in the way of a campaign, and failed to articulate a convincing vision for land, agriculture and rural development. Independent assessments prior to the elections indicated a major disillusionment with the MDC, due in large part to their mixed performance in the unity government, with a major swing to ZANU-PF predicted.

Will Britain and other Western nations reengage with Zimbabwe? This is not the result that they wanted, nor the one that most expected. They had been convinced that the violence, corruption and neglect of human rights and the rule of law that has characterised the ZANU-PF regime (in fact for most the period since Independence in 1980) would put an end to Mugabe’s rule. The diplomatic social milieu in Harare is of course very different to the rural areas or the townships and squatter settlements on the urban fringe where most voters live. It is not difficult to see why the result was so incorrectly called.

The question arises, should the West support presidents and parties with an electoral mandate but who are involved in clearly highly reprehensible, possibly criminal, practices? Where does an ‘ethical’ foreign policy fit in? And what about the role of the West in upholding international standards and human rights? Opinion is highly divided on this topic, in Africa and elsewhere.

This has been brought to a head by the on-going prosecution of the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta and his vice-president, William Ruto by the International Criminal Court. The African Union, irked by the seeming emphasis of the ICC on African abuses and not others (Blair and Bush are of course mentioned as those who have got away), has proposed that sitting presidents should not be prosecuted. Others have called for withdrawal from the ICC, arguing, like the US, that international meddling in sovereign power is problematic and biased. Mugabe – of course – has joined in the chorus.

The double standards of the West are of course plain to see. Mugabe, Morsi, Museveni, or Meles? Who is/was acceptable, and who deserves to be cast out? And on what basis? There are no clear rules, and the interests and biases of Western foreign policy and associated commercial and political interests quickly become exposed. Is it perhaps easier to go the Chinese route, and proclaim a position of ‘non-interference’, based on ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutual interest’, while at the same time promoting a highly interested commercial relationship through development cooperation?

The UK’s Secretary for State for International Development, Justine Greening, hinted at such a shift in UK policy recently in a speech at the London Stock Exchange. Some observed that she sounded more like a Chinese official, acknowledging the importance of aid relationships for UK business; a contrast to her predecessors who only emphasised human rights, good governance and Western liberal democratic values.

As African states become more assertive in international affairs, buoyed by economic growth and a sense that in the post-colonial world order they do not have to be behoven only to the West and their former colonial masters, there is a greater level of what some have termed ‘state agency’ – the ability to negotiate,  manoeuvre and make choices. Yet, with the West unable to dictate through aid conditionalities, there are even greater obligations on citizens, as part of civil society organisations, social movements, political parties and electorates, to hold states to account.

In places like Zimbabwe this is not easy, given the obstructive and sometimes violent and oppressive politics of the ruling party. As the opposition rebuilds itself it has some serious thinking to do. Avoiding getting perceived as a puppet of the West, and broadening its focus to encompass economic and social rights and freedoms at the centre of a redistributive agenda will be essential. Meanwhile, Britain needs to reengage, supporting investment in the productive sectors, including agriculture and belatedly backing the successes of the land reform, and join Zimbabwe as a partner in economic development, alongside China and others, avoiding at all costs the misplaced, patronising stance of the past.

Ian Scoones is a Professorial Fellow at IDS, he blogs at www.zimbabweland.wordpress.com, and is co-author of Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities

State, land and democracy: reflections on Zimbabwe

Last week I was in Italy at the invitation of the University of Bologna to talk at a day conference on ‘State, Land and Democracy in Southern Africa’. The morning was taken up with discussions on Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, while the whole afternoon was devoted to Zimbabwe.

It was a great discussion, and it was interesting how many of the themes from the wider region resonate in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe clearly does not have a monopoly on land being used as patronage, uncertainties around tenure regimes, debates about the role of large-scale farms, ‘land grabs’ and the role of private investors, or even the use of land as a tool in electoral politics. This seems to be standard fare across the region. Yet the fascination with Zimbabwe remains, and the debates framed by extremely polarised narratives and poor understanding of empirical contexts continue.

The Zimbabwe debate however seems to be maturing. There is a recognition that, whatever the fiddling, the elections of 2013 represent a turning point. The future is uncertain, but the land issue, and with this the role of rural electoral politics, is crucial. In my paper I argued (as I have done before in this blog) that the emergence of a new class of ‘middle farmers’ on the resettlements (both A1 and A2) is important to the understanding of the new political dynamics of the countryside, and any assessment of the 2013 election.

This group represents diverse interests, coming from both ‘peasant’ (communal area) and urban worker backgrounds, as well as having a fair share of the salaried class of civil servants. Yet, despite their disparate origins and class positions, they are bound together by a continued commitment to rural production, investment and accumulation, as ‘petty commodity producers’ and ‘worker-farmers’; even an emergent ‘rural bourgeoisie’.

Pitched against an elite group connected to and benefiting from ZANU-PF party, military and business networks, there is a tussle between different visions of the future, linked to very different patterns of accumulation – from below and from above. These on-going contests over land and styles of production are central to the future of the Zimbabwean state, and wider polity. I discussed two broad case study areas in Masvingo province: the ‘core land reform areas’, where land was taken from white commercial farms, and where there is a high density of A1 and A2 settlements in relatively better agroecological potential areas, and what I termed the ‘peripheral areas’ of the lowveld, where land reform was more contested – on the sugar estates, the large state farms and trust lands and in the wildlife areas. Here attempts at elite capture by big ‘chefs’, connected to capitalist interests in sugar, ethanol and wildlife production for example, are being resisted actively by those who demand land. The balance of power is uneven, but surprisingly we see repeated victories by those who are seemingly less powerful, and the state and its allies often find it difficult to see through their vision in these areas, given the volatile politics and uncertainty on the margins of state power.

What of the longer term future given this political dynamic? Of course, as discussed so many times before, Masvingo doesn’t reflect the situation everywhere, and there are a diversity of contexts and outcomes. However there are some basic patterns that the Masvingo cases give a window on. One scenario for the future sees a capture by the elite, and the extension of patrimonial relations between elites and national/international capital, ultimately excluding the alternative voices and futures, and quashing future resistance. This can be achieved of course only through the persistence of violent, non-democratic and ‘obstructive politics’ typical of the ZANU-PF regime. Another, more optimistic scenario, sees the emergence of an organised middle farmer group with economic and political clout, and crucially with a key role in feeding urban populations and providing foreign exchange through producing strategic crops (currently of course primarily tobacco). They in turn push the state to respond to their demands resulting in a regearing of state efforts in rural areas. This scenario thus offers the opportunity of rebuilding a responsive, more democratic state from below.

I argued that we should not reject the latter scenario, even if the former remains currently the more likely default. The shifts in electoral fortunes in 2013 might indeed indicate the power of such a voting block. And unlike the rural populace before, such people may not be kept quiet with sops in the form of food aid or subsidised fertiliser. They will demand more and, like the forms of resistance seen in the lowveld for instance to elite grabs, they may become more assertive and act to hold the state, and associated elites, to account.

Ultimately a rebalancing of political forces will be required, and here a revamped opposition will be key, as they may be able to appeal to an entrepreneurial, middle farmer class in the rural areas. To date, without a convincing narrative on land and rural development, the MDC has failed dismally, but hopefully as they lick their wounds from the 2013 defeat, there is some thinking going on about how to engage a still largely rural electorate in issues that matter to them. In particular, this will require thought about the type of constituencies that are emerging now as a result of processes of differentiation and class formation following land reform.

The relationship between state, land and democracy in Zimbabwe is far from settled, but we may be getting glimpses of the future, beneath the current turmoil that are worth looking at in more depth. Developing this conversation at a regional level, as this conference did, is especially useful.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

Old powers and new powers: agriculture and investment in Africa

Last week I chaired a fascinating panel discussion at a conference titled: “Emerging Powers: Going Global”. It was all about the new world order, and the role of China, Brazil, India and others, particularly in Africa. Such powers of course have long emerged and so the title was a bit misleading, but the interesting discussions focused on the changing dynamics of power, and especially in Africa.

The conference was held in the British Academy, in their fine building on Carlton Terrace off the Mall in London, the inside of which is adorned with portraits and busts of the great and the good of years gone by (all men, at least the ones I saw). The establishment of the BA was first proposed in 1899, and it was established in 1902, just before the coronation of Edward VII, following the death of Queen Victoria. It was at the height of the British Empire when Britain ruled the world, or at least large parts of it.

111 years on, Britain’s role in the world has much declined, and the great and the good of today assembled in the conference hall of the Academy (there were lots of Lords, Sirs, OBEs and more in the guest list – and I even wore a tie for the occasion) were having to contemplate a new configuration of power and influence, with Britain as a declining power.

Our panel was on food and agriculture, and included the inevitable discussion about ‘land grabs’, large and small farm models, and how investment in Africa could be increased, but also guided and regulated. The panel included two investors in farm businesses in Africa (including Zimbabwe), a financier from the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group, and researchers from India, Brazil and the UK. We had an excellent debate. Here are some highlights:

• The pattern of large scale land acquisition (‘land grabbing’) noted post 2007-08 is on the decline. Many investors have had their fingers badly burned. One panellist indicated that he would never touch land acquisitions, and would only invest up the value chain. Another said that you enter ‘green field’ investments with trepidation, and it’s so much easier to go for ‘brown field’ sites, where ownership is clear, infrastructure is available and so on.
• There was universal support for a smallholder led strategy (this was a surprise given the panel composition), but with linkages to large-scale capital investments in core estates or farms. Outgrower and contract farming arrangements were favoured, allowing for market connections, quality control and upgrading. While there were ‘intermediation’ problems to be addressed, the efficiency and productivity of smallholders was acknowledged, especially if they could be offered capital investment, input support and training.
• Land tenure and ownership was highlighted as a big issue affecting land based investments in Africa. Lack of clarity of who owns what, and empty land turning out not to be were highlighted. Negotiating at a local level with traditional leaders and local communities was seen as one route, but with its own risks.
• The ‘Africa rising’ narrative had to be tempered. The massive growth estimates that are sometimes touted are often based on extremely dodgy data; and where growth occurs it tends to be associated with oil discoveries or recovery from conflict. The longer term future is not as bright as the hype. Clearly investments from Brazil, China and others are going to be key, but they will inevitably allied to other investors and finance arrangements as part of multi-partite business arrangements. Unlike geopolitics, business does not differentiate between old or new powers in the same way, and there is much more interconnection.
• There is far more room for manoeuvre by African states than is sometimes imagined. While everyone is prepared to play on the rhetoric of solidarity and South-South cooperation, everyone also knows where interests lie. And in the end national sovereignty counts. Getting a good deal from investments in a ‘buyers’ market’ is easier than some think; however some states are better than others at the negotiations.

Interestingly Zimbabwe came up a number of times. The new geopolitical configurations in southern Africa mean that China in particular is a key partner, and essential to the support of the Zimbabwe regime. Chinese support for the agricultural sector, notably tobacco, but also cotton, was mentioned several times. One of the investors commented favourably on the potentials of the post-land reform setting, with multiple small farmers offering products to the market. Investment in marketing, product upgrading and processing linked to A1 settlements in particular was seen as somewhere where ‘money could be made’. He had seen firsthand how the Chinese were doing it in tobacco, and thought this could be replicated more widely. As he noted, the international media impression of Zimbabwe doesn’t match the reality on the ground. He was keen to get in there soon, before others got wind of the potential. There was a sense of early entrant advantage in a business opportunity ripe for exploitation.

Commentaries on the business potentials of agriculture in Africa – and particularly smallholder agriculture following land reform – from agribusiness entrepreneurs are not often heard in the hallowed halls of venues like the BA. But these are surely just the discussions going on Sao Paulo, Delhi and Beijing, not to mention Johannesburg, as ’emerging powers’ and their investors plot how to make the most from Africa’s potentials. While investing in agriculture is tough, as the panel confirmed, Zimbabwe may well be a good bet. This is certainly the view of the book, Flight of the Phoenix – Investing in Zimbabwe’s Rise from the Ashes during the Global Debt Crisis, which offers a very positive longer term view of the investment prospects.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland