Tag Archives: africa

What will Brexit mean for Africa?

June 23rd saw the UK vote for Brexit. A populist rebellion was provoked by an internal dispute in the Tory party, and chaos has been unleashed. We don’t know the full consequences yet, but it’s not going to be good.

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Commentaries before the vote speculated on implications. First there’s trade. The UK is an important trading partner with Africa, and deals with the EU govern much of this. Only this month an EU Economic Partnership Agreement was agreed with the Southern African Development Community, allowing free trade access to Europe for some countries. Now all these arrangements have to be renegotiated bilaterally through the World Trade Organisation, and its 161 members. It will be a slow and costly readjustment, creating much uncertainty. Baffled by this madness, Chinese official commentary put in nicely: Britons were “showing a losing mindset” and becoming “citizens of a nation that prefers to shut itself from the outside world”.

Then there is aid. The UK has been a substantial contributor to the EU aid programme, providing 2 billion euros, including 14.8% of the European Development Fund. While I would be the first to admit that not all of this was effective or efficient, it does allow a broader mandate than the increasingly narrow focus of the UK aid spend. And the UK influence on the portfolio has always been important.

But perhaps more important than the flows of cash is the influence of the UK on European development debates. Whether the UK government or NGOs, think tanks or research institutes, adding to the discussion about, for example, the impact of EU domestic farm subsidies on African agriculture, or providing input into the framing of development efforts, has been really important. This has been particularly so since the establishment of the UK Department of International Development in 1997 and the G8 Gleneagles agreement in 2005, and a commitment – amazingly across governments of different political hues – to a progressive aid agenda, particularly in Africa. This role in European positioning globally will be much missed.

The Brexit campaigners argued for ‘taking back control’ of aid and trade. But in a globalised world, this small island mentality is absurd. Britain thankfully no longer rules the waves, nor has vast swathes of the globe as colonies under its control. But sometimes the rhetoric suggests we do – or should do. This is of course naïve and arrogant, and betrays an extraordinary lack of understanding of contemporary global political economy.

The UK’s diplomatic ‘soft power’ has been often exercised most successfully through the EU, as part of a joint commitment to change – whether around issues of conflict, migration or development. This allowed a common voice, and a more measured position. This was certainly the case in Zimbabwe. With, until recently, serial failures of UK diplomacy, the EU has provided a useful bridge and a more effective approach to engagement, through a succession of EU ambassadors to the country, who did not carry the colonial baggage of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This will be sorely missed, and not only in Zimbabwe.

The UK voters who pushed for Brexit were worried about jobs, livelihoods and immigration. Those who will lead the country as result do not have these concerns at the centre of their agenda. They have a vision of free trade and further economic liberalisation: exactly the processes that will undermine yet further the poor and marginalised who voted to leave. This is the tragic contradiction of the ‘democratic’ result, and will lead to more strife into the future.

A cross-party and sustained commitment to internationalism, social democratic freedoms, human rights and inclusive global development, as enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals, may not survive this sea-change in political fortunes in the UK. The racist slogans and posters and the narrow nationalism that dominated the campaign reveal an uglier side to British (perhaps English) politics; most shockingly shown in the political murder of MP Jo Cox – a passionate campaigner for more progressive views on social justice and development.

Who takes over in the UK following the resignation of the PM, David Cameron, really matters. Not just in the UK, but in Africa too. At the last election in 2015, I argued on this blog that we should “be scared, very scared” about the prospect of a shift at the top of the Tory party. Now this is certain, everyone should be very worried indeed. We don’t yet even know the candidates, but the political opportunist Boris Johnson is at the head of the race.

Johnson’s attitudes to Africa can only be described as backward and colonial. His slur on Barack Obama revealed much. His tales of his holiday in Tanzania frame Africa as a last wilderness, threatened by growing African populations, and could have come from a colonial explorer from the nineteenth century. His rants on Zimbabwe betray a shallow understanding of history and politics, and as one commentator described it, an “obnoxious and overbearing British imperialist mentality”. His close links with a certain section of the UK political elite (many in the House of Lords), who have consistently prevented a sensible debate on Britain’s relationship with Zimbabwe, show his political prejudices. It is not good news.

With the pound collapsing, remittances to Zimbabwe will be more expensive for the diaspora, and the prospects of investment will decline. The chaos in the global markets provoked by this crazy populism will take time to stabilise, and will affect the poorest more than the rich. And the nasty side of British politics, rejecting a progressive internationalism, will undermine the UK’s standing in the world. We all will be poorer because of Brexit, including in Africa.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland

 

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Democracy in Africa: why it’s complicated

Nic Cheeseman has just produced a book called ‘Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures and the Struggle for Political Reform” with Cambridge University Press. It’s clear, readable and for a book with such a grand title admirably short. I liked the way it has a separate website for the references (and a bunch of other resources too), so the text is uncluttered and readable – and no footnotes, hooray!

The basic argument is that there are no perfect solutions to the challenge of generating democracy and a release from authoritarian rule in Africa. There are instead multiple pathways that must create a balance between inclusion (and avoid ethnic or other division and conflict) and competition (to generate accountable institutions and reduce corruption).

Well that’s no surprise I hear you say. True to some extent, but you’d be surprised how (still) there are those who prescribe democratic arrangements for Africa – competitive (often winner takes all) elections, particular forms of institution modelled on western values; private property and ‘the rule of law’. You know the ‘good governance’ list. There are dozens of programmes of this sort funded by western donors, particularly the US and the UK, that usually fail to understand the complex histories, geographies and socio-cultural settings of Africa that make particular forms of democracy possible, while other unviable. No I am not caricaturing. For example, a consultant for large western aid agency rang me up not long ago, and asked me a whole string of questions about democracy building in Zimbabwe, premised on wholly false assumptions about the context. When challenged, he just got confused and continued with his list of pre-set questions. The conversation in the end was rather short, as we were speaking at cross-purposes. But this was supposed to help inform a major investment.

So sometimes rather obvious arguments are important to say – again, and again. What is good about this book is that it covers a huge terrain. Zimbabwe is of course mentioned, but Cheeseman draws in particular on his work in Kenya to look at the fraught issues of ethnic divisions and electoral politics, the dangers of presidentialism, the challenges of power-sharing ‘inclusive’ governments and more. There are important lessons for Zimbabwe on all these fronts of course. But he goes wider to look at the successes of Senegal and Ghana in democratic transition, the balancing act of federalism in Nigeria, and the ‘model’ democracies of Botswana and Mauritius, which seem (in admittedly non-replicable situations) to have managed to get the balance between inclusion and competition broadly right.

The book also doesn’t fall into the trap of buying the simplistic arguments that democracy creates economic growth – it does for some, not for others, but overall, according to a UNU-WIDER report by Takaaki Masaki and Nicolas van de Walle, the relationship is positive, especially when democratic consolidation occurs (but I suspect with quite a few confounding variables). The book also doesn’t adopt the argument that patrimonialism (older forms of ‘big man’ network based politics) can be transformed into ‘developmental patrimonialism’, where central control keeps a lid on corruption. This is the argument of David Booth, Tim Kelsall and others, with the prime cases always being Rwanda (under Kagame) and Ethiopia (under Meles and subsequently). Cheeseman argues that such arrangements are always fragile, and while temporary gains may be realised, without an opening up beyond authoritarian control economies will falter, incipient corrupt practice take hold despite party discipline, and people will resist. The global case of this scenario is China, a theme also taken up in the book.

In a summary article, Cheeseman concludes:

“There is no ideal constitutional template that can be deployed across the continent…. Different countries may require different degrees of inclusion in order to achieve political stability. Judging whether a political system can bear the strains associated with greater competition requires an intimate knowledge of a country’s demography, geography and political history… Given this, it is remarkable – and worrying – just how few African countries feature inclusive political mechanisms that prevent certain communities from losing out systematically.”

Support for democratisation (in its broadest sense) is important. But to get beyond the mechanical, pre-cooked lists, as repeated by the aid consultant, will require much more nuance and sophistication. This book, while offering no answers (there are none), provides a useful primer for anyone interested and engaged in these debates – and that should be everyone!

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

 

 

 

 

 

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