Tag Archives: Patrick Chinamasa

Two speeches for ‘new era’ Zimbabwe

From http://www.zimbabwesituation.com

Over the last few weeks I have been in Zimbabwe, visiting our field research sites in Mvurwi, Matobo and Masvingo. It has been an exciting period, with fast-moving developments. The euphoria of November has given way to the realism of December, and with this some emerging sense of what the ‘new era’ might bring.

Two speeches have dominated the news – first the inauguration speech by President Mnangagwa and, second, the budget speech last week by reinstalled finance minister, Patrick Chinamasa. Of course actions must follow words, but overall I find the tenor and content broadly positive, and I remain cautiously optimistic that a corner has been turned.  In this blog, I will offer some excerpts from and comments on both, focusing only on land and agriculture issues.

The inauguration speech was well crafted, aimed to send messages to different audiences from each paragraph. Following a respectful acknowledgement of the former president Robert Mugabe, he rejected the sanctions imposed on the country, creating a ‘pariah state’. He argued for letting ‘bygones be bygones’ and for the need for everyone to accept the historical realities and politics of the country, particularly in relation to land reform. Land – and the irreversibility of land reform, but the importance of investment and effective utilisation – was emphasised right up front in the speech in the following important passage:

“…given our historical realities, we wish the rest of the world to understand and appreciate that policies and programmes related to land reform were inevitable. Whilst there is a lot we may need to do by way of outcomes, the principle of repossessing our land cannot be challenged or reversed. Dispossession of our ancestral land was the fundamental reason for waging the liberation struggle. It would be a betrayal of the brave men and women who sacrificed their lives in our liberation struggle if we were to reverse the gains we have made in reclaiming our land. Therefore, I exhort beneficiaries of the Land Reform Programme to show their deservedness by demonstrating commitment to the utilisation of the land now available to them for national food security and for the recovery of our economy. They must take advantage of programmes that my Government shall continue to avail to ensure that all land is utilized optimally. To that end, my Government will capacitate the Land Commission so that the commission is seized with all outstanding issues related to land redistribution”.

The following comment on compensation was the one that was picked up by the international press. It of course represented no shift in position, as compensation for ‘improvements’ on the land (but not for the land itself) has long been accepted, although payments have been extremely slow:

“My Government is committed to compensating those farmers from whom land was taken, in terms of the laws of the land. As we go into the future, complex issues of land tenure will have to be addressed both urgently and definitely, in order to ensure finality and closure to the ownership and management of this key resource, which is central to national stability and to sustained economic recovery. We dare not prevaricate on this key issue.”

Reference to the ‘laws of the land’ clearly relates to the Constitution, which as an all-party agreement confirmed this policy position. What was different in this speech was the tone, and the public commitment. While policies may have not changed, the PR machine and sense of urgency clearly has. This is excellent news, given that compensation has long been a major outstanding issue, preventing closure on the land reform, and resulting in on-going sanctions being applied around still ‘contested land’.

While the inauguration speech was inevitably thin on detail, more was offered in the budget statement last week. Chapter 7 focused on ‘support for agriculture’, with the budget rather optimistically expecting the sector to grow by 15.9% on the back of a really good season. Re-emphasising the importance of agriculture in the President’s inauguration speech as the ‘mainstay’ of the economy, issues of land utilisation, land tenure and boosting production were emphasised.

Chinamasa’s statement summarised the challenges of ‘new farmers’ thus, “On average, the new farmer had been encountering constraints which became a hindrance to full productive utilisation of the land, bordering around capacity, resources, and elements of insecurity over tenure. The result was much idle farmland, and unaccountability on the part of the farmer with regard to use of acquired land holdings for farming in support of domestic food security, supply of agro-inputs and exports”.

A number of remedies were offered:

On land tenure: “To give confidence to beneficiaries that their occupancy is guaranteed, and cannot be withdrawn willy-nilly, through the indiscipline of either youths, political leaders, traditional leaders or senior officials, Government is undertaking to institute measures to strengthen the legal standing of Offer Letters and 99 Year Leases. This enables the much needed farm investments, improved utilisation of land and, therefore, production”. This is good news, and also a relief that the lease/permit option remains preferred over a mad titling spree advocated by some. The budget emphasised the need to speed up farm valuations and surveys, so that the issuing of leases can be speeded up, supported by the Surveyor General (and drones!).

On land audits and under-utilised land: Through the process of land auditing “issues of multi-farm ownership, idle land and under-utilisation of land are going to be identified. Idle land represents dead capital and promotes speculative tendencies, if not checked on the part of the land holders. As a result, the economy loses on optimal agricultural production”. The Zimbabwe Land Commission is charged with this responsibility, and the budget speech urged the long-awaited audit to move forward.

On Command Agriculture: “The thrust is on full, efficient and sustainable utilisation of allocated land, for increased investment on the land and production”. The role of ‘anchor companies’ (such as Sakunda) as part of a strategic public-private partnership is emphasised,. Such companies provide “access to capital and markets, sharing of best practices, farming knowledge and transfer of expertise, mutually beneficial to both parties. More specifically, the identified anchor companies have the critical roles of providing access to capital, training the small scale farmers and coordinating marketing, including exporting”. Interestingly, Command Agriculture is seen as a “transitional inception intervention”. There is a recognition that, pending allocation of leases and the release of private finance (especially for the A2 farms), collaborative financing models, involving the state and the private sector are needed. “In the interim, the new farmer would need to be incubated as they learn the ropes and overcome learning-by-doing inefficiencies that entail yields lower than would obtain with best practices, making a case for transitional producer prices higher than import parity levels.” As discussed in an earlier blog, a key issue is how long – and how politically necessary – such an ‘interim’ phase is required, as the cost of defaults and $390 per tonne of maize is huge.

On ‘leakages’ and abuse: An extended section of the speech focused on leakages in the Command Agriculture and Presidential Inputs Scheme, recognising the problems of corruption that have been widely reported. A decentralised electronic data management is proposed, along with the capacitation of Agritex offices and ‘command centres’. Investigations of abuse are promised, whereby “culprits will be quickly brought to book”. Clearly Command Agriculture is a high-profile plank of economic policy for the ‘new era’ (at least for now) – extending from maize and wheat to include soy beans and livestock in the coming season. In line with the wider rhetoric around stamping out corruption, military discipline and well-designed logistics operation will be applied it seems, with Air Marshall Perence Shiri firmly in charge.

On loan repayments: The budget speech highlighted (in the context of course of a very good rainfall season) the loan repayment pattern of Command Agriculture. For maize, “loan recoveries are running at 66%, with the Command Agriculture Revolving Fund registering repayment receipts of US$47.4 million in loan recoveries from farmers. This is against an anticipated repayment target of US$72 million. Out of the 50 000 farmers contracted to produce maize under Command Agriculture, 33% fully paid their loan obligations, with 22% having partially paid their obligations, while recoveries others are being made as they deliver to GMB.” A broadly similar pattern is reported for wheat. Let’s see what the final figures are once all crops are delivered, but for a state loan scheme such returns are not bad, although clearly could be improved, with over 10,000 farmers not having paid anything by 23 November. To that end: “To encourage our farmers to continue paying back their debt obligations, all fully paid farmers are being prioritised in accessing inputs under the 2017/18 Command Agriculture programme.” This sort of financial discipline is encouraging, and is certainly reflected in conversations I had with a number of A2 farmer beneficiaries of the scheme who are committed to repayments, and are actively being chased for them, despite their apparent status or political connections.

On private finance: With Command Agriculture presented as temporary, what alternatives are suggested? “As we move forward, private sector and commercial bank finance will be required to fully take up its rightful role of adequately underpinning agriculture, particularly, A2 commercial farmers”. For this, the A2 99 year lease is seen as crucial, although continued politicking around this continues. For smallholders, contract farming arrangements are highlighted.

On compensation: Not much detail was offered here, other than a recommitment to paying compensation in line with the Constitution. The statement indicated monies were to be set aside, both for normal compensation and for those areas appropriated that were under bilateral investment treaties. The amounts were however not specified; clearly there is hope that donor support and debt rescheduling will help.

In sum, the policy directions proposed by both speeches are certainly on the right track. The opposition complained that their ideas had been stolen, highlighting a converging consensus on many policy issues. The challenge will be to make the grand ambitions happen, so far with extremely limited resources; although of course with the hope of new injections of donor funds and lines of credit. Central to the challenge for land and agriculture will be to combine all elements in a new, effective land administration and financing/support system. The new minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and his team, as well as the independent land commission, all have their work cut out. Hopefully some of the ideas shared in this blog and from our research over the years will help in charting a way forward.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

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The politics of reform in Zimbabwe

chinamasa-02

Last month two major reports came out on economic and political reform in Zimbabwe. The first from Chatham House, looking at economic reform and the question of re-engagement by international actors, and the second, from the Institute for Security Studies, looking at similar themes, but focusing more on the political challenges.

They come to rather different conclusions. The Chatham House report argues strongly for re-engagement by the West and the International Finance Institutions. The ISS report is more sceptical, arguing that Zimbabwe’s reforms could be seen more of an exercise in pretence, and may help prop up the regime.

We have heard these arguments before. The pragmatists, arguing for engagement with the inevitable response that this is appeasement and those arguing for a major overhaul, but without any clear plan for how. Neither of these reports fall firmly into these stereotypes. These are both written by commentators with deep knowledge of the situation.

However, I found the Chatham House report definitely the most convincing. The authors are sanguine about the challenges, but realistic about what needs to be done. Their headline message is that “International and regional governmental engagement does not guarantee the success of long-term reform, but continued isolation will almost certainly lead to the failure of reforms to take hold”.

They point to the very real shifts that have occurred in the last year or two, often not accounted for in commentary on Zimbabwe. In part this is a response to the desperate economic situation, but also a sense of greater realism amongst elements of the ZANU-PF elite. The Chatham House report highlights the words of Patrick Chinamasa (pictured above), who has been leading the negotiations with the IFIs, among others. In a London speech in July he said:

“We are doing everything in our power to improve the operating environment in Zimbabwe to attract foreign direct investment. What the country needs right now is capital – new money. The debts and liabilities are there, and we need a strategy that can make the economy grow. And for the economy to grow we need foreign direct investments, which is why we are involved in a strategy to change the operating environment and we’ve moved mountains in this regard.”

The economic situation is certainly dire. The appreciation of the US dollar has made Zimbabwe’s exports less competitive. Manufacturing has declined yet further, along with the tax base, and so government revenues. This means paying civil servants (83% of public expenditure) is more and more difficult. Attempts to improve liquidity through creating treasury bills, bond notes and the rest have met with protest. Banks have gone bust, cash is in short supply, and hard currency is leaving the country in large amounts as the country becomes the region’s ‘bureau de change’.

Continued restrictions by the US government under ZDERA (the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001) means currency negotiations with the US Federal Reserve are prevented, and the economy must rely on exports, remittances, foreign investment and credit lines, all of which are under pressure. Confidence is at a low ebb, as political turmoil persists, and this in turn puts off investors, who fear yet more disruption around the next elections, and as a result of any succession battle for the presidency. The Chatham House report lays out the details, with some stark facts and figures (although as ever misrepresenting the data on food security – see recent blogs on this).

From liberation to liberalism: what prospects for reform?

This is the context that is forcing change. Chinamasa represents what the Chatham House report authors call a “transition from hard-line ‘patriotic liberationism’ to a more pragmatic economic liberalism”. The ISS report agrees that Zimbabwe has “the technical competencies to deliver” but points to the political challenges. The report observes: ”political support has been partial, inconsistent and largely tepid, underscoring a dawning reality that the imperatives of retaining ZANU-PF hegemony, the inevitability of Mugabe leaving office and the related factionalism around succession fundamentally stifle prospects for reform and, by extension, narrow options for engagement”. It goes on: “engagement is selective, policy statements often incoherent and serious questions remain about government’s commitment to deliver”. It concludes pessimistically: “the course appears set for continued economic decline, internecine political machinations and growing potential for violence, resistance and repression”.

There are good grounds for such pessimism, but a more rounded examination, as contained in the Chatham House report, shows that there is more going on than many give credit for, and that the political struggles over what reform means are more complex. To date, the government has certainly made important strides towards IFI compliance, under extremely constrained circumstances. This has been focused on the public finances, including reforms of the banking sector, attempts at public wage restraint, parastatal reform and privatization, efforts to inject greater transparency and accountability into the mining sector, and implementation of Constitutional provisions around land compensation and audit. Not all of these interventions have been successful, and there have been popular and political backlashes. Many – rightly – remain cynical. But there has been a surprising energy and commitment. This is about economic, and crucially, political survival.

However, as the Chatham House report notes, such reforms are only the beginning. Many international players want to see more. For example, “A deep wage cut across the board, clarity and consistency on indigenization, and the finalization of 99-year leases” will be required, plus “measurable democratic reforms, including the alignment of legislation to the 2013 constitution, abidance to the rule of law and adherence to human rights norms”. This may all be a tall order, particularly in the febrile political atmosphere in the run up to the 2018 elections, meaning many in the international community and the wider opposition will remain unconvinced.

Currently Zimbabwe is in a bind. The constraints on both international public and also private investment are stifling any prospect of economic recovery. Many investors suspect that reforms will be affected by party political dynamics. As the Chatham House report observes: “Attempts to attract investors are hampered by the lack of apparent planning for Zimbabwe’s post-Mugabe political leadership, and a prolonged succession battle could be extremely risky, not just for the party, but also for the country”.

Despite these qualifications, the Chatham House report is upbeat. It notes: “even in a context of severe economic constraints – and despite some overlaps between party and government issues – the government continues to function, and is supported by a professional, albeit eroded, civil service. There is still an operational distinction between party and government, and the divisions in the party have not fully replicated themselves across the state. Zimbabwe’s institutional capacity is fairly robust. Parliament remains an important nexus for bipartisan debate and scrutiny of elected officials”. These are important observations, and often forgotten (see an earlier blog on persistent bureaucratic professionalism).

Political alliances for reform

If technocratic and institutional capacity is not lacking, political incentives for reform often are. Here the Chatham House report again offers a nuanced analysis. It points to two opposing forces, cutting across party lines. First, there are those who have incentives to support reform. This includes many in ZANU-PF and the military who have strong business interests. They are driving the reform agenda, and include many in the upper echelons of the party, as well as new opposition groups (most notably Joice Mujuru and People First). The military-business elite is crucial here, as they may be the ultimate arbiters in the succession battle. With revenues from the Marange diamonds drying up due to new regulations and reforms, and other patronage networks in decline, as the Chatham House report notes, they are likely to be vested heavily in improving the business environment, and so ally strongly with reformers in the party, notably Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa.

Others are implacably opposed to reforms, seeing these as an imperialist imposition. There are those in the G40 group within ZANU-PF who make this nationalist-populist argument. According to Chatham House, they are: “sceptical of economic liberalization and re-engagement, particularly with the Bretton Woods institutions, as they fear this will mean the end of ZANU PF’s historical ideological objective to create a de facto one-party socialist state with a ‘captive’ or ‘token’ opposition”. While anyone with a memory of ESAP has a right to be cautious, the need to revive the economy is also apparent to anyone.

There are those in the opposition parties, supported especially by diaspora groups, who argue strongly against re-engagement too. But for different reasons. They are relaxed about a liberalisation stance at the centre of reforms and advocate free market approaches, but feel that the international community is letting the regime off the hook. More chaos, more decline, they believe will make the transfer of power easier, at or before the 2018 elections. If the opposition had a vision and an organisational base, such a stance might be credible. But accepting continued suffering for unlikely political gain, is in my view highly  irresponsible.

The Chatham House report therefore calls for re-engagement, and a phased approach to reforms, recognising the limits of alternatives, and the dangers of not doing anything:

“The interests of the ruling party, of the citizens of Zimbabwe and of international stakeholders are not mutually exclusive. There is little doubt that one of the main incentives behind the current government’s apparent commitment to the reform agenda is party survival. But if this means measures to achieve a stronger economy and better livelihoods, there should be tangible improvements in social and economic rights – and maybe, in time, more space for promoting civil and political liberties. Other options have not worked. The opposition, for its part, is in a fractured state, and it is not clear whether any strong alliance will be forged before the next elections”.

Failing to engage, and persisting with outdated sanctions measures (the report in particular fingers the US’s ZDERA restrictions and Canada’s stance), could be disastrous, not only for Zimbabwe but for the region as a whole. The report argues “Avoiding renewed economic collapse in Zimbabwe is important for Southern Africa, especially at a time when economic resilience is weakening elsewhere in the region.”

I agree, which is why a pragmatic if politically-challenging way forward must be found. The Chatham House report certainly offers valuable pointers, if not solutions, and is well worth reading.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland

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Riots in Zimbabwe: don’t mess with the informal sector

zimra-warehouse-on-fire

In the last few weeks there have been riots in Zimbabwe. In Beitbridge, on the border with South Africa, furious cross-border traders set fire to a warehouse in protest at import bans recently imposed, while in Harare taxi operators protested against the cost of continuous police road blocks, where spot fines are extracted.

Both these incidents highlight how Zimbabwe’s economy has changed dramatically, and why the state has to accommodate, encourage and support the informal sector, not control, suppress and ignore it. Formal unemployment runs at 90 percent or more, but this doesn’t mean that all these people are not doing things. They are, but not in the jobs of the past. Livelihoods are improvised and flexible, combining ways of earning income – farming, trading, dealing, manufacturing, mining, selling services and a host of other distributive activities, reliant on deeply embedded social relationships. New networks of economic activity have emerged, as has a vibrant spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship. This is in the context of extreme hardship for sure, as the economy continues to plummet due to lack of investment. Informal economies are built on relations. Many operating in the informal sector are reliant on patrons and support from others; sometimes this is through relations of kinship, or through the church, and very often political patronage plays a part. If you want to secure a spot to trade in town, someone inevitably has to be paid off. Informal activity is tough, precarious fragile, sometimes illegal, and often is subject to arbitrary taxation from those in authority – as in the case of the road blocks affecting informal transport operators across the country.

The informalisation of the economy is a pattern across Africa, as James Ferguson eloquently describes. The improvised livelihoods of the poor are creating a new distributive economy, and with this a distributive politics, he argues. This is having a major impact on the way we understand African political economy – and not only in Zimbabwe. The shock is perhaps greater in Zimbabwe, as in the past the ‘formal’ sector was larger and stable, where ‘jobs’ and ‘wages’ were expected, especially for men at a certain age. But the post-structural adjustment growth of informality is a phenomenon everywhere; and is accelerating, especially in countries where reliance on a core commodity sector was the economy of the past.

Thus the informal sector – a huge and massively varied category – represents a very substantial proportion of Africa’s economic activity. In the rural areas this has always been the case – small-scale farming dominates and rural dwellers have always engaged in a bricolage of activities, both on and off farm. Today such complex livelihoods are the norm in town too. The jobs of the past – in the factories, mines, farms and so on- no longer exist – or may do so only temporarily – and the alternative is a set of activities that don’t fit the past expectation of a ‘job’ or ‘employment’, and are so not counted as such.

In Zimbabwe, the informal sector is the economy today: it cannot be ignored, wished away. It is what the 90 percent live on, but we know little about it, and policies often upset and disrupt, rather than support and nurture. So it is no surprise that the arbitrary import controls imposed were resisted when the blunt Statutory Instrument 64 that appeared to ban the import of everything from mayonnaise and coffee creamer to body lotion and building materials – was imposed (although hurriedly amended later). In the name of domestic manufacturing protection, the livelihoods of many thousands of traders who bring goods from South Africa were affected; no wonder they were angry.

Ever since Keith Hart wrote about Africa’s informal economy long ago, many people have pointed to its importance. In recent years, there has been a growth in scholarship that has attempted to grapple with the economic, social, cultural, political and geographical dimensions of informal economies, such as the excellent work of Kate Meagher in Nigeria and more broadly. But in public policy, statistical data collection and media commentary, the new real economy in so many places has been ignored, or dismissed and berated. Responses have been inappropriate too. Formalising the informal is not the point, and attempts at converting everything into a projectified ‘small enterprise’ are misguided. Controlling and regulating will not work, and will be resisted, sometimes violently. And yes, while much activity is outside the ambit of the state, and not taxable, it is the lifeblood of the economy – and certainly is in Zimbabwe. Yet glorifying and romanticising the informal is not the solution either. Living in the informal sphere is tough – incomes are small and highly variable, and the costs of patronage, coercion and control can be high, economically and psychologically.

The events of the last few weeks in Zimbabwe point to the need for a new accommodation between the informal and formal and between the economies and livelihoods of the 90 percent and the state. A new political economy is emerging, where the class relations of the past are no longer relevant, and state-economy-citizen relations must be rethought. Rather than imagining the informal economy as somehow outside, and needing to be brought in, it has to be thought of as central to development. Providing support, generating legitimacy, assuring accountability and preventing exploitative predatory, patronage relations are all roles for the state; ones that the Zimbabwean state is failing on currently. This means attempts at controlling, regulating and incorporating have to be avoided, despite the knee-jerk temptations. These are the key lessons from rioting in Beitbridge and Harare. The 90 percent after all are the electorate, and will protest in many ways if livelihoods in increasingly difficult circumstances are jeopardised.

This does not mean that attempts to rebuild the formal sector should cease. Far from it. Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa was in London making that case for Zimbabwe last week to the usual howls of protest. But the refinancing that will hopefully flow from the International Financial Institutions and other private investors will need to find its way to the new economy, and not just prop up the old. For in the longer term, it is the informal entrepreneur, the niche market trader, the small-scale artisan and manufacturer and the smallholder farmer who will scale up and multiply the massive, but uncounted and perennially unsupported informal economy; in time graduating into larger businesses and operations that become increasingly formal.

Managing and supporting such a transition is the central economic challenge of the future. The standard models and forms of expertise derived from the old economy are inadequate: a new politics and economy of the informal urgently needs inventing.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland

July 13 update: Debby Potts from King’s College London who, with UZ colleagues, has researched urban Zimbabwe over a long time, correctly pointed out that this piece did not reference the longstanding and excellent work on urban informality in Zimbabwe, which makes most of the same points. She has kindly provided a reference list for those interested in digging into the debate further.

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The big thaw: Zimbabwe comes in from the cold

The last few weeks have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity, culminating in the announcement that the European Union is to remove restrictions on financial aid to the government, and a new $300m programme would start in the new year focused on governance, health and agriculture.

This is long overdue. The sanctions imposed by western countries have done far more harm than good, and have provided an unnecessary political block to progress. The announcement was made by the new EU ambassador to Zimbabwe, Phillipe van Damme, and he was flanked by ambassadors from ten other EU countries, including Britain.

The thaw with Britain continues too. The new UK ambassador to Zimbabwe, Catriona Laing, presented her credentials to the President recently (there’s even a youtube video of the event!), and she tweeted enthusiastically about the opportunity to discuss UK-Zimbabwe relations, describing her new posting as her ‘dream job’. An interesting interview in the Herald exposed a very different stance to the frosty relationships in recent years. Her background is in development, and she previously worked for DFID, so it bodes well for UK engagement in the development field.

Zimbabwean officials too seem to be on the charm offensive with the west. Patrick Chinamasa argued that the policy is no longer just ‘look east’, but ‘look everywhere’. VP Joice Mujuru hosted a British trade delegation and the trade minister from Denmark was also warmly received. The UK government proclaimed the trade mission a great success.

All this is of course about trade and business, and the interests of capital, and its influence on foreign policy. The sanctions from the early 2000s sent signals to many western investors and there was a massive flight of funds. Indeed the decline in investment had a far greater impact than the sanctions per se. European business has therefore lost out from the isolation of Zimbabwe. And it’s widely recognised that much has been conceded to the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, South Africans and others. In some sectors – mining and tobacco for example – traditional commercial relationships with the west have been pushed aside in favour of new partners. This has cost Britain and others market share and economic influence. The trade delegation from the UK was keen on a range of investments, from infrastructure to agriculture; all areas where British business can make money in Zimbabwe.

The new focus on investment is certainly good news. Zimbabwe has been starved of finance, causing a serious crisis of liquidity, and declining investment in key assets. A return of the aid programme is helpful too, but it’s the investment that really counts. The ambitious ZimAsset economic recovery programme is premised on the arrival of such investment; nothing can happen without it as the government is bankrupt and has a massive debt.

Of course there are constraints. ‘Trust’ has been the watchword in the discussions of the past weeks. Is Zimbabwe a reliable investment destination? Do the ‘indigenisation’ policies limit possibilities? Interestingly the UK Ambassador emphasised that it was less the policy on indigenisation, something she noted was the sovereign right of Zimbabwe to pursue, but the clarity of the laws and regulations, and the importance of assuring security of investment. Lack of clarity, often promoted by the media and other commentators, causes uncertainty, rumour and misunderstanding. The Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, once again assured the trade delegations, but for good reasons doubts remain.

Does this mean that everything is back to ‘normal’? The answer of course in no. EU travel restrictions still remain on the President and Grace Mugabe, despite the cordiality of the discussions at State House. And there are a number of outstanding issues, notably relating to land. Compensation for land acquired during land reform is still due for most properties, and an agreed formula has yet to be negotiated and financed. The particular case of land acquired that was under Bilateral Investment Protection treaties still has pending court cases, and remain unresolved.

But the thawing of relations and the reinstatement of financial aid by the EU is an important signal. More day to day interaction with government will build the necessary trust, and hopefully ways forward on the most tricky issues will be found.

Meanwhile, let’s hope the new aid for agriculture in particular is well directed. With the new agrarian structure, the key is to provide support for the growth of local economies based on agriculture, and that includes a focus on the new resettlements and particularly the A1 areas, that have the potential for driving economic growth and employment through agriculture, and processing.

Investments in basic infrastructure, including roads, markets, veterinary and agricultural extension systems, as well as water management, storage and irrigation systems are long overdue. The failure to invest in the new resettlements has held them back for over a decade, but now is the opportunity to put that right. Hopefully the EU support will not shy away from this challenge.

The post was written by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland

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A year on from ZANU-PF’s election victory: limits and constraints

On July 31 last year, ZANU-PF were victorious in the elections. The opposition was annihilated. The elections were disputed by many, and many questions were raised about the process, but most commentators agreed that this was a shift of support back to ZANU-PF, with the opposition having run out of steam.

A number of good commentaries were published in the Journal of Southern African Studies that offered views from different perspectives, including from Miles Tendi, Phillan Zamchiya and Brian Raftopolous. Perhaps the most powerful though comes from McDonald Lewanika and Delta Milayo Ndou (formerly of the Zimbabwe Crisis Coalition) in ‘We the People’, a beautifully illustrated edited book of personal testimonies and reflections from Zimbabweans after the elections. Most are urban, educated and opposition supporters, but the sense of melancholy and loss, reflecting on a moment that had so much hope, is tangible and powerful.

Nearly a year ago on September 10 2013, a confident ZANU-PF announced a new cabinet and ambitious plans for the future under the ZimAsset programme. Attempts to rebuild relationships with the west started, while overtures to the Chinese continued. A new minister of lands, Douglas Mombeshora, has stated boldly that no new land invasions would be allowed, and that land administration would be regularised, with those illegally occupying land or underutilising it evicted.

It sounded as if a corner had been turned. But sadly such a transition has not occurred. In the last year, the economy has floundered, as the new investment has failed to arrive; relationships with Europe and the US remain tetchy; the Chinese are playing hardball; and land invasions have continued, despite attempts at audits and new permit systems (see next week’s blog).

Meanwhile, the opposition has imploded. The expected departure of Morgan Tsvangirai has not happened, and he clings on to one faction, with surprisingly wide public support. The MDC-T though has fractured, with Tendai Biti and colleagues declaring a ‘renewal team’, and presumably in time a new party, for a revived opposition. They are actively courting investors and foreign governments, while belatedly accepting that a focus on economic and social rights and redistribution issues – ZANU-PF’s political territory for the 2013 elections – must be central to any revamped approach. The situation is very messy indeed.

The warring factions continue to slug it out within ZANU-PF too, with different groupings being speculated on in the press almost daily. What is clear is that there is no easy resolution of the ‘succession’ issue, and Mugabe is playing the longer game (to the 2018 elections) to see how this will resolve itself.

The consequence is that there is massive uncertainty on the political scene, and this translates itself into challenges for economic regeneration. In May at a SAPES Trust event, Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa declared:

Zimbabwe is open to Foreign Direct Investment from all Nations of the World, whether these be in the North, South, East or West… Zimbabwe is ready to re-integrate into the global economy. Zimbabwe is looking for new friendships, new opportunities while consolidating old ones. We are looking for mutually beneficial economic relationships not confrontation. We are too small a country to pursue a policy of confrontation.

This signaled a softening of stance, and a willingness to engage. Equally the purge of corrupt parastatals and their officials led by Jonathan Moyo was clearly aimed at an international audience, with a very visible attempt to deal with corruption – although of course only in one area. Statements on the flagship ‘indigenisation’ policy have been much more tempered since the elections, with senior party officials stating that expropriation and nationalization are not on the agenda, and that there has to be flexibility in the application of the policy.

In a typically perceptive piece for the Solidarity Peace Trust, Brian Raftopolous argues:

The mixed policy messaging of the Mugabe regime can be attributed both to the challenges of seeking fuller international re-engagement while holding on to its empowerment programme, and the tensions within ZANU PF about how to proceed with such a re-engagement. The tropes of sovereignty, liberation history, regional solidarity and empowerment have been integral to ZANU PF’s political imaginary and ‘language of stateness’, in both the party’s ‘practical languages of governance’ and the ‘symbolic languages of authority’. However the exposure of the limits of the state’s capacity to effect its indigenisation programme has led to the dual strategy of seeking a rapprochement with the West, while promising to export the Zimbabwean model to the SADC region.

Such contradictions are the legacy of the past 14 or so years. The radical redistributive policies, most notably the land reform, have presented major challenges in economic terms. The withdrawal of external support and international investment has hampered the rebounding of the economy, and the business-political patronage networks that were established to prop up the regime in this period are certainly not the basis for a prosperous, competitive economy.

There are bright spots though. The informal sector is booming, and providing jobs and livelihoods. While many argue this is not the real economy, it is certainly the main economy. In the restructured agricultural sector, the tobacco boom continues, with a massive 210 million tonnes of tobacco being traded this year. While livelihoods are unquestionably improving especially for those on the land, galvanising new, coherent and sustained economic growth is a big challenge, and the long (often rather sensible) wish-lists in the ZimAsset blueprint will not be realized without sustained investment.

Much of course relies on a rapprochement with the west, and with international capital and finance. Given the bad feeling, abuse and threats that have occurred over time, this will not be easy, especially with Britain. Miles Tendi offers a fascinating analysis of this challenge, based on interviews with some of the key players, on both the UK and the Zimbabwe sides, and how a sustained ‘demonisation’ invective from both has not helped matters.

A fundamental question remains, however: how to balance a commitment to redistribution and economic empowerment with engagement in a globalized economy, and in a context where national debt amounts to a staggering US$6 billion? Is there any way to resist the inevitable reincorporation into a neoliberal world order, and sustain the progressive gains of reform? Despite the socialist solidarity rhetoric, the Chinese are interested in commercial business just as any other western nation or multinational company. And countries in the region are wary of heading down an alternative route, despite the electioneering rhetoric of Julius Malema further south. So ZANU PF is in a bind. As Brian Raftopolous argues, there are clear ‘limits to victory’.

 This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

 

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Making friends in London: is a new rapprochement on Zimbabwe occurring?

Recently, the ‘Friends of Zimbabwe’ group of western donors met in London, together with representatives of all of Zimbabwe’s main political parties. The ‘Friends’ group – formerly known as the ‘Fishmongers’ after an expensive restaurant in Harare – is a grouping aimed at the discussion of international donor policy on Zimbabwe, including sanctions. While all the western donors are represented, its positions are firmly influenced by the EU and the US, and perhaps especially by the UK. London was therefore a fitting destination for the latest meeting.

The final communiqué was the usual non-committal diplomatic statement, indicating continuing commitment to Zimbabwe, and recording the actually substantial aid flows that are being offered. But the departure for this meeting was the presence of senior ZANU-PF officials whose travel bans had been removed following the successful Constitutional referendum.

Justice minister, Patrick Chinamasa, was among the delegation, and he got a roasting on BBC’s Hard Talk, as he tried to defend the government position on a variety of policies. However, there were also other more civil exchanges, including one at Chatham House when senior officials from all parties, commented on the current situation with a clear tone of compromise and conciliation.

The political context in Zimbabwe remains highly uncertain, but there are unexpected shifts – partly as a result of the relative success of the ‘unity’ government, and partly as a result of failures in the opposition, both to offer a convincing alternative and to develop a clear set of alliances.

Simukai Tinhu offered a useful overview in a recent African Arguments piece. Phillan Zamchiya in a very detailed Crisis in Zimbabwe report reckons ZANU-PF is gearing up to win the election by stealth, stealing votes and fixing the results through a number of tactics. These are well worn tricks of course, but there may be wider political shifts underway too. However, simply blaming a poor result for the MDC on foul play may not be enough. For this reason many see another coalition as an inevitable result, with the big questions being who will occupy the presidency and what the balance of power will be in parliament.

Finance Minister Tendai Biti was also in London recently on his way back from negotiations with the IMF in Washington, and again spoke at Chatham House. Analysis by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was revealing:

“Judging by the Minister´s tone and the way he addressed some of the key issues, it is our opinion that the gap between ZANU PF and the MDC(T) on key issues appears to be narrowing. Similarly, the Minister was quite diplomatic in trying to demystify the myth that the MDC and pro-democracy civil society organisations are synonymous and are working together towards the so-called regime change agenda. He obviously did not want to alienate pro-democracy civil society organisations which traditionally helped the MDC in its formative years.

However by expanding the definition of civil society organisations beyond the usual narrow definition and stating that there is an operational civil society in Zimbabwe, the Minister sought to, in our view; keep a healthy distance between the MDC as a political party and other pro-democracy groups. This, it appears, was his counterpoint, against the ZANU PF argument that all pro-democracy forces are bent on a western-sponsored regime change agenda.

The view that points to a political convergence is supported by the plea the Minister had made to the USA and the IMF that Zimbabwe ought to be treated equally according to the same measure that has been used on countries with troubled pasts such as Burma. By saying this, he echoed his strong views for the lifting of sanctions by the European Union in July 2013.

On the issue of indigenisation, the Minister again struck a note which doesn´t quite resonate with some of the sentiments from the Western countries.

It would appear that behind closed doors, both the MDC and moderate ZANU PF Ministers agree on key issues than they disagree in public.

That´s how politics work. The current widely held view that President Mugabe hasn´t softened on his legacy ignores anecdotal evidence that indicate that lately he has been softening his clenched fist, so to speak. An example is his calls for peace, which has widely been dismissed by most people as rhetoric which doesn´t match what is happening on the ground. However anecdotal evidence from various sources including Zimbabwean equivalent of Wikileaks appear to suggest that the President´s attempts to soften are negated by some within his party who fear what might happen if ZANU PF softens on its legacy inspired by its liberation war credentials.

Although the Minister spoke about the current issues of concern, he was very measured in his approach. He exhibited every sign of a principled man, who, despite having undergone the vagaries of his difficult job and the incarceration he underwent in 2008, has matured, forgiven his persecutors and might even have undergone a paradigm shift. This shift, which is also reflected in the entire MDC, has seen it move from its widely perceived Eurocentric roots to the moderate pan-African approach. It also appears that there are some within ZANU PF who have softened on their legacy by moving to the centre ground although there are still some still on the far right. Those on the far right are in our view, the ones the Minister referred to when he said there are Ministers within the government who make irrational political statements that affect the economy”.

In light of other pieces of evidence we have gathered, particularly the likelihood that the US is to announce policy shift on Zimbabwe, there is every indication of a national and political consensus on key issues, which might see an unexpected political landscape after the elections.”

The consensus may be surprising to some who have been viewing Zimbabwe’s tortured process of transition from afar. There may be much more consensus on thorny issues of land reform, national ownership of key businesses and the role of civil society than is commonly understood.

Clearly the consensus is not universal and the more progressive elements across all the parties may be out-manoeuvred by those with other agendas, whether the military elite, fearing post-election reprisals, or white capital, seeking a reassertion of power. As Biti, a clear presidential contender in the (maybe not so far off) future, tentatively repositions the MDC, it may not just be the traditional western ‘friends’ of Zimbabwe, but others including China, Brazil and South Africa, who become the important brokers into the future.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland

 

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