Tag Archives: Nelson Chamisa

Post-election round up: what now for Zimbabwe?

I haven’t got round to doing a normal Zimbabweland this week. These are not normal times, and I have spent too much time following events on Twitter this last tumultuous week. So, again, I will offer some links to things I have found useful, even if I didn’t agree with everything in each article. I have also included some older links from Zimbabweland that relate directly to the dilemmas now faced.

Last Monday’s election produced a significant win for ZANU-PF in the parliamentary poll, largely due to the rural voters continuing to back the party, and the opposition splitting its vote, especially in Matabeleland. Overall ZANU-PF gained 144 seats and the MDC Alliance, 64. However, this represents a large swing to the opposition since 2013, but not enough to undo ZANU-PF’s grip on power.

There were a couple of independent candidates who won, and some upsets for some big party beasts (Mutsvangwa and Chinamasa being two), but also some disappointments for some progressive and inspiring candidates such as Fadzayi Mahere in Harare. In the local council elections the #This Flag leader, Pastor Evan Mawarire lost in his attempt to gain a local political hold.

Despite this being billed as the social media election, this may reflect more the ‘Twitter tyranny’ of the urban elites and others (including myself) who get a distorted picture. This is a theme developed by Hopewell Chin’ono. The rural masses who voted for ZANU-PF by and large do not follow Twitter debates, nor read blogs (although sometimes I am surprised). As discussed before so-called hashtag activism is significant, but only among certain groups. Instead, they look to their local candidates, and who they think can deliver.

Most eyes were focused on the presidential race between Mnangagwa and Chamisa. Here there was a much tighter race. Chamisa and the MDC Alliance announced even before the election that they had won, and continued to do so afterwards, fomenting fears of a stolen vote. Some perceived delays in announcing the results and on-going accusations of rigging of the elections in turn prompted riots on the streets by opposition supporters. The disastrous and disproportionate intervention of the military resulted in the killing of six, and further clamp downs on opposition support. David Moore gives an overview of the results and their aftermath.

On Thursday, the electoral commission announced that Emmerson Mnangagwa had won, and at 50.8% there would be no need for a run-off (Chamisa got 44.3% according to ZEC). In many ways, the outcome is not a surprise. We will see in time whether rigging took place, and if it did so whether it would have changed the result (there was a similar discussion after 2013 elections). The well-respected ZESN (Zimbabwe Election Support Network), a group of non-government organisations, produced an assessment that reflected the results announced by the ZEC, based on national sampling.

While offering many cautions, the teams of international observers regarded the election as adequate, if not ideal. Yes, of course, it was an uneven playing field with the incumbent making the running; yes the state media supported one party, while the private media largely supported the opposition; yes state resources were used to bolster the incumbent’s position and help with electioneering; and yes irregularities and delays were there. But, overall, nothing has been uncovered yet (and this may of course change) to dismiss these elections in the way some have been.

Indeed, most expected Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF to win handsomely, despite the energetic campaign of Chamisa and the Alliance, with their (not always welcome) backing from the expelled G-40 faction of ZANU-PF, most notably Jonathan Moyo via Twitter and latterly through Robert Mugabe (with his wife Grace close by) at the bizarre pre-election press conference.

It is important though to note how the gains made by the MDC Alliance are significant. Hopefully lessons have been learned about avoiding splitting the vote in key parts of the country and aggressively isolating competing candidates (the Khupe factor was significant in some places). Remembering the late Morgan Tsvangirai, some of Eddie Cross’ reflections provide a helpful focus on the future, and the importance of consolidating gains, building to the next election.

Zimbabwe today is a deeply divided country. Between rural and urban, between the educated social media connected elites and the rest, between different groups within the security forces and the police and between different vying factions within all main parties. Mnangagwa has a big job on his hands to create unity.

Whether the indiscriminate killing of opposition supporters (and other passers-by) in Harare after the elections was ordered or was directed by an independent rogue group of securocrats is not known. Recent events suggest that the ongoing divisions within ZANU-PF and within the security forces (with the police often being side-lined in favour of a violent military support) are a real threat to economic and political stability that so many yearn.

These are themes that were raised around the (not) coup in November, and again have been put into sharp focus. In different ways, both Miles Tendi and Alex Magaisa pick up the dangerous role of the ‘shadow’ military state in their thoughtful articles, with a follow-up BSR today from Magaisa arguing that the brutal events of this past week have tarnished the reputation of Mnangagwa irretrievably, unless he can regain control.

What this reconfiguration of power means for the politics of land and agriculture is not yet clear. The political elites of both ZANU-PF and the MDC Alliance professed a commitment to modernising agriculture and increasing production, and much of this could be read as support for a new capitalist class of farmers, largely on the A2 farms. How the military elite, also invested in land including on the A2 farms, see the future is not articulated, but probably not very different.

Where this leaves the rural poor, the vast mass who continued to vote for ZANU-PF despite everything, is unclear. Who are their advocates? With a lack of coherence in rural policies (as seen in the manifestos) and relatively few of the high profile politicians of either main political formation really having a deep commitment to rural development (beyond the usual rhetoric), the voters will have to hold their MPs and the government more generally to account. Patterns of rural (and urban) differentiation result in different political alliances, and the tendency of political parties – and perhaps particularly the MDC as a movement with urban labour origins – to ignore rural issues is fatal. How class dynamics and rural politics will pan out in the future will surely be a focus for discussions on this blog into the future.

Earlier this year, I did a series of articles for The Conversation on what next for the post Mugabe era on land and agriculture, focusing on the issue of compensation for expropriated land, the need for an effective land administration system and ten priorities for agriculture. These issues all remain crucial, and we look forward to a new government with a wide range of talents, and perhaps including others from other parties, so that an inclusive, progressive commitment can be sustained. Certainly, Zimbabwe urgently needs a period of investment, peace and stability, but the big question remains, given the divisions, can Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF deliver?

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

Advertisements

Leave a comment

Filed under Uncategorized

Military muscle and populist promises: authoritarian populism in southern Africa

Last week I was at an amazing gathering at the ISS in The Hague, which brought together nearly 300 activists and academics to discuss the origins and implications of authoritarian populism. A short reflection on some of the themes emerging was published this weekend in openDemocracy.

Whether in the form of Duterte or Trump, Maduro or Mugabe, Modi or Erdogan, the rise (and sometimes fall) of authoritarian regimes with populist, sometimes religiously inflected, often militarily enforced, is evident all over the world.

In the build up to the event, we published a series of articles on openDemocracy with cases from India, the US, Myanmar, Brazil, Indonesia, Colombia and South Africa. The parallels are striking, although the contexts and political implications are very different. Do take a look. More from Russia, Guatemala and Colombia are coming soon!

The focus of the Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative is the rural and agrarian dimension. Much debate has focused on urban metropolitan areas, yet the support for many authoritarian populist leaders is rural, and the consequences of neoliberal neglect, extractivism and resource grabbing is keenly felt.

Among the 80 odd papers prepared for the event (all available via the Transnational Institute, one of the co-hosts), there were quite a few papers from Africa, including several from Zimbabwe. How does Zimbabwe fit within this wider picture? Not obviously is the short answer.

Mugabe’s economic populism was well known, with land reform the centre-piece, and anti-democratic, often militarised authoritarianism has always been central to ZANU-PF’s political culture. Yet, Mugabe’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and socialist flag-waving did not put him in the group of regressive right-wing regimes.

Indeed one of the ambiguities of the term, authoritarian populism, is the difficult match to the now outdated categories of left or right. With liberation movement parties still in power in southern Africa, a particular form is evident. Former president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, had a well-honed populist streak, but maintained control by leveraging power in different ways through a ‘captured’ state. Julius Malema the firebrand Economic Freedom Fighters opposition leader is the supreme populist, with often extreme authoritarian tendencies.

It’s not surprising given their histories that both in Zimbabwe and South Africa, land is central to the populist discourse – linking in turn to nationalist narratives and liberation struggle commitments. With debates about ‘expropriation without compensation’ this has risen to a higher gear in South Africa, and parallels (usually wildly inaccurate) with Zimbabwe are frequently made.

Now with Zuma and Mugabe gone, what are we to make of Ramaphosa and Mnangagwa in this frame? Both have been spouting populist promises in their first months in power, but this is fairly standard political fare, and large pinches of salt are recommended. Both also appear to be committed to a business-friendly, open investment economic position. Both countries are ‘open for business;’ presumably including both leaders’ businesses, of which there are many.

It is too early to see whether a new state project is being cultivated, and whether this could be described as ‘authoritarian populism’, as Zuma and Mugabe clearly were, although with very southern African flavours. Key will be to understand the nature of underlying power, and how accountable this is. Neither have faced national elections as yet, so we don’t yet know how popular the populist pleading will be. While South Africa’s democratic roots run deeper, the concerns validly expressed about the military influence in Zimbabwe are real.

Much discussion of southern African politics – and perhaps especially Zimbabwean – is rather insular. However, the intersections of authoritarianism (in various forms) and populism (also with many dimensions) is a phenomenon across the world. Reflecting on other settings may help us understand how military muscle and populist promises mix and match in the Zimbabwe setting. It’s often not a pretty sight.

Effective resistance and opposition mobilisation with new styles of emancipatory politics are needed to counter authoritarian populism globally, but currently in Zimbabwe this doesn’t look likely, as in its early days Nelson Chamisa’s MDC seems to be exhibiting some of the worst authoritarian populist traits, this time with an evangelical Christian religious tinge.

As the election year in Zimbabwe unfolds, making sense of the new politics will require some new lenses, and different responses. Thinking about authoritarian populism and how to confront it across the world may help focus thinking in Zimbabwe, so do check out the many materials emerging from the ERPI.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

Illustration is by Boy Dominguez produced for the event, titled Populismo

1 Comment

Filed under Uncategorized