

**Political Economy Analysis of Fast Track Land Reform Programme
in Zimbabwe**

Arnold Rangarirayi Chamunogwa

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Supervisor: Professor Ian Scoones

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ABSTRACT

In 2000 there was a Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe which was undertaken in midst of socio-political upheavals and resulted in radical and widespread restructuring of the agrarian economy in Zimbabwe. Highly divergent views exist on how land was acquired and redistributed in the period (largely) between 2000 and 2002 based on studies in very different parts of the country. In this dissertation, I explored three different cases, from different parts of the country each with different political contexts and, in a comparative way, and examined the forms and styles of politics which were involved in land acquisition in relation to the broader literature on African politics. My central observation was that the local political context, affected by a range of historical, social, economic factors, had a huge impact on what happened during land reform. An analytical review of the three cases- Chipinge, Goromonzi and Masvingo- has shown that simple generalizations about Zimbabwe's land reform political dynamics are inappropriate and a much more differentiated account is needed.

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List of Abbreviations

ARDA:	Agricultural Rural Development Authority
AREX:	Agricultural Research and Extension
CIO:	Central Intelligence Organization
CFU:	Commercial Farmers Union
DCC:	District Coordinating Committee
DA:	District Administrator
EPZ:	Export Promoting Zone
FTLRP:	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GOZ:	Government of Zimbabwe
LSCF:	Large Scale Commercial Farming
MDC:	Movement for Democratic Change
MOL:	Ministry of Land.
MP:	Member of Parliament
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
PLIC:	Provincial Land Identification Committee
ZANU P.F:	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU:	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZBC:	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZFU:	Zimbabwe Farmers Union
ZRP:	Zimbabwe Republic Police

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Focus of Research

Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the year 2000, under a tense and often violent political climate as well as worsening socio-economic crisis and waning support for the ruling party which was facing enormous challenge from an emerging and vibrant opposition and civil society (Hanmer and Raftopolous, 2003). As a result of the socio-political upheavals that accompanied land reform, FTLRP has generated divergent opinions about the process and outcomes. Much debate is presented in terms of sweeping generalizations about the political and governance context of the land reform. This dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced perspective based on a geographically differentiated analysis of the process of land reform across three sites. It argues that in order to understand Zimbabwe's land reform, we have to look at the specific political context in particular places, avoiding generalizations.

Fast Track Land Reform resulted in a radical and widespread restructuring of the agrarian economy in Zimbabwe and this was accompanied by the emergence of new social dynamics and relations. However this new agrarian economy has not received adequate support from policy makers and development agencies such that it can contribute to the growth of the economy whilst at the same time sustaining the livelihoods of individuals dependent on it. The results of FTLRP have been tainted by the social and political upheavals which accompanied it and hence they have not been on the development agenda of donors. This study is relevant in two particular ways: firstly the study attempts to reconcile the divergent views towards agrarian reform in Zimbabwe such that there is a departure from generalizations which have left most resettlement areas marginalized and a more differentiated view is projected; Secondly, the study unpacks the different power dynamics in each particular area and the linkages that exist between the state and citizens such that any developmental interventions can be appropriately targeted and can be transformative.

Scholars are divided on their interpretations of land reform processes under the FTLRP. For example, Marongwe (2008 and 2011), Zamchiya (2011), Hanmer (2005) and others argue that

FTLRP was carried out in a context of clientilism and rampant patronage such that land claims were channeled through clientilistic networks superintended by Zanu PF for its own political survival. On the other hand Moyo and Yeros (2003) argue that the process was an agrarian revolution achieved through peasant mobilization, while Scoones et al (2010) offer a more differentiated approach and argues that informal political practice was at play however most of the beneficiaries of FTLR were ordinary citizens who genuinely made claims to land and benefitted without necessarily being cronies contrary to widespread media reports, even though of course patronage was involved for some. Thus highly divergent views exist on how land was acquired in the period (largely) between 2000 and 2002 based on studies in very different parts of the country, each suggesting different political and governance arrangements and consequences. The picture is confused and often unclear, and always highly specific to different settings. In this dissertation, I will explore three different cases, from different parts of the country each with different political contexts and, in a comparative way, to examine the forms and styles of politics involved in land acquisition in relation to the broader literature on African politics. In particular I will ask to what degree three contrasting understandings of political and governance processes, central to the literature on African politics which I label – ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’, ‘neopatrimonialism’ and ‘informal politics’ can provide a much more differentiated and nuanced understanding of how politics determined the outcomes of land redistribution.

1.2 Key questions and methods

The main objective of the research is to understand the political dynamics and patterns of authority which were at play during Fast Track Land Reform Programme and how they determined the outcomes of land redistribution. The following sub-questions will particularly be interrogated;

1. Who were the actors involved in FTLRP and what forms of authority did they exercise?
2. Which institutions were in involved in FTLRP and how did they emerge, and impact farm acquisitions and allocations?
3. What form of politics i.e. – ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’, ‘neopatrimonialism’ and ‘informal politics’ - was prevalent and why?

The research is based on a comparative review of three in-depth case studies which have been undertaken in Zimbabwe. The first one was by Marongwe (2008) and it was a study on FTLRP in Goromonzi district which is an intensive farming region due to its favorable climatic conditions, rich soils and proximity to the capital city. The second case study was by Zamchiya (2011) and it focused on Chipinge District in the high veld where high value specialized agricultural activities were undertaken at significant investments. The third case study was by Scoones et al (2010) which focused on Masvingo Province which is characterized by dry and semi-arid regions and thus ideal for livestock and wildlife production. These three regions also have distinct geo-political contexts which provides for different kinds of incentives for actors in FTLR. The three cases provide different and sometimes conflicting findings with regards to the identity of beneficiaries and the process with which land acquisition took place.

Though most of the conventional studies on land reform are quantitative in nature this research adopted a more qualitative approach. This was mainly because the study was reviewing three empirically grounded studies which could be easily complemented by other data sources as explained later in the paragraph. The choice of a qualitative approach proved to be helpful in gathering information and useful in finding answers to the research questions and testing the hypotheses. Both primary and secondary data sources were used to enrich the analysis. Primary sources included manuscripts and other archival materials on previous land reform processes; government publications including land audit reports and gazettes and; NGO reports, newspapers and periodicals. Secondary sources included books, publications and other related material which was useful in my analysis and literature review. Most of the data derived from secondary sources was validated with primary sources and vice versa. The cross pollination of secondary and primary sources increased the validity of collected data.

As the subsequent chapters show, the main argument emerging is that the outcomes of FTLRP vis-à-vis land beneficiaries were influenced by different political dynamics at play. These political dynamics were dependent on the underlying geopolitical context, socio-cultural histories, economic factors and incentives faced by key actors such that there is no single story for land reform in Zimbabwe. Instead there was a much more nuanced and differentiated manner in which citizens made claims to and acquired land and the same can be said of the manner in

which the state redistributed land. This is best illustrated by the three case studies of Goromonzi, Chipinge and Masvingo which are discussed in the dissertation.

1.3 Overview of the dissertation

The dissertation begins with a chapter which provides a background of land reform in Zimbabwe and a description of the key processes which preceded FTLRP and some detail on how FTLRP was undertaken. Chapter 3 provides a review of key literature on citizen-politician linkages in Africa with a particular emphasis on the demand and supply of limited resources such as land. This is followed by Chapter 4 which is a fine-grained analysis of three case studies namely Goromonzi, Chipinge and Masvingo and attempts to unpack the local authorities and power dynamics and their influence on the final identity of land beneficiaries. The final chapter is a discussion of the findings of the preceding case study analysis. The discussion seeks to draw out explanations for the differentiated outcomes of land reform based on each locality by profiling each site and unpacking its underlying geopolitical context, economic values, socio-cultural histories, contingent events as well as economic and political incentives faced by actors on the ground.

Chapter 2: Background

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a background of past land reform processes in Zimbabwe as well as particular background to FTLRP. The chapter also provides a summary of the context within which FTLRP was undertaken.

2.2 Land Reform between 1980 and 2000

A racially skewed agrarian structure and land tenure system existed at independence in 1980 and was dominated by “6000 white farmers and a few foreign and nationally owned agro-industrial estates, alongside 700,000 peasant families and 8000 small-scale black commercial farmers,” Moyo (2011, 941). From 1980 Zimbabwe pursued a relatively successful market-based land reform programme in which over 70,000 families were resettled on about three million hectares of land though set targets were not met (Bratton, 1994a; Moyo, 2000a and Cliffe, 2000). Soon after presidential elections in 1996, the state’s position on land reform shifted from electoral rhetoric to radical policy proposals and in 1998 a Donor’s Conference on Land was held and it led to the Inception Phase Frame-work Plan (1998-1999) of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme 2 (LRRP2). The LRRP2 was based on administrative and technical prescriptions however the breadth and spread of the programme attempted to reintroduce urgency to the need for widespread land reform in an effort to counter-balance economic and technical rationality with ideology and politics. The radical policy shift happened in the midst of a socio-economic crisis as a result of failed economic structural adjustment policies which had led to food riots¹. The expansion and reorganisation of civil society and trade unions which mobilised urbanites against the state in the late nineties reflected a general loss of confidence in the ruling party, Zanu PF and caused restlessness amongst the elites. The same period witnessed the re-emergence

¹ See Chattopadhyay R, (2000) “Zimbabwe: structural adjustment, destitution & food insecurity” *Review of African Political Economy* [Volume 27, Issue 84, 2000](#)

of war veterans on the political landscape who expressed their disappointment with the ruling party and demanded compensation and benefits for their role in the liberation war and land was also part of their demands². The reorganisation of war veterans redefined their political role and relationship with Zanu PF and the state and they became key actors in policy discourses and ended up having a projected role in FTLRP (Sadomba, 2008). During the same period and in previous years there were isolated cases of farm invasions based on restitution claims to ancestral lands however the state maintained tight control of the process to the extent that land occupations were at no time allowed to threaten private property rights on a large scale.

Table 2.1 Changes in the national distribution of land, 1980–2009

Land category	1980		2000		2010	
	Area (million ha)	% of total land area	Area (million ha)	% of total land area	Area (million ha)	% of total land area
Communal areas	16.4	42	16.4	42	16.4	42
Old resettlement	0.0	0	3.5	9	3.5	9
New resettlement: A1	0.0	0	0.0	0	4.1	11
New resettlement: A2	0.0	0	0.0	0	3.5	9
Small-scale commercial farms	1.4	4	1.4	4	1.4	4
Large-scale commercial farms*	15.5	40	11.7	30	3.4 [footnote]	9
State farms	0.5	1	0.7	2	0.7	2
Urban land	0.2	1	0.3	1	0.3	1
National parks and forest land	5.1	13	5.1	13	5.1	13
Unallocated Land	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.7	2
Total	39.1	100	39.1	100	39.1	100

Source: derived from Scoones et al. 2010; 4. ***Note:** includes all large commercial farms, agro-industrial estate farms, Church/trust farms, BIPPA farms and conservancies.

² See Zimbabwe war veterans defiant: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/714362.stm>

2.2 The defining phase: From LRRP2 to FTLRP via Jambanja³

A new chapter was opened in the history of Zimbabwe's land reforms when LRRP2 failed and the state's attempt to have a constitutional clause obliging Britain to compensate dispossessed farmers was rejected at a referendum. Land occupations became swift and widespread, and transformed into the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). FTLRP was preceded by spontaneous and widespread farm occupations led by war veterans, Zanu PF cadres and traditional leaders as well as involving large numbers of ordinary citizens from nearby communal areas and local towns, as well as sometimes farm workers. The state condoned the occupations but sought to co-opt them through provision of material and logistical support and by formalising the 'Jambanja' invasions in a programme for redistributing land to over 150,000 families in two types of schemes/models (Chaumba et al, 2003a and 2003b and Moyo 2001). The A1 model comprised of both villagised and self-contained plots targeting landless and poor families, while the A2 scheme targeted new 'commercial' farmers, providing larger individual plots on long-term leases to beneficiaries supposedly with farming skills and/or resources (GoZ, 2001 and Moyo, 2011; 943).

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme which began in earnest in 2000 resulted in significant and widespread restructuring of the agrarian landscape whilst radically changing patterns of land ownership in Zimbabwe as illustrated and summarised in Table 2.1. The radical restructuring of the agrarian economy was a result of a departure from the post-independent land reform policy based on technical prescriptions which were justified by the need to maintain and safeguard commercial viability of the agricultural sector and at the same time constrained by provisions of Lancaster House agreement⁴. Instead, visions of what land reform should be about which were earlier on suppressed by the state began to play out and these included; autochthonous claims based on restitution, compensation for war veterans and wider socio-economic and equity goals (Scoones et al, 2010; 22-23).

³ Jambanja is a local street lingo which means violent chaos and was used to describe farm occupations

⁴ The Lancaster House agreement which paved way for a transition from colonialism to independence required that the state could not compulsorily acquire land from white farmers to redistribute to landless black in the next ten years after independence.

As noted in Chapter 1, various opinions on the motives and rationality of FTLRP have emerged and on one extreme there is an argument that the nature of the year 2000 land occupations in Zimbabwe was such that it removed the process from the arena of broader public accountability, and effectively consolidated ZANU PF's waning political support through violence, reinforcing the use of land redistribution as a tool for political patronage (Raftopoulos, 2003; Alexander, 2003; Sachikonye, 2004 and Bernstein, 2005). On the other hand Moyo and Yeros (2005) have argued that farm occupations were a result of peasant mobilization based on the demand for socio-economic equity and were a bottom-up agrarian revolution. Marongwe (2008) and Chaumba (2003b) provides a detailed account of the legal struggles within the FTLR and how the state initially disobeyed its own courts' judgments and went further to reorganize the existing political space through 'fast-track' judiciary reforms, followed by retrospective backdating of legislation that suited its political agenda.

Van den Brink (2003:17) argues that looking at history and international experience has demonstrated that radical mobilization and violence characterises most land reform processes and Griffin, Khan and Ickowits (2002) argue that major land reforms in modern history have been born out of social and political upheavals. They further state that "peasant mobilization and land occupations are an integral part of electoral politics which often become the main vehicle for restructuring the political space that influences land reform". Land as a resource is at the heart of agrarian conflict and is the pivot of power. The land owning classes are not prepared to cede their privileged and entrenched interests and, "only an acute conflict and shift in the power structure will bring about significant change" (ibid: 1). There is no blueprint on what constitutes "successful" land reform. From a conceptual level, various justifications for land reform were propounded which could form the basis upon which the success of land reform could be judged. However, the success of land reform is contextual and depends on the priorities and objectives of those implementing land reform.

The purpose of this study therefore is to provide a much more nuanced analysis of the situation which is a departure from widespread generalisations which do not take into account geopolitical variations across different regions and across different farm sites within the same region. A core hypothesis is therefore that the local political context, affected by a range of historical, social,

economic factors, had a huge impact on what happened during land reform. In some respects all the divergent interpretations discussed above may be ‘correct’, but only for particular places and for particular times, as these contexts – and so styles of politics – vary dramatically. Thus in order to understand the politics of the FTLRP, a more disaggregated analysis is required. And for this, a set of analytical perspectives is required which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Understanding the politics of land reform: Literature Review

3.0 Introduction

Land reform is a redistributive policy process which involves land, a scarce resource and is often undertaken in a highly politicised and contested environment (Van den Brink, 2003, Turner and Ibsen, 2002, Windfuhr 2002 and Lahiff, 2001). It is a political process since it involves the acquisition and redistribution of a limited resource with high economic and symbolic value and also results in significant shifts in societal power dynamics. Thus land reform is often prone to capture by powerful actors and also provides a strategic resource for patronage and in some cases predation by a few elites and their cronies. It is therefore useful to use a political lens when seeking to understand the underlying dimensions of the acquisition and redistribution of land.

There is vast literature which looks at citizen-politician linkages in Africa vis-à-vis the allocation and distribution of state resources by governments and access to state resources by citizens (Lauth, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Bratton, 2007; Engel and Olsen, 2005 and; Van de Walle, 2007). The different theoretical and conceptual perspectives on “state-society politics and the acquisition and distribution of resources” can be used to analyse the underlying dimensions of land reform as they provide the criteria and principles which can be used to understand these underlying dimensions which include but are not limited to political identity of land beneficiaries; sources and exercise of authority in redistribution; institutions involved in acquisition and redistribution; logic and channels of redistribution and; contestations, negotiations and exchanges within the acquisition and redistribution matrix.

The key literature on state-society linkages in Africa can be organized in a way which can provide for a nuanced and differentiated analysis of individual cases of resource allocations across time and space and influenced by varying geo-political factors. In this study, I have identified three main concepts within this large literature. These will be used to offer a conceptual framework, suggesting a gradient/continuum which indicates the range of state-

society linkages , political styles and forms of state violence involved and their resultant impact on the redistribution of land. This framework thus offers a way of differentiating cases, and explaining the way political contexts influence land reform processes and outcomes.

The core concepts of my conceptual framework are as follows, running from a style of politics which is organised and violent to a more informal politics where less state-mediated violence is apparent. First, is the notion of the ‘instrumentalization of disorder’ which is a socio-centric approach focusing on aspects of agency and historicity of the African state with an emphasis on the deployment of disorder for political and economic ends (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chabal, 2005 and 2009). Second is neopatrimonialism which is a state-centric approach which focuses on the structural organization of the African state and its societal interactions (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Van de Walle 2001a; Therkildsen, 2005; Erdman and Engel, 2005). Third is *‘informalization of politics’* which is an approach which focuses on state-like institutions embedded in existing political cultures (Lund, 2006; Meagher, 2007 and; Crook and Booth, 2011)The distinctions between the three concepts will be discussed in the following sections however it is important to note that there are many overlaps amongst the three.

One of the cross cutting features of all three concepts is the vertical and asymmetrical networks of exchange which connects political elites and ordinary citizens. These networks are the main linkages between citizens and politicians and channels within which the demand and supply of state resources are negotiated and exchanged in most African polities. Chabal (1999; 49-51) describes these linkages as networks of reciprocity between political elites and ordinary citizens and these networks become informal channels for accountability and legitimation which are not necessarily based on the probity of how political offices are occupied or state resources are acquired but rather on how elites discharge their obligations in meeting the expectations of their clients. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997; 61-63) emphasise that these networks are superintended by ‘big men’ or powerful oligarchs who selectively distribute state resources through formal state structures to loyal followers in a top-down manner. On the other hand Lund (2005a; 673-678) provides a bottom-up view of these vertical networks of exchange whilst focusing on intermediary elites who mediate the provision and access to state resources between the state and its citizens.

The following three sections introduce the three core concepts of my conceptual framework in turn. Through this discussion, I will identify the key attributes of each, in order for these to be identified in the case study analysis which follows.

3.1 Instrumentalization of disorder

The main argument of the '*instrumentalization of disorder*' thesis is that "the state is utilised as the instrument of primitive accumulation which is achieved through the monopoly seizure of the means of production by political elites" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 10). Political elites abandon a developmental path and engage in predatory activities through the deployment of disorder and coercive force to both accumulate and distribute state resources and in the case of land reform the acquisition of land for redistribution is manipulated such that it becomes violent and chaotic and in the process elites and their cronies become the major beneficiaries with a few ordinary citizens benefiting in exchange for political support. Chabal and Daloz (1999; 158) describes it as the economy of affection whereby political elites aim to gather and use power to generate resources which can be used to purchase the affection of the people with the exchange involving 'scarce' resources and votes in particular. Political power is thus weakly institutionalised and highly personalised and the distribution of resources is often particularistic rather than universalistic as shown by the overall identity of land beneficiaries which is skewed towards sections of society which has shown support for the ruling elites.

The hallmark of instrumentalization of disorder is the arbitrary use or threat of use of physical force in order to achieve compliance when acquiring resources. This is due to the predatory nature of elites and abuse of power as coercive force is often state sanctioned or deployed through militias. Systematic and organized violence is usually marshalled towards sections of society which can be used to meet particular economic aims (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 77). The token inclusion of sections of society, as beneficiaries of land under land reform provides legitimization of state-sanctioned violence and state-managed disorder as land beneficiaries view the manner in which land was acquired as legitimate even though illicit State-sanctioned violence is also used to monitor and enforce exchange obligations within the clientilistic networks, especially when the resources are limited or dwindling. Predatory elites also make efforts to control and contain disorder within manageable limits by influencing the arbitrariness

of official coercion whilst at the same maintaining and controlling private violence through militias. Violence during land reform is also used to counter rival redistribution networks and incapacitate or in extreme cases decimate opposition to the process. Chabal and Daloz (1999; 84) argue that sometimes legitimate and popular grievances and claims can be hijacked by predatory elites and used as pretexts for criminal terror.

The use of disorder as a political instrument results in the weak institutionalization of political practices and political elites extract profit out of a vacuous and ineffective state. The state is both strong and powerless since it is overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 15). Holders of state office either pursue their own business interests or they provide favour to clientilistic links. The absence of transparency in both acquisition and redistribution of land presents opportunities for expropriation of prime and large tracts of land by predatory elites thus corruption becomes a key aspect of instrumentalization of disorder.

Redistribution of land is initially prioritised for intra-elite accommodation and in times of crises this is limited to a small clientilistic coalition comprised of military, bureaucratic, economic and political elites as they work together for political survival. Spoils from the predation of state resources and land in particular trickle down to ordinary citizens through clientilistic networks and this distribution is usually mediated by intermediate elites with political connections who bind the local to the national and sometimes through the captured bureaucracy. The legitimacy of the African political elites derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests and their legitimacy is only questioned when they fail to distribute resources (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 15).

3.2 Neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism is a combination of two intertwined and co-existing forms of domination namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, political and administrative relations are personalised and there is no distinction between the private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 63 and Erdmann and Engel, 2006 18). The

patrimonial and legal-rational spheres are not isolated from each other; instead they permeate each other with the patrimonial penetrating the legal-rational system and twisting its logic, functions, and effects though it does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic. Political and bureaucratic office is used for appropriating land for private enrichment as well as selective patronage to beneficiaries who can mobilize political support in return for land and farming inputs. The acquisition and redistribution of land takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy and/or formal rules. However the bureaucracy and formal state structures are challenged and invaded from above and below by informal relationships, predominantly political such that the mix of political (usually informal) and bureaucratic authority becomes institutionalised.

The most salient feature of neopatrimonialism vis-à-vis acquisition and distribution of resources is clientelism which involves personal networks of politicians, but also occurring within and around the bureaucracy on all levels (Erdmann and Engel, 2006; 21). Clientelism does not necessarily have a strong redistributive effect and it is defined as “the exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources for political support in the form of votes” (van de Walle 2003: 311-313; van de Walle 2001a: 71 and; Erdmann and Engel, 2006; 20). Corruption is also inherent in neopatrimonial land redistribution processes and it occurs both at the highest level of political authority where prime land is acquired by elites and in public administration where bureaucrats and their colleagues dominate the list of land beneficiaries. Thus political corruption and bureaucratic corruption exist simultaneously and tend to mutually reinforce each other (Andvig et al. 2001: 11). Neopatrimonialism is found in the political and administrative arena of governance but does not necessarily involve violence, predation and manipulated disorder such as in the instrumentalisation of disorder. The clientilistic strategy adopted by political and bureaucratic elites in redistributive policy processes such as land reform is not necessarily chaotic or disorderly. Actors have a certain degree of choice as to which logic they want to employ to achieve their goals and realise their interests and when they are faced with competing clientilistic demands they often take refuge in formal rules that can be enforced through formal state structures such as the judiciary (Therkildsen, 2005; 39 and; Erdmann and Engel, 2006; 22).

However critiques such as Arrighi (2002); Leonard and Strauss (2003); Ponte (2004) and Mkandawire (2001) have argued that a balanced mix of informality and formality actually

achieves better development outcomes and widely dispersed distributional effects. Formal state institutions on their own cannot fulfil their universalistic purpose of public welfare; instead politics and policies are determined by particularistic interests and orientations. When particularistic interests are supported by legal-rational rules, these are used ahead of informal rules.

Political and bureaucratic decision making is discretionary and not necessarily rule-bound creating room for patronage. For most beneficiaries, political channels are more effective than administrative channels when accessing resources [land] from the state and clientilistic networks can become the basis for collective action [redistribution] (de Wit and Berner, 2009; 929) [*own emphasis*].

The emergence and dominance of political-bureaucratic networks in the acquisition and redistribution of land becomes a key defining criterion for neopatrimonialism during land reform and the near absence of violent and manipulated disorder differentiates it from instrumentalization of disorder described in the earlier section.

3.3 Informalization of Politics

While both the previous two categories show elements of ‘informality’, being outside the formal rules of state and bureaucratic conduct, the informalization of politics extends this to realms beyond the state and bureaucracy to encompass a form of politics where state-like institutions operate. These may not be formally part of the state but are critical to understanding contemporary politics, particularly in rural settings at the margins of formal state power. These institutions interact with the state, often in informal ways, not codified in law, but as part of accepted practice. They thus facilitate the processes of redistribution, reform and allocation normally accepted as central state functions. The concept of ‘informalization of politics’ broadens the scope of state-society linkages by assessing how non-state forms of organization mobilizes resources, legitimacy and power through continuous struggle and negotiation (Meagher 2007; 497-410). In most African polities there are instances when public authority is not exclusive to the state and non-state institutions behave like state institutions; there is intense institutional competition and apolitical processes become highly politicised. These non-state

organizations and institutions exercise legitimate public authority but do not enjoy legal recognition; they are found between the public and private, the state and society (Lund, 2006; 673-679). The exercise of power by these institutions is bolstered by explicit and/or implicit reference to the state.

The salient feature of the 'informalization of politics' is "the emergence of actors who do not necessarily belong to the traditional governmental sphere, but yet play a part in the control of public affairs establishing complex relationships of antagonism, complementarity or simple juxtaposition with the state," (Bhudo, 2006; 800). These auxiliary actors have informal status and they evolve at the fringes of the administration; they play a part in the control of public affairs and act as foot-bridge between the bureaucracy and the general populace during reform processes such as land reform. De Wit and Berner (2009; 933) argue that these actors are more effective if they are a part of the political machinery and they can balance the need to make money and the need to remain popular, reliable and connected to decision making processes. The existence of non-state institutions and actors who behave like the formal state results in institutional pluralism and in the case of land reform this results in land acquisition and redistribution being susceptible to patronage and elite capture and this generates contempt for formal rules and regulations resulting in the manipulation of power. Meagher (2007; 413) draws attention to the case of Ghana and Somaliland where:

"Blurred boundaries facilitated elite capture of power and resources through opportunistic forms of mobilization and distribution that operated outside both formal and informal institutional frameworks. The effect was to weaken enforcement mechanisms at both the informal and formal levels, weakening not only conceptual categories but the authority and legitimacy of indigenous as well as state institutions".

Individuals and groups may take their claims to resources to institutions which they feel will most likely give them the most satisfactory outcomes and their political identities are also fluid allowing them to participate in different clientilistic networks. In addition to forum shopping by potential clients, intermediary patrons also make attempts to acquire and manipulate disputes for their own political ends (Lund, 2006; and Crook and Booth, 2011).

3.4 Salient features of instrumentalisation of disorder, neopatrimonialism and informalization of politics

Table 3.1 provides a tabulated summary of the salient features of each concept of state-society linkages in Africa and contextualises the features/variables within land reform processes. The table therefore provides the indicators which will be expected to distinguish land reform as a process of violent primitive accumulation or; as a neopatrimonial capture by state agents or; as an outcome of informal politics by state and non-state actors in alliance. Each of these processes (means) is likely to lead to rather different outcomes (ends) in terms of the nature of redistribution in a land reform, and these three possible means/processes and their related outcomes provide a gradient/continuum on which each case can be placed while accepting the proviso noted above that in reality the form of politics in each case will overlap and blur.

Table 3.1 Summary of salient features and outcomes of each concept

Instrumentalisation of disorder	Neopatrimonialism	Informalization of politics
<p>1. Deployment of violence, coercive force and disorder:</p> <p>a. To acquire land and its related investments for private gain</p> <p>b. To monitor, enforce and sanction the channels and spaces of land redistribution</p> <p>c. To mobilize and distribute land in exchange for public legitimacy and political support (votes)</p> <p>2. Predation by elites and predominantly narrow patronage were a few elites (national and intermediary) acquire and reward each other with prime and large tracts of land</p>	<p>1. Hybrid state structures which are relatively strong and effective but prone to manipulation for private accumulation of land by politico-bureaucrat elites (party-political machine located within the formal state structures and overlaps into the party system)</p> <p>2. corruption and clientilism in land allocations is largely coordinated and managed through the political-bureaucracy network</p> <p>3. A combination of narrow and distributional patronage. In the latter land is allocated to particular sections of society for social and political capital</p> <p>4. Acquisition and allocation of land is largely top-down and driven by political-bureaucratic networks</p>	<p>1. Non-state institutions which exercise state-like functions and exercises legitimate public authority in acquisition and allocation of land</p> <p>2. 3. Emergence of auxiliary actors outside formal state structures involved in land reform. These act as foot bridge between bureaucracy and the population and are involved in land acquisition and allocations</p> <p>4. Largely distributional patronage with minimal narrow patronage as land is distributed to a cross section of beneficiaries</p> <p>5. Both top-down and bottom-up acquisition and allocation of land through continuous negotiation and contestation</p>

The next chapter takes this framework and uses it to explore the political contexts and dynamics across three different cases, located in different geographic regions of Zimbabwe, asking how political contexts influence land reform processes and outcomes.

Chapter 4: Case Study Analysis

4.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a political economy analysis of three case studies based on well-grounded empirical research undertaken by Marongwe (2008), Zamchiya (2011 and forthcoming) and Scoones et al (2010) in Goromonzi, Chipinge and Masvingo respectively. Their seminal studies were based in three regions with quite contrasting agro-ecological conditions; previous land use patterns; levels of farm investment and socio-political histories including notably party preferences and affiliations as summarised in Table 4.1. The analysis in turn draws from theoretical concepts discussed in the previous chapter, exploring how political context affects land reform.

The critical analysis of each case study will be based on a substantial discussion of the following: key actors or leaders in the acquisition of land and its subsequent redistribution; the nature and patterns of authority exercised in the acquisition and redistribution of land; the redistribution of land and redistribution being conceptualised as both the distribution of land by the state and by non-state actors and access to land by citizens through state and non-state channels and finally; the legal and/or extra-legal exercise and threat of violence and coercive force both by state and non-state actors, during acquisition and redistribution of land. This will be contextualised with the eco-socio-political histories of the case study sites.

Table 4.1 Agro-ecological conditions and previous land use patterns on study sites

	Goromonzi	Chipinge	Masvingo
Agro-ecological conditions	Region 2, 750–1000mm rainfall, good rich soils	Region 1, over 1000 mm rainfall, excellent rich soils	Region 3 and 4 comprised of poor sandy, heavy soils and less than 500mm rainfall
Previous land use*	Crop Farming, Livestock, Ostrich, Wildlife, Horticulture	Specialized and diversified farming. Macadamia, Coffee, Dairy,	Cattle ranching, sugar production, cotton and game ranching [<i>the last three in Chiredzi</i>]
Farm investment and infrastructure development	49.2% used borehole water, 32.8% had access to private dams	Highly mechanised with significant investments meant for high value cash crops	High investments at sugar estates and safari businesses. Low investment
Voting patterns 1980-2010**	Zanu PF stronghold though opposition votes increased since FTLRP in 2000	Opposition has won over 80% of all elections since 1980	Swing constituency as political support has increasingly become evenly balanced with a difference of 3.7% in 2008
Incidences of political violence***	High, 628 out of 2168 nationally	Low 118 cases out 2168 nationally	Low with 33 cases out of 2168 nationally

Source: Author with extracts from various reports *restricted to farm sites **derived from trend analysis of electoral outcomes since 1980

*****based on 2008 figures when the worst electoral violence incidences were recorded since independence**

4.1 Goromonzi Case Study

The study by Marongwe (2008) sought to investigate the beneficiaries of FTLR in Goromonzi district by examining their class and power, as well as socio-economic and political characteristics. There were three main issues under investigation in the study and these were as follows; “firstly, an investigation of the institutional and process issues of beneficiary selection; the second objective examined the outcome of the first, zeroing in on: who benefited from Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRRP); the third and final issue under investigation was the impact of FTLR on agricultural production,” (Marongwe, 2008; iv). The most salient feature of FTLR in Goromonzi was the use and threat of use of violence and coercive force by both the state and non-state actors in the acquisition and distribution of land which consequently resulted in high levels of disorder in the process. A few elite individuals, national and local acquired and rewarded each other with farms in a non-transparent manner.

There was evidence of the deliberate use of violence and the use of coercive force by elites to allow them to acquire farms and their related infrastructure and economic investments. For example at Chabwino and Munhenga farms, which were identified as “hot spots of terror” (CFU report, 2000) as entry into the farms was blocked and political space closed, the wife of a top army commander was reported as having confiscated land and other equipment, including a centre-pivot from those farms (Zimbabwe, Government of 2006:49 and Marongwe, 2008; 290-1). This is an example of how ruling elites profited from the chaos which prevailed at occupied farms as they came in to take high-tech equipment and harvest crops even though they would have allocated themselves farms elsewhere. Systematic and organized violence is usually marshalled towards sections of society which can be used to meet particular economic aims (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 77). Hence the collusion of farm invaders and primitive accumulation by elites had a bearing on which farms could be acquired and who benefitted from. The political space did not allow for opposition sympathisers or dissenters to acquire land and remain on the plots, although in nearby farms not acquired by elite’s substantial numbers of ordinary citizens acquired land, largely originating from nearby urban areas.

Marongwe (2008; 312) notes that “beneficiaries who became victims of the process could not seek justice from any of the land committees *or other state institutions such as the judiciary,*” [own emphasis]. Scholars such as Chabal (2009), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Helmke and Levitski (2006) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue that clientilistic and patronage networks become more feasible when both patrons and clients have monitoring and sanctioning powers. Thus violence and coercive force was being deployed in an effort to monitor, enforce and sanction land distribution networks as well as dispelling rival networks.

When institutional mechanisms of regulating society start failing the clout of criminal bosses increase due to forum shopping and politicians assert themselves through criminal terror as they use the pretext of legitimate popular grievances and dissatisfaction in the existing social, economic and political order (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 81-84). In Goromonzi district, some farm occupiers started emerging as criminal elements and these enjoyed the protection of the state, either directly or indirectly. For example at Caledonia Farm, war veterans defrauded home seekers of millions of dollars whilst the state failed to intervene; there were allegations of cattle rustling, extortion and perpetration of violence against other settlers and; the farm also became a

safe haven for criminals and eight carjackers were nabbed there in 2004 (Marongwe, 2008; 319). State structures were completely absent at Caledonia Farm and three war veterans who led the occupation of the farm had unrestricted powers in which they dominated the institutional process of land allocation and maintenance of 'law and order'.

Wrangles which were reported in print and electronic media on the allocation of offer letters in Goromonzi District illustrate how heavy reliance on committees in the implementation of FTLR resulted in manipulation of land allocations by both national and local elites and how it had an impact on who benefitted land in Goromonzi district. The constitution of land committees; their interaction with formal state institutions and their overarching powers meant that the Zanu PF political machine and clientilistic networks were developed and consolidated within formal state structures. In Goromonzi district these committees played a domineering role in as far as land identification, acquisition and redistribution was concerned and they are still in existence and their powers remain unchecked.

Marongwe (2008; 285) argues that power and authority of new actors and institutions such as war veterans and committees of seven which emerged varied from one resettlement scheme to another but were mostly observed in A1 sites. What can be observed however is that the dominant actors at 'scheme' level were war veterans, Committees of Seven (*management committees made up of seven people were put in place to take care of scheme management*) and traditional leaders. Chief Chinamora asserted his traditional authority over Chabwino, Munenga, Amurisa and Marden of Svisva Farms thus emerging as a dominant actor. Committees of Seven at Dunstan, Zanado, Baines Hope Farm and Buena Vista Lot 1 and Lot 2 were dominated by war veterans as they were the original invaders; they exercised authority as they demarcated, pegged and allocated land with Ministry officials only coming in to confirm and make minor changes (Marongwe, 2008; 296). At Caledonia Farm, which was occupied for purposes of allocating residential stands the housing cooperative became the de-facto institution governing the scheme.

Thus it can be concluded that in Goromonzi district unofficial and political authority took precedence over official and technocratic authority at the local 'scheme' level initially and mostly on A1 sites (whose occupations were led by war veterans) whilst on A2 (where there was largely land grabbing) sites political-technocratic maintained its hegemony. Over time technocratic authority reasserted itself over unofficial authority as Ministry officials allocated

additional plots and in some instances cut down the number of beneficiaries on A1 settlements, for example at Dunstan Farm Ministry officials reduced the number of settlers from 218 to 115 (Marongwe, 2008; 296). Both the provincial and district land committees, which were controlled by powerful politicians asserted their authority over emerging scheme authorities as shown by examples of A1 land allocations, most of them self-selecting beneficiaries as a result of farm occupations, which were overturned to pave way for A2 allocations to national elites and their cronies.

Thus the distribution of land in Goromonzi district was affected by a number of processes, and influenced heavily by an ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ dominated by a few elites who gained from grabbing larger farms at the expense of others. Thus the pattern of allocation that resulted meant there were more large A2 farms, populated by elites, and fewer A1 farms occupied by war veterans and ordinary citizens who joined them. Elites were able to manipulate the technocratic/administrative process, and land invaders who claimed land earlier were unable to resist given the power and influence of such elites. A system of narrow patronage is observed in Goromonzi where a few elites (national and intermediary) acquired and rewarded each other with land in a particularistic rather than universalistic manner. Marongwe (2008; 211-331) provides the following examples;

In Mashonaland East province, 38 out of the 56 farms that were allocated as a whole were from Goromonzi ...About 57% of the land in the district was redistributed under the A2 model as opposed to the 43% that went to the A1 (small-holder based) schemes (Marongwe, 2008; 262)...Some senior government and security officials were allocated farms in excess of 1000ha. 95% of those allocated land in Mashonaland East were not on the List ...Civil servants (AREX and the Department of Lands supplied the bulk of the beneficiaries) constituted the largest class of beneficiaries at 25%. The Zimbabwean National Army followed closely with 18%, followed by businessmen at 14%, top Government officials and other prominent figures constituted 10% of the beneficiaries; the unemployed constituted about 12% of the sample.

Elites – including politicians, security force personnel, and administrative and technical bureaucrats as well as other state employees - dominated the list of beneficiaries in Goromonzi district. This was because of two main reasons: The disorder deployed at farm level and

multiplicity of institutions in land allocation created room for local bureaucrats to corruptly allocate themselves and their colleagues' prime land and; state employees became an important constituency for the survival of Zanu PF as a ruling party, since the state could no longer afford to give its employees reasonable salaries, rewarding them with prime land would retain their support for a while. Crucially Goromonzi district is close to Harare, the capital city, making it easy for urban based elites to move between their residences in town and their newly acquired farms.

Thus I argue that the prevalence of chaos in Goromonzi district was reinforced by an instrumentalised disorder. This made it more tenable and profitable for predatory elites, their intermediaries and ordinary citizens who emerged as beneficiaries to gain land. The multiplicity of institutions involved in land acquisition and allocation in turn resulted in disorderly allocations and emergent gaps which allowed for perverse clientilism and rampant corruption in Goromonzi district. This pattern was enhanced by the proximity of the site to Harare, and the presence of highly influential elites in the district.

4.2 Chipinge Case study

The study by Zamchiya (2011) focused on Chipinge district with particular/unique geopolitical and agro ecological factors as illustrated in Table 4.1. Chipinge is a high potential farming area, formerly with a focus on high value export crops, including macadamia nuts, Farms in this area were therefore seen as potentially highly valuable, and this influenced land allocations. Also, Chipinge District has a history of having a strong and influential opposition party, Zanu Ndonga, from as early as independence. This political context equally had a strong influence, as Zanu PF sought to exclude opposition supporters from the benefits of land reform

The study focuses on three A1 schemes namely Glen View Lot 1, Wedgehill and Wolfscrag farms which comprised of A1 villagised and self-contained settlements. The study pursues three objectives which are as follows: exploring the process of how land was acquired through formal allocation, occupation and formal allocation after re-placement of original invaders; secondly, exploring the identity of beneficiaries and those excluded to determine who got land, how and

why and finally examines the motivations of new farmers in seeking and acquiring land and interrogate how they became subordinated to partisan politics (Zamchiya, 2011; 1094). Zamchiya's study concludes that Fast Track Land Reform in Chipinge district was a ZANU-PF project meant to manipulate people's diverse claims to land by ensuring that land acquisition and redistribution was undertaken within party controlled patronage networks based on reciprocal loyalty by both ruling elites and land reform beneficiaries. There was reassertion of legitimacy by Zanu PF and at the same time subordination of beneficiaries to the party so as to guarantee their security of tenure.

Post 2000 land reform in Chipinge was kick started by farm invasions led by war veterans, traditional leaders with autochthonous claims, farm workers and mobilised ordinary citizens. However politico-bureaucrat elites moved in swiftly to assert their authority and determined which farms could be ultimately acquired and who would benefit from the redistribution process as the district had high value farms with significant investments and fertile soils coupled with favourable climatic conditions. Thus political-bureaucratic networks became a salient feature of land reform in Chipinge district. The 'politico-bureaucrat' alliance resulted in hybrid state structures [footnote] which are relatively strong and effective in as far as discharging their technocratic functions in land reform but prone to manipulation for private accumulation of farms and their related infrastructure. The District Land Committee became the central cog of the politico-bureaucrat network and acted as a supra-structure and had overriding powers over who ultimately settled on the plot as will be shown by examples in the next paragraph. The committee was composed of Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association's (ZNLWVA) district chairperson, ZANU-PF district chairperson, Head of the Department of Agritex, Head of the Department of Lands, Chiefs' representative, District Administrator (DA), and a Security Sector representative (Zamchiya, 2011; 1103). Applications for land were also made through the Zanu PF district coordinating committee who would then submit them to DLC making the process exclusionary to opposition supporters (Zamchiya, 2011; 1114). The political machine within which land was acquired and redistributed became located within formal state structures and overlapped into the party system.

Land redistribution was both through formal administrative procedures and farm occupations. At Wolfscrag Farm land was acquired through occupation led by war veterans aligned to Zanu PF

(those aligned to Zanu Ndonga an opposition political party declined to join) who mobilised traditional leaders who had restitution claims. The district administrator (DA) further allocated plots to farm workers who had initially not benefitted from occupations and civil servants also acquired land at the same farm though formal administrative structures albeit in an opaque manner (Zamchiya, 2011; 1104). Glen View Lot 1 was acquired and allocated through purported administrative procedures by the Ministry of Land (MoL) and District Land Committee (DLC). Wedgehill Farm was initially occupied by farm workers but they were displaced and the farm allocated to security sector officials, civil servants and war veterans through the DLC (Zamchiya, forthcoming). In instances where redistribution was through farm occupations new local authorities comprised of war veterans, ‘committees of seven’ and traditional leaders would emerge at scheme level and these were responsible for local governance functions such as pegging and allocating plots, determining land use patterns and solving collective agency problems. However, the ‘state’ would move in to reassert its authority subordinating emerging local authorities to the political-bureaucratic network and disorder associated with invasions was short-lived in Chipinge. Zanu PF as a party maintained influence and control over both farm occupations and formal administrative allocations. The manner in which a farm was acquired and farming land was redistributed had an influence on who would benefit from the process as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Farm occupations were an attempt at a bottom-up approach in the acquisition and distribution of land; however this gave way to political-bureaucratic domination inverting the process to a top-down distribution within Zanu PF controlled patronage networks. Emerging authorities such as war veterans, traditional leaders and the committee of seven became intermediaries between politico-bureaucrats and beneficiaries negotiating exchanges and providing mediation in the redistribution process. The domination of elites resulted in a skewed distribution process which favoured only those who closely participated in the clientilistic networks. The distribution was as follows: *60812 ha distributed to 922 A2 beneficiaries compared to 36132 ha distributed to 4881 A1 beneficiaries...in the study sites; Civil servants 35.0 %, Traditional authorities 22.2%, War veterans 16.7%, Security Services 15.0%, Other ‘Ordinary’ 6.9%, Former Farm workers 4.2% (Zamchiya, 2011; 1098-9).* The patterns of distribution and identity of beneficiaries was partly influenced by how the farm was acquired however the exertion of power by political-bureaucratic networks can be felt across and within study sites.

For example Wolfscrag Farm occupations were led by war veterans and traditional leaders and these dominate the list of beneficiaries; civil servants were further allocated self-contained plots through the administrative apparatus of the state. Despite the autochthonous claims by traditional leaders, the farm was a high value enterprise at which timber, coffee and macadamia was grown hence it could not be left at the mercy of ‘invaders’. Glen View Lot 1 which specialised in cattle breeding with high milking technology investment on the farm was allocated through the MoL and DLC and in the end prime land with high value dairy milk infrastructure was taken by civil servants with grazing land being allocated to ordinary beneficiaries. Wedgehill Farm was highly mechanised and specialised in macadamia and coffee production with high infrastructural development and the farm workers who initially occupied the farm were evicted by the DLC to pave way for security sector officials, civil servants and war veterans. The coordination and management of land acquisition and redistribution by political-bureaucratic networks and the politicised and autochthonous nature of farm invasions left the process prone to corruption and clientilism and limited possibilities of having a more diverse composition of ordinary beneficiaries. Bureaucrats, often with the support of political systems, manipulate policies and institutional arrangements in order to create personal wealth and they can become part and parcel of mechanisms that promote primitive accumulation (Leys, 1975 and O’Brien 1975 for examples from Kenya and Senegal respectively).

4.3 Masvingo Case Study

The study by Scoones et al (2010) involved in-depth field research in 16 land reform sites over a decade. The research sites were located in four research ‘clusters’ across the province, involving a sample population of 400 households. The main thrust is to challenge the ‘myths’ associated with Land Reform in Zimbabwe. The myth which is more relevant for this particular study is *Myth 2: The beneficiaries of Zimbabwean land reform have been largely political ‘cronies’* and the study discusses the identity of land beneficiaries and how they benefitted the land, including the processes of land allocation.

In Masvingo, war veterans and traditional leaders emerged as auxiliary actors outside traditional governmental spheres but yet played a key part in the control of land redistribution processes and had complex relationships with state structures involved in FTLR, providing a link between the bureaucracy and ordinary citizens. The study argues that these actors have long had an ambivalent relationship with the state – at one time supported by the state, and at others in opposition. As noted in Chapter 2, war veterans emerged on the national scene as political actors in the late 1990s in the context of economic and political crisis. Some elements of the war veteran’s movement were co-opted by the ruling party, Zanu PF as political agents, particularly following 2000, while others remained more focused on local issues, and indeed showed considerable disgruntlement with the actions of the Zanu PF elite (Scoones et al 2010). In the context of the Jambanja phase of land reform, war veterans dominated the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the invaded farms, where the state seemed to have lost control and formal authority (Chaumba et al 2003). Thus ‘war veterans’ and their rules of engagement were evidently non-state institutions which exercised state-like functions and legitimate public authority and this became a key feature of land reform in Masvingo. These non-state actors and institutions operated under the purview of the state in general and Zanu PF in particular but not in a homogenous way or without contestation.

Most farm occupations were led by war veterans who mobilised ordinary villagers from surrounding communal areas. Farm occupations were fluid and complex, and varied from site to site. Jambanja was often associated with disorder and general lawlessness. For example at Fair Range farm roads were closed down; trees cut down; cattle theft and poaching reported; property and sugar cane looted and political space was closed down and war veterans often had a dual role as farm invaders who invaded farms and at the same time mobilised political support for Zanu PF (Chaumba et al 2003). However the invasions coexisted with a developmental trajectory pursued by the same emerging authorities comprised of war veterans and traditional leaders and sometimes constituted as the committee of seven. For example social networks such as work parties, funeral assistance and religious interactions emerged on most farm sites at the same time as opposition sympathisers were being barred from schemes and there was asset stripping of farms. Formal land use planning tools were used to peg and allocate farms unofficially and when technocracy was reasserted war veterans and traditional leaders worked together with bureaucrats to rationalise and legitimise farm occupations.

The patterns of authority during land reform in Masvingo changed over time and were quite complex as there were complementarities and contestations, flexibility of posts and people and the fluidity of identities and identification. The state had an ambiguous character as it was present in one area and absent in another. For example Turf Ranch is located in a remote area where state control is fragmentary whereas the state's hand was quite visible at other farm sites with high value farming operations (Scoones et al, 2010; 188). Informal practices became embedded with formal state structures and systems resulting in antagonism, complementarity or simple juxtaposition. At *Wondedzo farm* the war vet leader established criteria based on economic status as an indication of ability to utilize farm thus determining who got a villagised plot or self-contained plot (Scoones et al, 2010; 188). The assertion of authority by bureaucrats in terms of land planning and use as well as provision of offer letters (Chaumba et al, 2003 and Scoones et al, 2005; 45) resulted in differentiated relationships between local 'scheme' authorities and technocrats. In some instances official authority came into conflict with unofficial authority as Ministry of Lands officials downsized, re-planned and allocated additional plots on occupied farms, for example at Clare Farm or when government officials came and destroyed temporary structures and drew new settlement plans at Lonely Farm and; in worst cases such as Uswashava farm, government has refused to provide settlers with offer letters since the farm was not designated under FTLRP. There are other instances when political authority would override technocratic authority especially when powerful elites would disregard land use rules e.g. at Lonely Farm A, a settler occupied land allocated for grazing but could not be removed since his son is employed in the state security department. On most farm sites there was cooperation between MoL officials, extension workers and settler committees in land use planning; demarcation and pegging of plots and dispute resolution such that formal pegging by the state legitimised informal acquisition through occupations. Traditional authority reasserted itself in some instances overshadowing political contestations as they articulated land reform as a process of restitution e.g. Chiefs Chikwanda and Makore at Sanangwe and Wondedzo Farms and Chiefs Chitanga and Chinana Turf Ranch and Edenvale Farm (Scoones et al, 2010; 195-7). These traditional authorities exercised important forms of informal politics with a developmental purpose particularly at A1 farms as they were also involved in the distribution of humanitarian aid as well as farming inputs and implements provided by the government during the early years of land reform.

As a result of the factors discussed above, land reform in Masvingo was undertaken in both top-down (*DA allocations and administrative procedures*) and bottom-up approaches (*farm occupations*) through continuous negotiation and contestation resulting in largely distributional patronage with minimal narrow patronage as farming land was widely dispersed to a diverse group of beneficiaries. Scoones et al, (2010; 5) study shows that 68.2% beneficiaries were ordinary citizens and 20.2% were civil servants and security service employees (Scoones et al, 2010; 53). However, 30% of beneficiaries at sugar plots were central and local government employees (Scoones et al, 2010; 54) due to proximity and sometimes participation in patronage networks. Most A2 beneficiaries were allocated plots through formal administrative processes or patronage connections e.g. at Fair Range which is formerly part of Mapanza Estates hence of strategic economic value and; Hippo Valley which is also of high economic value with high-tech infrastructure development was allocated through a technocratic process with the bulk of beneficiaries being war veterans and civil servants. Conflicts in the redistribution process also arose from the re-designation of A1 settlements to A2 and subsequent reallocation of plots and displacement of early occupiers, e.g. at Asveld Ranch, a ranching and safari operation which was initially occupied by invaders, it was eventually designated an A2 settlement and distributed to outsiders side-lining locals with the remaining portion being taken by a senior government official. Even though the benefits of land seem to be widely dispersed in Masvingo, there is nevertheless some evidence in some of the sites of linkages between invaders and Zanu PF party authorities resulting in the tightening of party control in resettlement areas.

Thus in Masvingo, informal politics was evident, where 'state-like' institutions were established through land invasions to carry out developmental functions. These were of course not immune from political influence and, as in Chipinge, politico-bureaucratic networks operated. This was most apparent in the allocation of A2 farms, which were often acquired by those in government positions, sometimes through the manipulation of allocation procedures. By contrast in the A1 schemes which were invaded by alliances of war veterans, local traditional leaders and local people a different outcome was seen. These invasions sometimes had direct support from party and military structures, but often were independent especially at the initial stages. A complex form of local politics was evident, reflected in the diverse outcomes on the ground.

Chapter 5: The political dynamics of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe

5.1 Introduction

The review of literature on citizen politician linkages vis-à-vis the supply and demand of resources by the state and citizens respectively indicated that the manner in which limited resources such as land are claimed, accessed and redistributed is influenced by the geopolitical context, economic value, socio-cultural histories, contingent events and economic and political incentives faced by actors on the ground. Different localities within the same region can witness differentiated interactions between the state and citizens/society and these interactions are fluid and dynamic as they continuously shift over time.

The comparative analysis of Chipinge, Goromonzi and Masvingo case studies has also confirmed that there is no single story for land reform in Zimbabwe. There was a much more nuanced and differentiated manner in which citizens made claims to and acquired land than projected in the generalized narratives dominating the literature. The same can be said of the manner in which the state redistributed land. Having arrived at that observation it becomes important to explore further some of the underlying factors which led to each locality experiencing particular land redistribution patterns, making use of the framework introduced earlier in the dissertation.

Table 3.1 offered an overview of the salient features of each of the three types of political dynamic drawn from the extensive literature of African state-society interactions. A number of these features can be assessed comparatively across the cases. In the following discussion I focus on four: geographic location, relating to the proximity to the capital and the economic value of potential farm production; voting patterns to explore whether party affiliation and influence has a bearing on the form of politics seen; levels of electoral violence and its locational pattern and agents of perpetration as an indicator of the degree to which state-mediated disorder, especially through party run youth militia, has an influence; and local institutions, and the role of war veterans and traditional leaders.

5.2 Unpacking the underlying economic and political dynamics in Goromonzi District

In Goromonzi District the instrumentalisation of disorder by national and intermediate elites was more evident as disorder and coercive force was deployed on most sites to pave way for the acquisition of farms with high infrastructural development and economic value by elites especially on A2 farms. Goromonzi District had not previously experienced significant land reforms before as it was considered the prime farming area of the country and also comprised of farms designated as export processing zones, notably the Macheke-Virginia region which significantly contributed to the national tobacco output. There was thus significant demand for land in the area, particularly from dispossessed urban dwellers many of whom had lost their jobs due to the economic structural adjustment period. While some of these poorer, urban dwellers gained land through land invasions and were allocated plots in the A1 schemes, the dominant pattern in Goromonzi was the grabbing of large farms by elites, either as whole farms or as large A2 farms.

These elites, many well connected to Zanu PF and the military, were able to make use of their position to instrumentalise disorder. This involved considerable violence and the deployment of youth militia and others. This early phase then paved way for neopatrimonialism as bureaucratic and political elites manipulated the farm allocation process and technocratic authority reasserted itself on some farm sites albeit in the political and economic interests of elites. Informal institutions were also evident on some farm sites as war veterans, traditional leaders and influential individuals emerged as ‘scheme’ authorities especially on A1 farms.

The prevalence of disorder and its manipulation for economic and political ends in Goromonzi was equally a result of a national climate of lawlessness and lack of rule of law. Across the country in the period around 2000, there was a general breakdown in the rule of law as witnessed by the disregard of court orders and rulings with regards to farm invasions; institutionalised and state-sanctioned political violence and; failure by the police to maintain law and order (Raftopolous and Hamner, 2003). A clear distinction between disorder and the instrumentalisation of disorder has to be made as the latter explicitly refers to the systematic manipulation of chaotic process for the benefit of a few powerful individuals and their cronies.

This was clearly evident in Goromonzi, and thus differentiated this setting from other areas where ‘jambanja’ exploited a vacuum in authority and apparent disorder to allow farm invasions, which in many instances were in fact very orderly, even if formally illegal.

The proximity of Goromonzi District to urban settlements like Harare, Ruwa and Chitungwiza shaped the land occupation dynamics and the outcomes of who the beneficiaries were as the region attracted ruling elites based in the capital, civil servants and urban dwellers who would find it convenient to shuttle between their newly acquired plots and urban residencies. War veterans and ZANU P.F. party cadres were conspicuous in mobilizing people in the urban settlements as they took advantage of the difficulties associated with finding decent accommodation and inability to pay rentals as one of the push factors for urban residents to participate in the land occupations.

Since the emergence of a vibrant opposition party, Mashonaland East province has always been a stronghold of Zanu PF and between 2000 and 2008 the party resoundingly won all constituencies in Goromonzi District and nearby areas. However the party’s fortunes changed in the 2008 harmonised elections when the opposition MDC made some inroads and won Goromonzi South constituency, while losing in Goromonzi West and North by less than 5% (ZESN report, 2008). Various factors can explain how constituencies in Goromonzi have shifted from being ruling party strongholds to become swing constituencies. Of relevance to this study is the large influx of ‘urbanites’ into the resettlement areas through land invasions which could have diluted the traditional communal area support for Zanu PF. The opposition largely drew its support from urban areas and most land beneficiaries who came from the nearby towns and cities and benefitted land in Goromonzi maintained their jobs and residencies in urban areas. Thus, while mobilised by Zanu PF activists, these new farm dwellers from the urban areas, were not necessarily supporters of the party, although their commitment to the opposition could not be outwardly expressed for fear of retaliation by the Zanu PF stalwarts who controlled key positions.

This fragile political situation in Goromonzi became very evident during the 2008 elections, as political force was used to intimidate and displace opposition supporters from the communities' and a total of 628 cases of violence were recorded in the 2008 elections and these were the second highest nationally⁵. There were strong incentives for the political elite to instrumentalise disorder, both during the land acquisition process and subsequently. This was valuable land, near the capital, and this was also a battleground for wider national political control, that Zanu PF was not going to let go of. Thus the patterns of organised violence and disorder, and the modes of acquisition of land by political-military elites can be explained in particular because of these factors, while recognising that on the A1 farms in particular other dynamics were evident, with poorer urban dwellers, many of whom were not Zanu PF supporters privately, moving onto land to support their livelihoods.

5.3 Unpacking the underlying economic and political dynamics in Chipinge District

Chipinge District provides a good case of neopatrimonialism, as political-bureaucratic networks dominated the land redistribution process resulting in politically motivated allocations of land. Chipinge district has had a unique history of political pluralism and multi-party elections which dates back from independence in 1980 to date. ZANU Ndonga, a small opposition political party whose leader, Ndabaningi Sithole⁶ had roots from the district exclusively won all parliamentary elections in the two constituencies, Chipinge North and Chipinge South, held from 1980 up to the 2000 elections which coincided with FTLRP. Even though the opposition retained Chipinge South constituency in the 24–25 June 2000 parliamentary election, for the first time ZANU-PF won Chipinge North, at the height of Fast Track as the constituency covered much of the Highveld where Fast Track occurred⁷. In the 2005 parliamentary elections Zanu PF went on to win both parliamentary seats albeit with a small margin of less than 5% which is an indication of the intense political competition in the district. In the 29 March 2008 general election ZANU-PF managed to win one parliamentary seat in the district, Chipinge central, which covers most of the

⁵ See <http://www.sokwanele.com/map/electionviolence> for a detailed presentation of geographical distribution of violence and the identity of perpetrators.

⁶ Ndabaningi Sithole was the founding chairperson of ZANU in 1963 and led the liberation movement before he was ousted in the early 1970's. He went on to form ZANU NDONGA which became an opposition party post-independence.

⁷ See www.zesn.org.zw for all election results since 2000

Fast Track resettlement schemes and lost all the other three seats namely Musikavanhu, Chipinge East and Chipinge West in the arid lowveld to the opposition. Zanu PF clearly saw the importance of land reform patronage for gaining a foothold in this opposition territory, and deployed neopatrimonial political-bureaucratic networks to that end.

The level of political plurality in Chipinge District reduced the incentives for political elites to locate patronage (land redistribution) networks within the communities since ZANU PF did not command sufficient support. Instead there were more incentives for them to have the political machine located within the bureaucracy which could be more effective in advancing the party's agenda, concentrating support in certain areas. However this does not imply that voters made their voting choices solely based on the land reform process because, voters have other social, political and economic needs that influence how they vote. It is the plurality of political options and the intense contestation in the political arena – a feature of this region since Independence – that is important in understanding the Chipinge dynamic. In contrast to Goromonzi, the area was not plagued by violence. Only 34 cases of violence were recorded in Masvingo province out of a national total of 2168 recorded cases and in comparison to 628 cases for Mashonaland East and 118 cases for Manicaland in the 2008 presidential elections which is considered the bloodiest in post-independent Zimbabwe's electoral history (Sokwanele Violence map, 2008). Youth militia while present did not operate in the same way under the direction of senior political elites. Instead the political contests were more local and mediated by district level political-bureaucratic maneuvers which were embedded in very context specific political-bureaucratic networks, reflecting the political competition in the area.

Much of the land acquired in Chipinge District was from highly mechanized farms with high economic value productions making them potentially highly lucrative. Self-contained A1 plots were also more common than villagised A1 plots and most of the land was fertile such that civil servants were equally tempted to benefit from land reform and used their strategic position to benefit ahead of ordinary citizens. In many respects the form of allocation in this area was more similar to A2 allocations elsewhere, as land invasions by local people were quickly superseded by formal technical-administrative allocations, allowing the exercise of patronage networks and the creation of neopatrimonial dynamic, linking political and bureaucratic actors.

5.4 Unpacking the underlying economic and political dynamics in Masvingo

In the case of Masvingo, land redistribution was initially dominated by auxiliary actors, mostly war veterans, Zanu PF activists and traditional leaders who in most instances acted as the link between political and bureaucratic institutions particularly on A1 farms since in some areas the state was not strongly present. The war veterans who led farm occupations cannot be treated as a homogenous group as there were factions amongst them especially considering that Zanu PF in Masvingo Province has always had two rival factions led by the late Vice President Simon Muzenda and the late senior Minister Edison Zvobgo, dating back from the liberation struggle right into post-independent Zimbabwe. Therefore political-bureaucratic networks could not easily marshal war veterans as a singular unit as factionalism resulted in competing patrons at scheme level. For example, at Wondedzo Farm two rival war veterans mobilised villagers from communal areas and demarcated, pegged and allocated plots with one of the war veterans becoming headman and chair of the committee of seven. This leads to the argument that the identity of war veterans was fluid and slippery as they acted as war veterans, Zanu PF leaders, members of the committee of seven with some of them becoming traditional leaders depending with needs of a particular time and situation. Political authority was not homogenized as different actors within ZANUPF were also at conflict and they discharged political authority these include the provincial governor, President's office, security service chiefs, party structures and powerful individuals with strong political connections. Such intense political contestations within Zanu PF in the province had a major bearing on who eventually benefitted under FTLRP, making the likelihood of simple capture by one group unlikely.

The relatively low agricultural potential of land in Masvingo province and the long distance from Harare meant that high ranking elites were not necessarily attracted to the area, although some had home connections in the province and acquired farms. Outside the sugar estates there was limited infrastructure and it was in the estates where the clearest pattern of neopatrimonialism was evident, where allocations were influenced by political-bureaucratic networks as in Chipinge. Neopatrimonialism was especially evident in Masvingo particularly on A2 farms whose allocations were made through political-bureaucratic networks. In Masvingo just as in Chipinge there was no widespread evidence of systematic instrumentalisation of disorder, and

recorded violence and presence of youth militia around the 2008 election was minimal and for the whole of Manicaland only 118 cases of political violence were recorded which is less than 5% of the national total (Sokwanele, 2008).

This meant that in what became the A1 resettlement schemes, and in the large areas in Masvingo that were not formally allocated but were occupied, a different style of informal politics emerged. This was led by different actors, including war veterans and traditional leaders (with the boundaries merging between them over time), allowing the jambanja invasions to lead to substantive developmental outcomes, as new farms started to till the land, invest and accumulate. State-like institutions were established which began to interact with formal state structures over time in the planning of sites and the delivery of services. This informal politics thus served a broader, productive developmental purpose. These structures of course were not immune from wider political processes, and the resettlement areas in Masvingo as elsewhere were seen as a Zanu PF domain. However, as in Chipinge and Goromonzi, this did not mean that all residents were Zanu PF supporters, even if they could only express allegiance in public to Zanu PF for fear of reprisals. The electoral results of 2008 show a finely balanced pattern, with traditional support for Zanu PF continuing in the southern constituencies, while a more even split with the opposition occurring in Gutu and Masvingo Central.

6. Conclusion

An analytical review of the three cases- Chipinge, Goromonzi and Masvingo- has shown that simple generalizations about Zimbabwe's land reform political dynamics are inappropriate and a much more differentiated account is needed. Essentially there were two processes going on – one involving invasions by war veterans and others, with varying degrees of political interference from the center and another involving a very direct form of grabbing, either through technocratic/administrative means or directly through political maneuvering. Each of these processes was affected differently by the way politics was played out under FTLRP which in turn was affected by the different economic and socio-political histories of the regions. These eco-socio-political histories influenced the outcomes of land reform and the way acquisitions and allocations were made in each of the three cases can be juxtaposed with the salient features summarized in Table 3.1. I conclude that instrumentalization of disorder was more salient in

Goromonzi as compared to Chipinge in which neopatrimonialism was much more defined and Masvingo were informal politics dominated the processes.

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