What will Brexit mean for Africa?

June 23rd saw the UK vote for Brexit. A populist rebellion was provoked by an internal dispute in the Tory party, and chaos has been unleashed. We don’t know the full consequences yet, but it’s not going to be good.

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Commentaries before the vote speculated on implications. First there’s trade. The UK is an important trading partner with Africa, and deals with the EU govern much of this. Only this month an EU Economic Partnership Agreement was agreed with the Southern African Development Community, allowing free trade access to Europe for some countries. Now all these arrangements have to be renegotiated bilaterally through the World Trade Organisation, and its 161 members. It will be a slow and costly readjustment, creating much uncertainty. Baffled by this madness, Chinese official commentary put in nicely: Britons were “showing a losing mindset” and becoming “citizens of a nation that prefers to shut itself from the outside world”.

Then there is aid. The UK has been a substantial contributor to the EU aid programme, providing 2 billion euros, including 14.8% of the European Development Fund. While I would be the first to admit that not all of this was effective or efficient, it does allow a broader mandate than the increasingly narrow focus of the UK aid spend. And the UK influence on the portfolio has always been important.

But perhaps more important than the flows of cash is the influence of the UK on European development debates. Whether the UK government or NGOs, think tanks or research institutes, adding to the discussion about, for example, the impact of EU domestic farm subsidies on African agriculture, or providing input into the framing of development efforts, has been really important. This has been particularly so since the establishment of the UK Department of International Development in 1997 and the G8 Gleneagles agreement in 2005, and a commitment – amazingly across governments of different political hues – to a progressive aid agenda, particularly in Africa. This role in European positioning globally will be much missed.

The Brexit campaigners argued for ‘taking back control’ of aid and trade. But in a globalised world, this small island mentality is absurd. Britain thankfully no longer rules the waves, nor has vast swathes of the globe as colonies under its control. But sometimes the rhetoric suggests we do – or should do. This is of course naïve and arrogant, and betrays an extraordinary lack of understanding of contemporary global political economy.

The UK’s diplomatic ‘soft power’ has been often exercised most successfully through the EU, as part of a joint commitment to change – whether around issues of conflict, migration or development. This allowed a common voice, and a more measured position. This was certainly the case in Zimbabwe. With, until recently, serial failures of UK diplomacy, the EU has provided a useful bridge and a more effective approach to engagement, through a succession of EU ambassadors to the country, who did not carry the colonial baggage of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This will be sorely missed, and not only in Zimbabwe.

The UK voters who pushed for Brexit were worried about jobs, livelihoods and immigration. Those who will lead the country as result do not have these concerns at the centre of their agenda. They have a vision of free trade and further economic liberalisation: exactly the processes that will undermine yet further the poor and marginalised who voted to leave. This is the tragic contradiction of the ‘democratic’ result, and will lead to more strife into the future.

A cross-party and sustained commitment to internationalism, social democratic freedoms, human rights and inclusive global development, as enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals, may not survive this sea-change in political fortunes in the UK. The racist slogans and posters and the narrow nationalism that dominated the campaign reveal an uglier side to British (perhaps English) politics; most shockingly shown in the political murder of MP Jo Cox – a passionate campaigner for more progressive views on social justice and development.

Who takes over in the UK following the resignation of the PM, David Cameron, really matters. Not just in the UK, but in Africa too. At the last election in 2015, I argued on this blog that we should “be scared, very scared” about the prospect of a shift at the top of the Tory party. Now this is certain, everyone should be very worried indeed. We don’t yet even know the candidates, but the political opportunist Boris Johnson is at the head of the race.

Johnson’s attitudes to Africa can only be described as backward and colonial. His slur on Barack Obama revealed much. His tales of his holiday in Tanzania frame Africa as a last wilderness, threatened by growing African populations, and could have come from a colonial explorer from the nineteenth century. His rants on Zimbabwe betray a shallow understanding of history and politics, and as one commentator described it, an “obnoxious and overbearing British imperialist mentality”. His close links with a certain section of the UK political elite (many in the House of Lords), who have consistently prevented a sensible debate on Britain’s relationship with Zimbabwe, show his political prejudices. It is not good news.

With the pound collapsing, remittances to Zimbabwe will be more expensive for the diaspora, and the prospects of investment will decline. The chaos in the global markets provoked by this crazy populism will take time to stabilise, and will affect the poorest more than the rich. And the nasty side of British politics, rejecting a progressive internationalism, will undermine the UK’s standing in the world. We all will be poorer because of Brexit, including in Africa.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland

 

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7 Comments

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7 responses to “What will Brexit mean for Africa?

  1. Freedom

    This is enlightening Prof.

  2. Comrade Amos

    I agree that Brexit was a monumental mistake. I agree that Britain is now a nastier and more small-minded nation because of this. It is catastrophic!

    But I have to say, relative to the racism and isolationism unleashed by Mugabe (on Zimbabwe), Brexit is child’s play. Zimbabwe has witnessed 16 years of state-sponsored violence and bigotry, and catastrophic economic policies around ‘indigenisation’.

    Zimbabwe is a lesson to the UK – not the other way around. The ‘colonial’ attitudes of Boris is the last thing anyone is worried about right now on the international stage.

  3. Thanks Ian. We are all trying to sort out what this means for African partners, international cooperation, and policy. Is Brexit a foretaste of what is to come in U.S. elections, or more a cautionary tale for us and African partners. Let’s hope its the latter and not the former.

    Jim McCann
    Boston University

  4. MrK

    Johnson’s attitudes to Africa can only be described as backward and colonial.

    Boris Johnson just dropped out. You’d think that someone who styled himself after Winston Churchill for most of his life, would jump at the chance to become Prime Minister – not so.

    Anyway, both Cameron (2) and Johnson (8) belonged to an extremely exclusive Oxford drinking society called the Bullingdon Club. So much for the ‘Born To Rule’ class of 1987 . More on the Bullingdon Club here.

    • Comrade Amos

      Uhm, in a free society, a student can belong to any drinking society that he/she chooses. If you imply elitism, well so what. All graduates are part of the elite.

      • MrK

        Why do you feel a compulsive need to defend the tribe no matter what, including the aristocracy?

        And no, any student cannot choose to belong to any drinking society. You get elected into the Bullingdon, you don’t just show up and apply for membership.

        Which of course misses the point. They all know eachother, including Nat Rothschild, who was in the Bullingdon the same year as George Osborne.

  5. am

    On aid to Africa I would think it is likely too decrease overall. Not just in dollar terms due to the depreciating pound but also in pound terms. I can’t see the 0.7 commitment being kept when Britain starts scrambling to shore up its own economy.
    Remittances from the diaspora paid in pounds will decline in local currency terms. So investment in business and generally helping the folks at home will become less.
    Imports from Britain in nominal pound terms should become cheaper for Africa again due to the appreciation.
    A general opening of the UK market for African imports to the UK may take place after Brexit happens but how this balances against African exports to the EU formerly through the UK is not clear to me.
    So in the short run not much good and in the longer term post brexit not very clear either.

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