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New farm size regulations in Zimbabwe: can they encourage land redistribution?

In mid-February, the Government of Zimbabwe issued a new set of farm size regulations, arguing that this would release new land for land reform. This announcement arrived out of the blue and came as a surprise to many. Was this a new attempt to rationalise land holdings following the 2000 land reform? Was this the implementation phase of the national audit starting? Was this a political move to deal with large holdings accumulated by the previous regime? Why now, and what impact would it have?

Despite the press claims that this was a big, bold new move, a closer look at the new regulations suggests that actually things haven’t changed that much. The 1999 regulations were marginally adjusted in 2000, and this was a further minimal, slightly random, adjustment, as the table below shows.

Natural region

2000 regulations

2020 regulations

I 250 250
II 350/400 IIa/b 500
III 500 700
IV 1500 1000
V 2000 2000

 

Within land policy, farm size regulations demonstrate a policy commitment to redistribution, avoiding massive consolidations and huge, under-utilised farms. In theory that is. As an administrative tool they are only as effective as the land administration system; and unfortunately in Zimbabwe this is not very effective.

In practice land allocations since land reform in 2000 have been ad hoc and at the discretion of land officers and committees at the district level. Exceptions are regularly made. In many respects, having such flexibility makes much sense. A simple centralised system cannot deal with local variations and contingencies. It can only be a guide. The problem comes when such flexibilities are exploited by those in power; maintaining large or multiple farms, for example, and so excluding others from access to land.

Prosper Matondi of Ruzivo Trust has provided a useful draft paper on the recent regulations, helpfully facilitating debate. He points out the huge variation in actual allocations as against the formal regulations (Table 4.1 in the paper), based on the government’s own audit data. In our sites, a similar story applies. There are 16 (of 817) A2 farms in Masvingo province that exceed the ceilings (12 in Mwenezi in Region V – all huge livestock/wildlife ranches – and 4 in Gutu/Masvingo districts in Region III/IV) and there are 11 (of 700) A2 farms over 500 ha in Mazowe district. How many might be deemed suitable for subdivision for (small-scale) agriculture is very unclear.

So will the new regulations really have any effect?

Land ceiling regulations are a very blunt instrument in land policy. They have been intensely controversial internationally over many decades. From the 1960s in India they were implemented across the country, aiming to break up the zamindari system of large holdings. Different states took different approaches, and outcomes were varied. Today, there are some who believe they have become a constraint, particularly for smaller farmers aiming to grow. Technological change in irrigation in particular has made the assumptions behind the original reforms problematic too.

In South Africa, an attempt to set land ceilings in 2017 through a new Bill fell by the way-side, and many were extremely critical of the process. Apartheid era legislation preventing farm subdivision extraordinarily is still in force, notionally protecting the ‘viability’ of large-scale farms. The 2019 land panel has argued strongly for a rethink, both on subdivision and a renewed effort to impose ceilings, linked to land taxation – with high levels beyond the ceilings to encourage the market-based release of land. Maybe this a route for Zimbabwe to follow too?

However, there is an even more basic question raised: what are the appropriate sizes for expropriation or taxation legislation? What sizes for what conditions make sense? This is the tricky part. In the colonial era, policy on land sizes also existed, but was racialized. The original assumption was that a white farmer needed land that would produce an income equivalent of a senior (white) civil servant in government. So-called Native Purchase Areas were established in the 1930s to create a yeoman class of African farmer, but were considerably smaller (averaging under 100 ha) than white commercial farms. Other blacks meanwhile were deemed to require less land – indeed land apportionment legislation was geared of course to ensuring that land was sufficiently small and poor in the ‘reserves’ that labour was released for the rest of the (white) economy.

What was deemed ‘viable’ was also influenced by the planning models on optimal production in different agroecological regions. This again linked to a bunch of assumptions, influenced by a particular idea of (white commercial) farming. The famous agroecological ‘Natural Region’ map, produced in 1961 by Vincent and Thomas, identifies what should be produced in each region. In the drier regions it was only extensive livestock, unless there was irrigation, for example. Of course there is plenty of cropping in Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces: it’s not ‘optimal’ as far as the assessment goes, but it’s necessary for the livelihoods of many.

As Ben Cousins and I showed in a paper a while back, ideas of ‘viability’ are therefore highly contested, conditioned by politics and assumptions about production, and (ideologically-inflected) visions of what a farm and farmer should be. What is viable for one type of farmer (say with off-farm income earning options) may not be viable for another. And ideas of what is optimal cannot be generalised either. Much depends on levels of investment (irrigation for example), land formation and topography (large areas with huge granite outcrops are not the same as large areas with levelled, high quality irrigable land), and how the land can be used (including market potential). Just saying that, in a region defined by average rainfall (what is that these days, with such variability anyway?), a maximum land size should be X really doesn’t make sense.

This is why local adaptations of national farm size regulations are essential, but they must be based on a sound and transparent administrative process. This is why building a wider land administration system in Zimbabwe is essential and just issuing edicts through new regulations will change little.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

 

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Seeds for Africa’s green revolution: can India help?

Over the last year or so we have been doing some work exploring how the Indian seed sector might contribute to African agriculture, boosting productivity and assisting in particular smaller, poorer farmers. Could the seed sector replicate the great success of the generics pharmaceuticals from India that have revolutionised access to low cost drugs, with many benefits across the developing world?

The work has been supported by DFID-India, and has been led by colleagues linked to the Future Agricultures Consortium (in Ethiopia, Kenya and the UK), as well as at the RIS in Delhi. The final report, put together by Dominic Glover, is just out. It is accompanied by a shorter briefing paper too that focuses on the generics drugs-seeds comparison.

The briefing opens; “Experts agree that Africa’s farmers need quality seeds, but the continent’s share in the global seed trade is very low. African countries often lack the institutional capacity to support the growth of seed markets in the continent, an issue that cuts across regulation and other areas. The supply of breeder seeds is weak and improved crop varieties are introduced extremely slowly. Foreign expertise and investment could help build capacity in crop breeding and other aspects of the seed sector, including management, logistics, marketing and the integration of new technologies.”

This is the vision, but what of the reality? There are some parallels with the pharmaceutical sector, but they can be over-stretched. The big successes of generic drugs emerged in a particular period. Today markets are much more competitive, and many of the successful generics manufacturers have moved on, merged or been bought up. Seeds are also a rather different product, and we have to differentiate between different market segments. Low cost, high volume production of quality seed may be possible say for vegetable seeds, but it is less likely for grain crops for instance, given the costs of development, regulatory restrictions and the marketing/transport/logistics challenges. So how ‘pro poor’ will a top quality tomato seed really be, and will it really be any better or cheaper than one produced in Holland, France or China?

And then there’s the GM factor, an issue that has had less resonance in medical applications of biotechnology. Genetically-modified seeds – basically transgenics – have been highly controversial globally. And also in Africa, where there remain restrictions on their use in most countries, including Zimbabwe (despite widespread spread of GM crops informally, notably in Zimbabwe’s cases GM maize from South Africa). But the Indian seed sector sees GM crops as essential for growth. Bt cotton (a pest resistant GM crop) has been a massive success in India since its formal release in 2002 (and indeed before – although with some serious qualifications about its ‘pro-poor’ success). Monsanto, together with the Indian company Mayhco, pioneered it, but today many companies market the transgene backcrossed into numerous varieties. Bt cotton has filled the coffers of the seed companies across India, but now the market is saturated, and the extension of GM revolution in Indian agriculture has been stalled by controversies about transgenic food crops, notably the furore that exploded around Bt brinjal (aubergine) a few years back. Business managers in the seed sector see exports of Bt cotton to Africa as a next frontier.

There have been various attempts to make links, facilitated in part by the US government and outfits such as the Syngenta Foundation (closely associated as the name suggests to the biotech company of the same name). And the most recent development has occurred in Zimbabwe, with the purchase of a majority stake in Quton by Mahyco (and so with close links to Monsanto) from SeedCo in 2014. With cotton in the doldrums this acquisition has passed off without much comment, but Quton is a significant player, with some fantastic genetic resources and much skill and experience. It was originally part of Cottco, and formerly the Cotton Marketing Board (see a couple of earlier papers I did with James Keeley on seeds and agricultural biotechnology regulation in Zimbabwe). The genetics it has were built through public investment in the Cotton Research Institute. Quton has been toying with GM cotton for years, but regulatory hurdles have prevented it from moving forward. This acquisition certainly positions it as a major player for a future GM-accepting Africa, despite the concerns.

However, this Indian (and indirectly, American) investment is one of few direct take-overs. The expansion of the Indian seed industry in Africa has been slow and rather tentative. Most activity is in East Africa where business connections across the Indian Ocean and linked to diaspora links has been the most intensive. This is why we focused our research in Kenya and Ethiopia, both of which have Indian seed sector links. We identified a series of mechanisms by which these are forged, ranging from direct seed sales, to local multiplication, to company alliances and mergers. None have really boomed as yet, and we were really looking at only first-stage commercial engagements.

What were the challenges faced? There were many. First is the international business context. India often cannot compete with the hyper efficient logistics operations of others. It may have low cost production in India, but it is not so effective at the trade element. Second, regulations around seed are complex, nationally-focused and often quite political. Some companies have got in trouble as objections to the testing of food grains for instance were made – not so much on scientific grounds, but on the basis of unclear risks to importing grains on national food security. Seed testing authorities do not have standard approaches, and each country is different. With markets being small and entry costs high, this is a challenge. Third, moving into a country, acquiring land for seed testing and multiplication and developing a new business is challenging. The whole debate about ‘land grabbing’ has heightened awareness around foreign investment. And when things go wrong – as has happened with the Indian investor Karuturi both in Ethiopia (over land grabbing claims) and in Kenya (over tax bills and labour disputes) – this has ripple effects that are difficult to control.

Currently, India is a relatively minor player in seed exports to Africa, with less than two percent of the trade, and ranking only 14th. Trade with Africa is growing in a variety of ways, and there are clearly useful skills and technologies that India can offer. But how this will be ‘pro poor’ and so support developmental trajectories is less clear. The ‘Green Revolution’ experience is often held up as the example that Africa must follow. But as the report notes

“The development of India’s own seed industry, as well as India’s Green Revolution, were largely directed and supported by public investments and policy frameworks. Even then, the benefits of India’s agricultural transformation were not evenly or equitably distributed…. If Africa is to enjoy an agricultural transformation that creates broad developmental benefits, then the public sector as well as civil society institutions will need to play crucial roles. It is therefore not only a question of what profit-seeking seed firms from India might accomplish in pursuit of their own commercial interests, but how improving access to modern agricultural technologies might create broad benefits for cultivators and consumers, and for rural and national development”.

There is much hype about ‘South-South’ cooperation and the role of ‘business in development’, but in a complex and often rather unprofitable sector like seeds for poor, smallholders, a more developmental strategy is needed that gears investment, regulation and wider support in ways that private goods (and profits) work for wider public gain. Holding on to public genetic resources and deploying public policy and expertise in support of the seed sector – agriculture more generally – in alliance with business (from whatever source) is, as explained in a now old paper with Shaila Seshia, the big, usually forgotten, lesson of the Asian ‘green revolution’.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

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‘Resource nationalism’: a risk to economic recovery?

 In a recent presentation, Southern Africa: Economic Prospects 2012, Professor Tony Hawkins from the University of Zimbabwe, offered some notes of caution about Zimbabwe’s economic recovery, despite the high growth rates being recorded recently.

 He argues that Zimbabwe is becoming “increasingly resource-reliant with the share of GDP of agriculture and mining together now virtually double that of manufacturing”. This structural change is illustrated in a table, contrasting the share of GDP and percentage of exports in 1990 and 2010-11.

SHARE   IN GDP 1990 2010
Mining 4% 9.1%
Agriculture 15% 13%
Manufacturing 22% 11.5%
EXPORT   SHARES 1990 2011
Primary 82% 94.5%
Manufactures 18% 5.5%
Exports:GDP 28% 50%

Exports he explained “now contribute half of GDP – up from 28% – while the share of primary exports is up 95% from 82%. This reflects the de-industrialization of the economy”. He continues: “…if Zimbabwe is to re-industrialize, firms will need to have very different business models from those of the past”. But, he says policymakers are fixated “on capacity utilization, strategic industries, import substitution, self-sufficiency and local ownership”. This, he says, is “more likely to accelerate de-industrialization than reverse it”.

This is overlain with what he calls a “toxic cocktail of resource nationalism and the resource curse”. He explains: “The two interact as politicians, desperate for revenue and votes, prioritize wealth exploitation over wealth creation. The resource curse is evident where policymakers use diamond revenues to finance current – not capital – spending”.  Policymakers, he says, “argue that Zimbabwe is not a poor country – its diamond, gold and platinum wealth could – and should – be used to repay our foreign debt, rather than seeking debt relief. This is a political – sovereignty – argument, not an economic one. Those who tout this argument believe not just that Zimbabwe can – and should – go it alone, but also that this is a means of escaping the governance and structural reforms implicit in HIPC debt relief.”

He argues: “Resource nationalism takes many forms ranging from higher mining taxes to indigenization and local ownership laws. Regardless of what form it takes resource nationalism fails unless its long-run focus is on wealth generation, not asset ownership and short-termist wealth exploitation”. Reflecting on the statistics, he comments: “Today the Zimbabwe economy is recovering – not growing – by consuming its wealth. The country has increased its reliance on resource-depletion growth, while failing to diversify production and exports and invest in the future”.

He concludes that policy needs to shift the focus

  • “From consumption to investment
  • From asset ownership and wealth consumption to wealth creation
  • From needs-based remuneration to productivity-based earnings
  • From reviving uncompetitive firms that have passed their sell-by date to start-ups and new entrants.
  • From near-term income growth, reliant on wealth depletion and consumption, to long-term growth sustainability based on investment and competitiveness”.

These are all certainly good aims, and the note of caution about how mineral and agricultural riches can be fragile, if not reinvested is important. But the commodity boom driving economic growth across Africa is not going to go away. Africa is resource rich, and the demand for these riches is growing, particular in Asia. The new geopolitics reflects this as China, India, the Middle East, Brazil and others seek out alliances in Africa in order to secure access to resources to fuel their own economic growth.

This new world order is what Hawkins calls the ‘new normal’. Rethinking the political economy of growth in the era of the commodity boom will require accommodating these new realities, but also guarding against the risks, making sure the new riches are broadly shared and appropriately invested, and keeping the new investors accountable  and avoid dependency in a new periphery.  This will be a major challenge for future economic policy, in Zimbabwe and beyond; one that will require some major rethinking.

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