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Getting agriculture moving: finance and credit

Getting the agricultural sector financed is a key challenge in Zimbabwe, and links concretely to land administration challenges discussed in previous blogs in this series. Making both places and people bankable is a priority, but responses have to be geared appropriately to different scales of farm operation (A2 and A1), as well as linking macro responses at the economy-wide level with regional, district and farm level responses. There are a number of dimensions to this context in Zimbabwe.

Political economy contexts

There are significant political dimensions to financing in Zimbabwe. Flows of finance and credit to the Zimbabwean economy have been heavily affected by the political relations between the Zimbabwean state and others over the last 17 years. The intermittent engagement with the International Finance Institutions due to outstanding debt arrears, and on-going restrictive measures around western donors working in ‘contested areas’, where compensation claims have not been settled, has influenced what amount and what types of finance are available. The Zimbabwe’s government’s own economic management decisions have often not helped either.

This macro-economic picture in Zimbabwe is dire – and has been for years. The formal economy went through an extreme collapse in the 2000s with the withdrawal of international finance, through a tentative recovery facilitated by currency stabilisation following 2009, and then a further crisis today, partly associated with the commodity price downturn, as well as economic mismanagement and corruption. The current cash crisis, a consequence of a combination of factors, and the strong regional demand for US dollars, has compounded things seriously, making business – including farming – very tough.

Furthermore, alternative finance from China and elsewhere has not been forthcoming. Acknowledging debts and liabilities generated by the land reform (see blog on compensation) is an essential precursor to moving forward; otherwise land reform areas will continue to be seen as high risk areas for financing. The current international re-engagements around fiscal management and other structural reforms, including the agreements around re-structuring the debt/arrears, offer opportunities if all sides of the bargain are kept. Addressing debt suggests a framework within which the compensation issue could be addressed.

Over the last 17 years there have also be indirect effects of the macro-economic situation on land investment. This is particular apparent as marketing and input supply intermediaries have been unable to get finance, as international risk ratings have remained high, and international loans for financing new operations have not been forthcoming. High interest rates, and so the high cost of money, have fed into this, resulting in illiquidity and a severe shortage of low risk cash for financing agriculture. The demand for financing in all sectors is so high that financiers prefer to lend into lower risk and high, immediate return areas (e.g. mining, and some retail operations, for example), with the result that there is little left over for financing agricultural investment. Re-engagement becomes critical to increase liquidity in the bank/finance sector, and so to shift interest rates and money supply.

A role for parastatals?

A particular feature of the macro-economic collapse has been the disappearance of a bond market. In the past the Agricultural Marketing Authority used to issue state guaranteed bonds that provided finance to the GMB, CSC, Cottco and other parastatals. The parastatals then took on an important role in market coordination and financing, including a variety of loan schemes for both small and large-scale farmers. Large-scale farmers, for example, were able to take out three month credit lines, with discounts on the volume of inputs procured. The Cold Storage Commission/Company used to finance local auctions and markets, and facilitate rural marketing. In the liberalisation era, parastatals went out of fashion, and their role declined. This was combined with a range of poor management and investment decisions, as well as growing corruption. The CSC focused efforts on the export market and large-scale beef production and invested in a series of costly white elephant abbatoirs. While Cottco was privatised, others such as Grain Marketing Board remained under public control, and became a key state agency for ‘command agriculture’ in the 2000s.

Today parastatals cannot raise meaningful funds on local bond markets, and certainly cannot rely on Treasury finance. Instead they must seek other partnership financing from the private sector. This is witnessed in the expansion of privately-run agribusiness operations on parastatal land, with over 20 new projects in train; some on a very large scale with significant capitalisation, and involving both local and foreign investors. This may help generate new forms of viable operation, but this removes parastatals from the wider social and market coordination role that used to be played, while the wider social benefits of such new investments have yet to be seen. A few banks (CBZ, Zimbank) and the AMA have raised limited money via agro-bill bonds, but the credit supplied remains on very high interest rate.

Contract farming

There are particular financing problems in agriculture, and these often vary according to the type of commodity. Even at the height of the economic crisis in the 2000s, export crops were able to take off, as external finance, often from China, India and other non-western countries, became available Thus the investment via Tian Ze (and China Tobacco, a State Owned Company) was vital for the growth of tobacco contracting in the early 2000s, including on land reform areas. This was facilitated by the Zimbabwean state, through foreign currency retention incentives, permits to purchase tobacco outside auctions, subsidised seed multiplication through the Tobacco Research Board, and significantly via the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, as new regulations were put in place that facilitated contracting arrangements. Investment in cotton contracting in smallholder areas, including A1 farms, continued from the successful take-off in the 1990s following liberalisation, with even more players entering the ginning and contracting buying market in the 2000s and following land reform, although cotton companies have faced major challenges through a combination of side-selling and the decline in international cotton prices in recent times.

These export cash crop operations were able to continue because of the appropriateness of the crop to smallholder conditions (unlike tea and coffee, for example), and the ability of companies to shift to contract farming arrangements and the ability to sell products in hard currency externally. This form of cash crop contracting has become a vital form of financing in land reform areas in general, with the tobacco boom being the most celebrated example. As the economy stabilised, other contractors/buyers (including western companies) have returned, but now in a much more competitive setting, and heavily constrained by the economic environment, not least the lack of cash.

Some crops that were formerly grown on contract on large-scale commercial farms were not so easily transformed under the post-land reform setting. Large-scale export horticulture/floriculture is a case in point, where in the past very high-tech, just-in-time operations were linked to supermarket/broker purchase in Europe, usually under stringent standards (as in GlobalGap), and these could not be replicated by new farm owners. The operations were equally tied into complex financing and insurance arrangements that the large buying companies (in Holland for example for flowers and vegetables) were unwilling to reinstate due to potential risks, and increased costs due to the withdrawal of direct air freight routes to Europe.

Today, however such value chains are being reinvented for the new situation, with new models for outgrowing, contract purchase and financing being defined through a variety of business arrangements. Thus for smaller farmers operating on contract and producing certain crops, financing via contract arrangements rather than direct loans from banks has become an important route to land investment – although as discussed in other blogs not without challenges. Many such farmers mix contracting with direct sales and self-financing, as the terms of contract financing are not always favourable.

However, this does not apply to all crops, and contract eligibility restricts access for some. In addition to tobacco and cotton, that are now well-established contract crops, there are some other crops where contracting is developing, usually associated with a particular buyer. This includes paprika, potatoes (for chips/restaurants), and barley and sometimes sorghum (for brewing). Some attempts have been made to finance maize production under contracts, but this has been limited, as millers have been able to source cheaper product from outside the country.

Contracting arrangements in livestock systems are less developed, but may involve the financing of livestock owners by abbatoir owners for example to fatten and deliver animals to particular outlets. This is more prevalent in poultry production, where ‘outgrowers’ are linked to the supply of day-old chicks, feed and veterinary supplies. However, while contract farming with small-scale producers has been important, it has also had problems, notably through side-selling and the assurance of contracts. This has undermined the business viability of some operations, requiring government regulation in contract markets.

Financing for small-scale farmers outside contracting is highly restricted. Few small, $1000 dollar loan options are available. There are some examples of collective arrangements for raising funds and savings, including credits cooperatives and savings clubs, and some of these are supported by NGOs and churches in communal areas, but they have had little impact in the resettlement areas. Asset loans, such as chickens, may not hit the mark. Since the group lending approaches of the 1980s, there has been little experimentation with credit, and the collapse of such schemes through the demise of the Agricultural Finance Corporation in the late 1980s. The failure post structural adjustment in the 1990s to replace this system means that there is remarkably little accumulated experience of small-scale credit arrangements in Zimbabwe, in contrast to other countries in the region, and certainly Asia.

Partnership finance: joint ventures

Partnership based finance through joint ventures is another route through which funds can be raised. A joint venture is distinct from a share-cropping arrangement and is permitted under proposed new legislation. This includes where external financiers and former farmers who go into business with larger farmers, and the farm operation becomes a joint venture company. This is occurring in production, as well as processing and marketing, and is an important route to refinancing, where risks are spread as part of the joint venture agreement.

Joint ventures and partnership finance is increasingly seen as a route for rehabilitating and investing in state farms. A number of examples exist, including the now famous Chisumbanje sugar mill and plantation on an ARDA estate. Indeed around half of ARDA farms are now run with a private sector partners, and similarly investors into CSC farms are unfolding, reminiscent of the notable DMB operations (financed through CDC) during the 1980s. This may in time be linked to outgrower arrangements (as envisaged for Chisumbanje) as a core estate operation is developed through external finance, but remains under state control. With the lack of financing for parastatals (see above), these partnership arrangements have become vital for parastatal operations of many sorts.

Bank finance

For larger scale farmers, joint ventures and contracting however may not be the route they want to follow, and financing has been a major constraint, especially since 2000. Surveys show repeatedly that many A2 farms are undercapitalised with low levels of production, and sometimes significant land underutilisation. This has been a direct consequences of the macro-economic situation feeding through to financing options, despite various government schemes to support loans for farm equipment etc. Some are able to fund farm operations from other work (for example A2 farmers who have jobs as civil servants or in businesses) or through remittances (particularly from abroad), as well as through vertical integration of business (linking an A2 farm with abbatoirs, supermarkets and so on).

However such financing is relatively small, and not sufficient for major take-off especially in farm operations that require rehabilitation and recapitalisation. Significant but quite inadequate and irregular amounts of credit for irrigation equipment and farm mechanisation have been raised through lower cost external tied loans (e.g. US$98 million from Brazil through the More Food International programme, based on low interest payment over 15 years) using Agribank as one key conduit.

For most A2 farmers, bank finance is essential. This has been largely unavailable. It has also been restricted by the delayed issuance of leases, and their wording. Although land can be mortgaged, the phrasing of the first version of the lease contract presented the lease as state property that could not be sold or sub-let. It is therefore not clear how the land could be foreclosed to recover unpaid loans, and this undermined transaction possibilities for lenders. Procedures for bringing in an alternative lessee were also not clear. As many have argued, a revision of the lease wording is a crucial policy revision to balance the ability for the lease to form collateral in loan arrangements with banks, while allowing the state regulatory oversight to address its fears of the re-concentration of landholdings. The balance in safeguarding the security of loans and investment has been achieved in many other leasehold based property systems, although these experiences do not seek to regulate land concentration.

Zimbabwe could replicate the tested lease regulations that safeguard bank mortgage finance, and find innovative but competitive ways of auctioning foreclosed lands in a way that safeguards against multiple farm ownership. Moreover, the state is ultimately the guarantor as owner of the land, and can take back the land and compensate for improvements (paying any debts in the process), but this procedure would have to be specified. With this finance institutions, assuming improved liquidity, will be able to enter the land/agriculture financing market with lowered risk. There are a diversity of views on such proposals within the banking sector. Facilitating an effective discussion with government on rural financing is a high priority, given the banking sector’s potentially important contribution to agricultural and rural development.

For all farmers, there are of course forms of collateral beyond land. New approaches to financing has been encouraged through the Moveable Property Security Interest Bill. While ridiculed in the international press as banks accepting cows or goats as payment, it makes a lot of sense. But many banks have often reacted in a typically conservative fashion, basing assumptions on past practice rather than wider experience of a more flexible approach to collateral. Again the obsession with freehold title discussed in last week’s blog rears its ugly head. In terms of alternative collateral systems, mortgageable properties may be important as can moveable assets such as farm equipment, vehicles and livestock as specified in the Bill. Mortgages can be issued with hire purchase arrangements embedded – for example for the purchase of equipment – and warehoused commodities can be offered as commodity-based collateral, for example. As international experience shows (see below), private banks and finance houses can make use of rather more diverse ways of gaining security around loans than is currently being offered.

 Agricultural financing for land investment: a complex challenge

In many respects the often obsessive focus on land as collateral in the Zimbabwe debate is only a small part of a bigger and more complex story of agricultural financing for land investment, one that has barely been explored in post-land reform setting. The largest amount of funding for land reform farmers comes from contracting, with an increasing array of joint ventures emerging on A2 farms. As discussed last week, all of this must be seen in the context of wider, incomplete efforts at macro-economic reform and support for the revitalisation of the economy. Restrictions on financial flows, resulting in liquidity problems, high interests, the collapse of bond markets, and lack of international finance opportunities, as well as the flow of credit and finance away from agriculture, have severely restricted agricultural recovery. Resolving land issues – including accepting liabilities for compensation, revising lease terms, and developing regulatory frameworks for financing – is a core part of the macro-economic agenda, and central to finding a way forward for Zimbabwe.

This post was prepared by Ian Scoones and appeared on Zimbabweland.  It is part of an occasional Zimbabweland blog series on priorities for the new Zimbabwe Land Commission.



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Access to $1000 credit: would this help unleash agricultural commercialisation in Zimbabwe?

One of the repeated complaints of farmers on the new resettlements is the lack of access to finance. This is holding back commercialisation, particularly for A2 farmers with bigger plots but also for those on A1 farms eager to expand, intensify or diversify. All of this needs money, and it is in short supply.

In our studies of farmers’ fortunes in Masvingo, and more recently in the tobacco growing areas of Mazowe, as part of the Space, Markets, Employment and Agricultural Development project, we identify three standard pathways of agricultural commercialisation, each associated with different sources of finance. All are limiting, and available only to a few, or relate only to particular commodities.

The first route is through regular accumulation, investment and saving. This is tough, given all the other demands on funds, and requires real tenacity. Each year profits have to be sunk back into the farm, and new equipment purchased. This is a route we see in the vegetable farmers of Masvingo who by making use of water resources, investing initially in a small pump, have expanded their production and marketing significantly, and after a few years are able to upgrade, with new irrigation equipment, the purchase of pick-up trucks and so on. The regularity and reliability of income from horticulture (if the water is available and the pests can be kept at bay) helps drive this pathway to commercialisation. Some farmers have been very successful, now with turnovers of tens of thousands of dollars, employing large numbers of people and with transport businesses on the side. And all from an initial outlay of a few hundred dollars.

The second route is investment from external income sources. Getting going in farming is often the hardest part, like many businesses. Basic up-front investment is necessary. For A2 farmers with quite large plots – up to 100 or 200 ha – making productive use of this land really requires substantial capital investment. Most such farms were formerly ranches in our study areas in Masvingo, and had limited infrastructure. Those farmers that inherited dams and irrigation equipment were lucky, but most did not. A2 farmers tended to have jobs in town, or at least good connections. These were crucial in getting going. But in the economic crisis period, standard government jobs were not enough to live on let alone provide additional income for investing in farming. Those who were able to get going usually had NGO jobs paying on foreign exchange, or had connections overseas. This diaspora and employment money was recycled and invested in farms. Such farmers, unlike their neighbours, were able to rebuild or rehabilitate irrigation schemes, build dairies and farm sheds, as well as purchasing transport – the ubiquitous 1 tonne truck – to facilitate marketing.

The third route we have identified is of course via contract farming. This is important for crops such as tobacco, but also cotton, and through a different arrangement, sugar. This means the farmer does not have to pay for inputs up front, and the contracting company will supply seed, fertiliser, pesticides and other inputs and also take care of the marketing. Increasingly cash-strapped farmers are hooking up with contractors for other crops, including maize. I have been amazed how many readers of this blog get in touch, and ask to be put in touch with a contractor for selling their crop. There is clearly a massive demand for this intermediary function, where those with cash and capital can invest in farming without taking on the burden of actually owning or holding land or producing. Former white farmers are heavily involved, as well as the new black business elite, alongside the standard cotton and tobacco companies, and of course the estates. The terms of the contract may be one-sided, with the risk pushed towards the producer, as discussed in earlier blogs, but contract farming does release cash, in the absence of any other source.

It is this absence of any other source of finance that is striking across our case studies. Rural financial institutions simply are unable to respond. Some say this is due to the lack of collateral due to the land tenure system, but this is red herring in my view, given the possibility of loaning with all sorts of other security beyond freehold tenure. Surely the new farmers who are desperate for finance would open up commercial possibilities for banks and other finance providers. But the financial sector is very conservative in Zimbabwe, being used to a very different structure of agriculture and form of finance. They do not know their new client base and have few incentives to offer new financial products.

Rural finance in Zimbabwe thus has a massive missing middle ground – between the miniscule forms of finance offered by savings clubs and rotating loans schemes promoted by church groups and NGOs and the large lumpy finance offered through the conventional routes. While there have been some state-backed attempts at improving the situation, they have often foundered due to complex bureaucracy, absurd conditions and lack of outreach. The type of finance offered by banks is largely irrelevant to most new farmers (see Tables 4 and 7 in this Finmark report from 2012)

While I have little knowledge the type of business models that would work, my bet is that a company, perhaps initially supported by a development organisation, that could offer a US$1000 loan on flexible terms would have massive uptake and success. This is the sort of amount that is needed, sufficient to buy a decent pump and irrigation kit, sufficient for a down-payment on a second-hand pick up, sufficient to get going on a commercial chicken project, sufficient to buy a beast or two, or some basic farm equipment. This would make all the difference (and there are now some examples supported by USAID and others). It is standard in Asia for example, so why not in Zimbabwe?

While the three pathways to commercialisation noted above are great if your crop is contracted, if you have close ties to someone with a well-paid job, or if you farm a commodity that gives quick, reliable returns, and you can manage to save. But this is not everyone, or every type of agriculture. Today commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe is being held back, and rural finance is probably the biggest blockage.

 This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland



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Growth in jeopardy? Reflections on Zimbabwe’s 2013 budget statement

Minister of Finance Tendai Biti recently presented the 2013 budget. It was, in his words, the most difficult yet. He revised growth projections downwards to only 4.4%, because of continued depression in the global economy and uncertainty about Zimbabwe’s economic and political prospects.

But there were some bright spots. The minister has presided over a remarkable period of recovery. Some basic graphs in his budget statement illustrate the point (copied below). Zimbabwe has grown faster than any other country in the region, and mining and agriculture have been the greatest contributors to growth. By 2010 mining contributed a massive 18% to overall economic output as measured by formal GDP indicators, and nearly 50% of export revenue.



Growth in agriculture was stronger than expected in 2012, as both tobacco and cotton performed better than projections. Maize was however heavily affected by drought. The treasury expects a continued pattern of growth in the sector, around 5-6%.

But the success of agriculture has been overshadowed by the growth of mining, with annual growth rates of around 30%. Exports increased by a massive 230% in the period from 2009-2011. By the end of 2011, mineral exports accounted for 47% of total exports, made up of platinum (43%), gold (28%), and diamonds (20%) in particular.  Furthermore, the average share of mining to GDP has grown from an average of 10.2% in the 1990s to an average of 16.9% from 2009–2011 overtaking agriculture. Diamond output is expected to increase to 16.9 million carats in 2013, largely driven by enhanced production from the major diamond mining houses at Marange Diamond Fields. Platinum output is expected to rebound to 11.5 tons in 2013.

However, while growth has occurred at impressive levels since dollarization in 2009, it has not continued at such rates. Zimbabwe’s seemingly miraculous recovery from the dire doldrums of the late 2000s may have stalled, a concern raised in the budget. With continued investment uncertainty, and the prospects of yet more disruption during and following elections, question marks are raised about the robustness of the economy. While minerals and agriculture can continue to underpin some growth, the levels required for recovery to earlier levels are still not being achieved.

How can the economy be revived for the longer term? This will require investment, including by the state. The 2013 budget offered US$3.8bn in government expenditure. But this is a pathetically small amount in relation to needs, and much of it already accounted for in terms of salary obligations. Government taxation and revenue collection is improving, but the economic base remains small. Tendai Biti is in a bind. He is right when he says there is no more cash – not even to finance an election, let alone forge a recovery.

Next week, I will look at some future scenarios, making the case for a greater focus on agriculture, and avoiding an overly strong reliance on minerals, despite their allure.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland



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The golden leaf: boom time in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s tobacco industry is booming once again. From the low point in 2008, at the peak of hyperinflation, when only 48m kg was sold, optimistic estimates for 2012 suggest that around 150m kg will be sold, with prices early in the selling season around 30% higher than last year. Production levels are not back to the peak level in 2000 of 236m kg, but the trend is ever upwards, with sales rising from 65m to 123m to 132m kg between 2009 and 2011. In 2011, the sales generated around US$360m, helping to fuel the dramatic 34% growth in the agricultural sector in the past year. With the season not yet concluded over US$440m has been sold in 2012.

Once the almost exclusive preserve of around 3000 large-scale white farmers, tobacco is now being produced and sold by around 60000 black farmers from the new A1 and A2 resettlement areas. With average sales of around 10 bales per farmer, this will result in an income of around US$5000 – no mean sum in Zimbabwean terms. And of course tobacco creates employment along the value chain, as well as tax revenues.

This is one of the really unexpected success stories of the land reform. While many accepted that small-scale A1 farmers with larger areas of land could engage in successful staple production and ‘accumulate from below’, as we described across our sample areas in Masvingo, for new farmers to participate so successfully in the high value export industry of tobacco farming was seen as unlikely. Most had written off the industry, expecting it to atrophy and die.

But contrary to expectations, the tobacco industry has been transformed, from the farms to the auction floors. A whole new set of people are involved. It is not only the farmers who have changed, but also the labourers, the buyers and the financiers. Women are increasingly involved, particularly in the processing, sorting and auction-floor activities. White farmers are still involved too in the high quality/high cost end of the industry, in a few farms remaining under their control, but also in lease arrangements with A2 farmers, who needed the skills and expertise for the production of top quality flue cured Virginia.

New contracting arrangements have emerged to support smaller scale farmers grow tobacco. Contracting reputedly resulted in the production of 34m kg in 2011, out of the total of 132m. Some major new entrants have emerged in the market, notably those with Chinese connections. Tianze, for example, has around 250 growers linked to it. Overall there are around 13 contract companies operating, as well as multiple smaller scale leasing and other arrangements.

It is this financing aspect that has been critical for the dramatic growth of the small-scale sector. This has allowed farmers to invest in inputs, and the rate of refusal has declined, and overall quality has increased. Chinese contract companies, loan facilities and other forms of finance have transformed the system. More traditional players, from the western based companies and other commercial lenders, are now re-engaging knowing that there is money to be made.

There are downsides of the tobacco economy, of course. Curing is largely carried out using local fuelwood sources, and the impact on forests and woodland resources has been high. A more sustainable source of fuel will clearly be necessary. Equally, the high labour demands have resulted in accusations of child labour on the farms, flouting labour laws and undermining child rights. These of course were core issues when white farms took on tobacco as a core crop some decades ago, and will hopefully only be transitional challenges.

For the longer term, the tobacco story in the last five years has some important lessons for the wider agrarian transition. While tobacco is not a crop appropriate everywhere (and is not significant in our study areas in Masvingo, for instance), there are some more generic insights worth noting. First, A2 farmers, who have really struggled elsewhere including in Masvingo with poor production due to low capitalisation and investment, can make it under the right circumstances. Second, markets are key, but so is support to engage in markets. It is not just price levels, demand and supply, but up-front investment, skill development and knowledge building about quality control and market niches. Third, finance is vital; and that’s where Chinese finance and contracting arrangements become critical. Fourth, there are definitely roles for white farmers with skills and capacities in a particular commodity area, but probably involving engagement in different ways, at the high end of the market.

Hopefully the lessons from the tobacco transition can be applied to other aspects of the agricultural economy, leveraging finance, expertise and market access for the benefits of a larger group of people than the previously narrow, privileged large-farm sector.


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